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Abstract
This thesis is composed by three chapter. The first chapter is a survey of the
literature on the selection and the economic impact of migration in the destination
countries. The first part provides a review of the theoretical literature on the determi-
nants and the selectivity of migration by focusing on how immigrants self select with
respect to unobservable or observable characteristics. The second part presents the
literature on the impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives by
taking into account the main theoretical models and discussing the challenges of the
empirical evidences. Chapter 2 reviews the admission policies within the European
Union (EU). In recent year, the EU has tried to harmonize the selection policies by
promoting immigration of highly skilled people in order to compensate labor short-
ages in the face of a growing global competition. However, Member States appear
to be reluctant to adopt common rules on admission of third country nationals. In
recent years skill-selective immigration policies have been implemented in several de-
veloped countries. However, little evidence exists to date documenting their impact
on the local labor markets. Chapter 3 aims to address this gap by focusing on a
reform introduced in the UK in 2011 to re-orient economic migration towards skills
that are the most in need of the economy. This analysis takes advantage of a ’natural’
experiment in the UK by investigating how tightness in a selective policy affects the
selectivity and the quality of immigrants and the effects on real shortages in the labor
market. This challenge is possible under a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis and
a triple-difference estimation, which estimates the impact of a policy interpreted as
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INTRODUCTION
International migrations considered as a structure of global inequality that involves
persons when migrate, but also when persons might migrate or have migrants in their
household (Weiß, 2018).
Millions of international migrants move each year across the world, seeking to re-
duce the gap between their own position and that of people in other, wealthier places
in terms of wages, labor market opportunities, or lifestyles. Economic literature
shows that immigration rate depends on international differences in the returns to
factor supply, net of migration costs, skill levels, income inequality, and immigration
policies. International migration of high-skilled individuals has risen dramatically in
recent decades due to the rise in the demand for tertiary education. Between 2000/01
and 2015/16, the share of migrants with a high level of education rose from 27% to
35% for those born outside of the OECD, and from 21% to 30% for those born in an
OECD country (OECD, 2019). Typically, migrants are perceived as ’highly skilled’
when they have at least tertiary education, although other definitions are possible,
notably on the basis of the nature of the occupation in which they are employed. The
economic literature usually defines ’highly skilled migrants’ on the basis of wages paid,
consisting of persons earning above a threshold value (Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009).
Labor migration policies differer in the ways in which they try to attract workers.
In particular, countries use two main ways of recruiting highly skilled workers from
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abroad. One is supply-led systems, like points-based systems, which aim to increase
the skill composition of international labor flows by selecting them on the basis of
certain characteristics, like for instance age, educational attainment, language pro-
ficiency and occupation. A number of countries have labor immigration policies for
admitting highly skilled migrant workers that are, in part, based on a human capital
model. Instead, demand-driven systems are usually based on the principle of job
contingency and are often supplemented by a labor market test or on shortage lists
assessments of labor market needs. The argument that there is a ‘need’ for migrants’
skills is related to the aim of using migrant workers to reduce perceived specific labor
and/or skills shortages. Most OECD countries are experiencing a growing shortage
of highly-skilled labor and immigration is viewed as one way of addressing these. For
this reason, most OECD countries have introduced policies aimed at facilitating the
recruitment of such workers. Shortages and skills are hard to define and measure
concepts. The European Commission (2004) states that labor shortages occur where
the demand for workers in a particular occupation exceeds the supply of workers who
are qualified, available, and willing to do that job (Boswell, Stiller, and Straubhaar,
2004). While, the common definition of shortage typically includes employers’ diffi-
culties in finding workers to fill vacancies at current wage and employment conditions.
In this respect, employers’ calls for migrants to help fill vacancies is that the demand
for labor exceeds supply at the prevailing wages and employment conditions. Ac-
cording to the literature on labor economics, market economies include self-clearing
mechanisms, such as the changes in wages and prices to bring supply and demand
into equilibrium. If the request for labor exceeds the supply, as the term ‘shortage’
suggests, wages should rise, putting in motion forces that reduce the demand for labor
via automation, job restructuring, or other adjustments, and increase the supply of
workers (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010).
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This thesis begins with a survey of the economic literature on immigration by
looking at immigrants selection and socio-economic performance in the host labor
markets. The first part of Chapter 1 examines why people become immigrants and
whether immigrants are positively or negatively selected relative to the receiving
country population. Migration theories focus on how income and wage levels and, to
a lesser extent, income inequalities affect migration flows. In the models on migration
decision, people’s decision to migrate depends on their income in the origin and in
the destination countries. One of the canonical assumptions of the neoclassical model
is that people are utility maximizers. This means that people move if their income
will be higher in the destination country, net of migration costs. Economists use
the "utility-or income maximization model" at micro level and the "gravity model"
at macro level to estimate the determinants of immigration by using micro-data in
the first case and aggregate data in the second case. The literature that uses the
individual-level data observes an individual in just one among the possible locations
by using predicted incomes as determinants of the internal migration decision. At the
macro-level, theory explains migration by geographical differences in the supply and
demand for labor. Recent contributions make use of the Random Utility Maximisa-
tion (RUM) framework to model the individual migration decision by using bilateral
data for the analysis of international migration. In this model, individuals base their
decision to migrate in order to maximize their utility across all potential destinations.
In economic models of the migration decision, cross-country differences in economic
conditions play a central role in determine whether people move, predicting that
changes in relative economic conditions lead to changes in migration flows. In this
respect, the Hicks-Sjaastad model emphasizes the fact that mean income levels differ
across regions, and these income differentials, net of migration costs, lead to unidirec-
tional migration flows. Sjaastad (1962) pioneered the application of human capital
11
theory in order to understand migration. According to the human capital model,
migration is the act of maximize utility by choosing the destination that offers the
highest return to the skill. The most influential model on skill selection in immigra-
tion was elaborated by George (Borjas, 1987) based on a canonical model by Roy
(1951). His application (1987, 1991), shows that international migration is not only
influenced by net earnings differences between countries, but also by factors such as
international differences in income inequality and the degree of skills transferability.
According to this model, less-skilled people are better off in countries with a lower
return to skill and less income inequality while more-skilled people are better off in
countries with a higher return to skill and more income inequality. Although this
framework has become a canonical model of selection in the literature on migration
economics, the evidence of the existing cross-country studies is mixed. Assessing the
overall net gain or loss to the economy from immigration is a challenging task both
from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. The study of how immigration
affects labor market in the destination countries is central in the economics of migra-
tion. The impact of immigrants on the destination economy is hotly debated among
academics, especially concerning the impact of low-skilled immigrants on wages. Most
recently, this debated has focused on the effect of an unexpected surge in Cuban mi-
grants (so-called Mariel boatlift) to Miami in 1980. In 1980, Cuba’s President, Fidel
Castro, temporarily allowed people to leave to the US. This migration flow increased
Miami labor force by 7%, and the labor supply to less-skilled occupations by even
more, because most of the immigrants were mostly unskilled. In 1990, Card in the
seminal work exploiting an exogenous supply shock concluded that the Mariel influx
had virtually no effect on the wages or unemployment rates of less-skilled workers.
However, in a revisited analysis, Borjas (2015) found that the increase in the number
of the potential workers lowered the wages on high-school dropouts, namely of those
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workers who faced the most competition from the new immigrants. Nevertheless, the
debate is much broader (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012;
Borjas, 2015; Peri and Yasenov, 2015, for a reassessment of Card’s (1990) "Mariel
boatlift" article). Most researches find that immigrants have negative effects at least
on some workers, as the economic theory typically predicts when immigration change
the balance of skill in the destination countries. These contrasting findings depend
mostly on two factors. The first concerns the definition of skilled/unskilled workers.
Some researchers consider both high-school and dropouts together (see Card, 1990).
While, Borjas’s paper measured wages of two slices of that larger group, namely: (i)
people who never finished high school, and (ii) people who finished high school but
went no further. The second factor concerns whether migrants and natives are sub-
stitutes or complements for each other (see Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). If immigrants
are substitutable for natives, foreign-born workers can replace native-born workers.
In this case, employment of natives fall, and wages fall. If immigrants and natives are
complements in production, an increase in the number of immigrants could increase
natives’ employment and wages. In this case, immigration can benefit natives who
are complements to immigrants in the production process. The second part of the
Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive overview of both economic theory and empirical
evidence on the socio-economic impact of migration. Using the neoclassical model,
this part focuses first on theoretical prediction and key assumptions in labor demand
and supply that determines whether immigrants have a positive or a negative effects
in the destination countries. Basic neoclassical model predicts that immigration have
a negative effect on substitutable native workers, because it put downward pressure on
wage and employment in the short run. Instead, immigration improves labor market
outcomes for native-born who are complements to immigrants. However, the effect
of immigration on labor market outcomes is more complex and theoretical models
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often predict different results under different assumptions. Last part of the chapter
explores the question on how immigration affects natives’ wages and employment
through the main methodologies that economists use to estimate the labor market
effects of immigrations, namely: spatial correlation, natural experiments, skill cells
and factor proportion models. These studies reach different empirical evidence on
the wage effect of the native-born workers. Typically, analysis bases on the spatial
correlation and natural experiments approaches tend to find smaller, if any, negative
effects on labor market outcomes of native workers. Instead, studies that use the
skill cells or factor proportion models usually find more evidence of adverse effects,
although with some exceptions.
As the skill content of migration could change the degree of substitutability/
complementarities with natives, it is a crucial point in determining the effect of im-
migration on income in destination countries. This is probably the reason why gov-
ernments are recently looking at skill selective immigration policy setting. In fact,
because the labor-market quality is of increasing concern to the governments of devel-
oped countries, it is important to know the determinants of the educational selectivity
of immigration. The regulation of labor immigration is one of the most controversial
public policy issues in high-income countries. European countries have been con-
fronted for many years to the task of balancing the need for a qualified young labor
force and the fear that large inflows of workers may create unemployment, lower wages
and generally increase the competition for natives. Furthermore, as global migration
has increased, so even the public concern about immigration. One of the roots of
this fear consists of the speed at which immigration has grown, causing insecurities
about social and cultural change. One of the main concerns regards the potential
assimilation and integration process in societies and in their labor markets. For this
reason, several member states have developed their legal framework in the attempt
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to move from a situation of endured immigration towards a system of selective immi-
gration. In fact, in Europe, both EU-wide and nation-wide legislations influence the
entry and residence conditions for migrants (Burmann, Perez, Hoffmann, Rhode, and
Schworm, 2018). While these measures are widely discussed in the policy arena, there
is still a lack of rigorous evidence on their effectiveness. Chapter 2 aims to review the
regulation at the EU level concerned the development of skill-selective policy. The
immigration policies at the EU level have been traditionally characterized by a dual-
ism. While internal labor mobility is subjected to the EU jurisdiction as it has one
the main principle of the EU common market, the immigration from third-countries
is a matter of each Member State policies. The EU has tried to harmonize migration
policy, by promoting the immigration of highly skilled people in order to compensate
the labor shortages in the face of a growing global competition. For this reason, the
EU has undertaken several initiative in order to compensate the labor shortages in the
face of a growing global competition and of a race to attract talents. One of the most
influential was the so-called “EU Blue Card Initiative” introduced in 2009, with the
aim to offset skill shortages and to address the problem of demographic aging. The
EU Blue Card is an EU-wide work permit for highly qualified employment, aimed at
making EU a desirable destination for skilled workers from third countries. The EU
Blue Card was implemented by 25 EU member states, apart from Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom. It is designed to be demand-oriented, such that immigra-
tion follows the needs of the labor market. Restrictive admission conditions and the
existence of parallel rules, conditions and procedures at national level have limited
the use of the EU Blue Card scheme. Recently, the EU has made several efforts to
create a more favorable framework for workers mobility, including negotiations for the
revision of the EU Blue Card Directive. Although the competencies of the EU in the
area of immigration policies have increased, the decisions on the actual selectivity of
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immigration continue to be a domain of national governments. During the last years,
a policy shift has occurred both at EU level and at that of its Member States. At
the EU level, several action plans are attempts to attract highly skilled immigrants
and to facilitate the mobility of third-country nationals once thy have been admitted
to an EU Member State. Nevertheless, the scope of this efforts is limited, because
the immigration policies continue to remain by and large in the national domain.
Moreover, in a climate of increased global competition, most countries have adopted
measures aimed at attracting highly skill individuals. The last part of the chapter
looks at the development of selective-policies in the UK and in Germany. These policy
initiatives raise some fundamental policy and economic questions. A central question
in labor immigration policy is how to link the admission of new migrant workers to
the ‘needs’ of the domestic labor market and the economy more generally.
Skill-selective migration policy is the target of the empirical analysis of this thesis.
Currently, the traditional way of regulating labor migration in the UK is to require
employers to sponsor workers if they want to hire a non-EU citizen. The Government’s
idea to link migration policies more explicitly to the UK’s skills needs to prompt it to
carry out a fundamental rethink of the rules around the selection of immigrants. In
2008, this idea led the UK to adopt a Points Based System for managing migration,
with Tier 2 as the main route for selecting skilled non-EEA nationals into the country
for work. The objective of the Labour government was to prioritize the selection of
the most highly skilled and best-paid migrants through the PBS. Instead, the New
coalition government came in power in 2010 based its immigration policies around
the reduction of the net immigration ”from the hundreds of thousands to the tens
of thousands” (Conservative Party, 2010). The new system identified those migrants
which the UK needs, ensuring they have the necessary English-language ability and
can support themselves when they first arrived. In this way, the UK government gave
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more emphasis on the concepts of ’skill needs’ and ’skill shortages’. Since April 2011,
in fact, the UK Government has developed an educational selectivity system, which
looks at the labor-market quality of immigrants. In this respect, the government uses
immigration as a tool to address labor shortages, through the shortage occupation
list, which identifies occupations where there is an understanding both that a shortage
exists and that this shortage should be addressed through labor immigration. Third
chapter tests whether the policy was successful in meeting its declared goals, and
has checked if this mechanism is working on the basis of this professional priority.
This challenge is possible under a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis and a triple-
difference estimation, which in this case estimates the impact of a policy interpreted
as an exogenous shock made by the Government in the selection of people in the
labor market. Such institutional changes have influenced access to some categories of
works (treated) and not others (control) by observing both groups before and after
the event of interest. The first causal identification regards the effect of a policy
change on the average wages for the period between 2009 and 2013. Moreover, the
second part of the analysis exploits the effect of Brexit Referendum in the UK labor
market by considering the same occupational categories. Although Brexit has not
still happened, the referendum can be already considered as a natural experiment.
However, this analysis would find an "identifying" effect to test if the result of the
referendum has already had an impact on the UK labor market. The contribution
of this analysis mostly relies on a source of data that allows to exploit variations in
high-skilled and especially in labor shortages at the occupation level conditioned on
information on CoS granted as well as on minimum salary thresholds. To the best of
my knowledge, this analysis represents the first exercise that exploits the exogenous
reform in 2011 intending to understand the impact of an institutional change at a
national level. In this setting, this implies to quantify how a policy change in the VISA
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selection affects the group of shortage occupations compared with the differences in
the other Tier 2 occupations before and after the 2011 Reform.
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Chapter 1




Destination countries are concerned about the composition and scale of migration
flows as they contribute to shape both the overall economic impact of immigration
and its distributional consequences. Immigration literature has broadly discussed
about the mechanisms involved in immigrant selection. The debate has been fu-
eled by concerns about the characteristics and the socio-economic performance of
immigrants in the local labor markets. The general finding is that if the skills of
immigrants are higher, then their earnings and employment probabilities are higher,
and therefore their net fiscal contribution is more positive. This chapter aims to
survey the literature on the impact of migration in the destination countries. An
account of what economic theory would predict when immigration occurs is provided
by explaining the selection models of immigration that look at immigrants’ character-
istics. The key questions on migration concerns its benefits and costs for the receiving
economies. Fears that migration may, at least in the short run, have adverse effects
on labor market opportunities of the resident working population are a main reason
for opposition to more liberal migration policies. Research mostly focuses on the
labor market effect of immigration and the main conclusion is that immigration has
no effect or at least a small negative effect. The second part of this chapter reviews
both the theoretical models and the empirical findings that focus on the mechanisms
by which immigration may affect labor market outcomes of the native resident work
force in the destination countries.
1.1 Introduction
The theoretical and the empirical study of immigration has a long history in economic
theory. Starting from the writings of Smith (1776) and the income-maximizing mod-
20
els provided by Hicks (1932) and Sjaastad (1962), early empirical research focused
on explaining the size and the direction of migration flows, as well as on determin-
ing why certain groups of individuals are more likely to migrate than others. Then,
later works have emphasized the role of the family in migration decisions, the role of
consumption and various non economic factors. However, the fundamental premise
of most studies is that migration is driven by spatial differences in the net returns
to factor supply and it is a response to labor market disequilibrium (Bodvarsson,
Simpson, and Sparber, 2015). An important step in the development of migration
theory stemmed from Sjaastad (1962) who articulated a theory of migration as a form
of human capital investment. Sjaastad’s theory has become the suitable model for
explaining both internal and international migration. The most influential analysis
in this respect was provided by Borjas (1987, 1991, 1999, 2014), which embedding
the Hicks-Sjaastad income-maximizing approach within the Roy’s self-selection model
providing some important new insights. In fact, Borjas (1987) applied the Sjaastad’s
model to argue that migration is not only influenced by net earning differences be-
tween countries, but also by factors like international differences in income inequality
and the degree of skills transferability. Starting from Borjas (1987), there has been a
great deal of interest in models that predict how migrants differ from non-migrants.
Many of these studies rely on applications of the Roy model of occupational self-
selection. In this respect, since the skills are sufficiently transferable across countries,
the sorting of people is mainly determined by international differences in the rate of
return to skills (Poutvaara, Borjas, and Kauppinen, 2015). Most of the literature on
the impact of international migration on destination countries usually assumes that
migration is exogenous, such as the flow of migrants across regions is fixed. However,
more recently, some models are considering migration as endogenous in order to fully
account for both the determinants and the consequences of migration. In this way,
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some theoretical models are incorporating the decisions to migrate, the duration of
migration and the return migration as well as factors like the role of migration costs,
immigration policy, income inequality, network and family ties, political institution
and trade (Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 2015). The question of why people
migrate has been central to migration research for many decades. The complexity of
the phenomenon has been approached through different analytical approaches, pro-
viding evidence both at micro-level by exploring the migration decision-making by
individuals and at macro level by analyzing the drivers of international migration
flows between countries. The first part of this chapter provides a review of the theo-
retical literature on the determinants and the selectivity of migration. In particular,
it deals with the literature that has tried to answer to “why people migrate” and “who
immigrates”. It takes into consideration the theoretical literature on the economic
determinants of international migration which stemmed from the much older theory
of internal migration. The standard models imply that immigration rate depends on
the international differences in the returns to factor supply, net of migration costs,
skill levels, income inequality, and immigration policies. In particular, considering
the cross-country differences in economic conditions, utility-or-income maximization
model at micro level and the gravity model at macro level predict that changes in
relative economic conditions lead to changes in migration flows determining whether
people move. The economic incentives that influence immigration can be grouped
in four categories: (i) negative incentives that push people to emigrate, (ii) positive
incentives that pull immigrants to the destination country, (iii) positive incentives
that induce people to stay at home, and (iv) negative incentives that cause people
to stay away from a foreign country. If the factors related to the stay and stay away
are stronger than the push and the pull factors, immigration is unlikely to occur on
a large scale. On the contrary, when the push and pull factors are stronger than the
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stay and stay away factors, immigration will increase (Van den Berg and Bodvarsson,
2009). In addition, this review takes into account the recent theoretical and empir-
ical works that examine how immigrants self select with respect to unobservable or
observable characteristics, focusing on how changes in relative economic conditions
affect the composition and the characteristics of immigrants. A central finding in the
economic literature on international migration is that immigrants are not randomly
selected from the population of origin country and the nature of non-random selection
affects the level and the distribution of welfare through the wage structure in both
sending and receiving countries (Borjas, 2003). Specifically, the chapter examines
how immigrants self-select in response to international differences in returns to skill
and education, taking into account the Roy model elaborated by Borjas (1987, 1991,
1999, 2014) and the following extensions and alternative models.
The second part of the chapter is devoted to show the impact of immigration on
labor markets. For a long time, economic research has focused on the labor mar-
ket effect of immigration (see e.g. Card, 1990; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Card, 2005;
Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston, 2005; Aydemir and Borjas, 2007). Traditionally,
economists considered the labor market as the main channel through which immigra-
tion affects the economy in the destination countries.
There is not a single right answer regarding the labor market effects of immigration
on natives in the destination. The main conclusion of this stream of literature tend
to find small effects of immigration on wages and employment in the destination
countries. Although many studies find that immigration does not appear to have had
negative labor market effects on natives the destination, some studies do find evidence
that certain groups have seen their wages fall because of immigration. A number of
different approaches have been taken in an attempt to overcome this challenge. They
all generally rely on dividing up the labor market into segments. This segmentation
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allows for the exploitation of differences in the extent of immigration within different
parts of the labor market, controlling for a range of additional factors. Studies that
use the spatial correlation and natural experiments approaches tend to find smaller, if
any, negative effects on wages and employment of native-born workers. Studies that
use the skill cells approach or factor proportions models tend to find more evidence
of detrimental effects, although there are exceptions. The labor market effects of
immigration thus remain open to debate. This ambiguity seems to be due to two
main arguments that we will analyse in what follows: (i) immigrants and home-born
individuals may be more or less substitute; (ii) empirical approaches present some
problems to solve.
1.2 Basic Models of Immigration and the Develop-
ment of the Migration Theory
The simplest models on migration were originally developed by Hicks (1932); Lewis
(1954); Sjaastad (1962); Harris and Todaro (1970) in order to explain migration in
the process of economic development. The basic model used to analyze the economic
effects of immigration considers the immigrants as workers. This model is focused on
the wage differences across countries that motivate people to migrate. It highlights
that migration is driven by geographic differences in labor supply and demand and
the resulting from actual wage differentials across countries (Kurekova, 2011). Under
the assumption of full employment, it predicts a linear relationship between wage dif-
ferentials and migration flows (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998; Massey, 1993; Borjas,
2008).
Fig. 1.1 shows the labor markets both in the destination and in the origin countries
before and after immigration. Before immigration, under the pre-immigration labor
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market equilibrium, LD workers are employed atWD in the destination that represents
the country with the higher wages. On the contrary, in the origin, such as the country
with lower wages, Lo workers are employed at wage Wo. When immigration occurs,
LD +M workers result to be employed at wage WD +M in the destination country,
while Lo−M workers are employed at wage Wo−M in the origin country, generating
a new equilibrium.
Figure 1.1: Basic Model of Immigration
The basic model predicts that immigration leads to an increase in the number
of workers in the destination country and to a decrease in the number of workers in
the origin country. This implies a fall of wage in the destination and a rise of wage
in the origin country. As Fig.1.1 shows, the downward-sloping labor demand curves
means that there is a demand for labor in each country based on the value of workers’
output (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). The supply of labor in this model is
assumed to be perfectly inelastic and it does not depend on the wages. Other impor-
tant assumptions of the model involve that: (i) immigrants are perfect substitutes for
natives; (ii) workers are homogeneous; (iii) the amount of capital in each country is
fixed; (iv) markets are perfectly competitive. Furthermore, this baseline model takes
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into account the difference between the short run and the long run impact. These
assumptions on labor demand and supply influence the different effects on natives’
wages and employment, suffering some potential limitations. In particular, immigra-
tion is not random and may be correlated with positive labor demand shock both at
the country level and across local labor market within countries. In addition, there is
not only one type of labor, but there are different types of workers who have different
skill levels (see for instance Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012). The assumption
that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes in production is criticized because
immigrants and natives can be complements or substitutes in the production process1,
as it will be showed in the second part of the chapter. Furthermore, immigrants can
bring or attract capital, increasing the marginal productivity of labor in the receiving
country, and changing the demand for labor (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015).
Finally, the model assumes that immigrants can easily and without costs move from
one country to another. This assumption can be relaxed as showed in the Appendix
(Fig.A.2).
1.2.1 The Decision to Migrate: Push and Pull Factor
Migration is a global phenomenon caused by a number of reasons. Many factors con-
tribute to the decision to migrate. These reasons may fall under economic factors,
but also under socio-political, cultural, environmental, health and education factors.
In this respect, migrants can be “pushed” out of their home countries or migrants are
1The effect of immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes depends critically on how much
substitutable or complementary immigrants and natives are in the labor market. If immigrants
are substitutable for natives, foreign-born workers can replace native-born workers (employment of
natives fall, and wages fall. However, total employment of natives plus immigrants may not change
indeed, it is likely to increase since wages are lower). If immigrants and natives are complement in
production, an increase in the number of immigrants could actually increase natives’ employment
and wages. In this case, immigration can benefit natives who are complements to immigrants in the
production process.
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often “pulled” into destinations that offer high wages, good health care, and strong
educational systems2 (Simpson, 2017). Push factors are those that force the individ-
ual to move voluntarily, and in many cases, they are forced because the individual
risk something if they stay. Push factors may include economic and non-economic
factors. Most people migrate for economic reasons. Economic literature on the deci-
sion to migrate, focuses on the role of economic push and pull factors that influence
whether people become immigrants. Economic push factors that lead people to be-
come immigrants can include poor economic activity, poverty/low wages, high taxes,
high unemployment, overpopulation and lack of job opportunities. However, labor
market conditions and economic growth are considered the most relevant economic
push factors in the analysis of work-based migration. Non-economic push factors
include political and social factors3. Some of these could combine with economic
factors influencing the decision to become immigrants. Pull factors are those fac-
tors in the destination country that attract the individuals or groups to leave their
home. Economic pull factors include demand for labor, high wages, generous welfare
benefits, good healthcare and education systems, strong economic growth, technol-
ogy, low cost of living. While, non-economic pull factors can include: (i) family and
friends/networks; (ii) rights and freedoms; (iii) property rights; (iv) law and order;
(v) amenities (Simpson, 2017). Immigrants move for seeking to reduce the gap be-
tween their own position and that of people in other, wealthier, places in terms of
wages, labor market opportunities, or lifestyles. In making their decision, individuals
compare the net benefits of migration to the costs. A comprehensive assessment of
the cost and benefit of migration is complex. Although there has been remarkable
2A push factor induces people to move out of their present location, whereas a pull factor induces
people to move into a new location.
3Non-economic push factors include: race and discriminating cultures, poor health care, corrup-
tion, crime, compulsory military service, natural disaster, famine, political intolerance and persecu-
tion of people who question the status quo.
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progress over the last decades, the academic literature has not yet fully explored all
channels by which migration can induce costs and benefits. First, the complexity and
ever-changing features of migrations: modern technologies, decreasing costs of travel,
global product competition, and internationalization of education, among others, have
had a dramatic impact on the way migrations are conducted today. Consequently,
the changing patterns of migration require a new thinking both on conceptual level,
as well as on the level of empirical implementation. A second consideration is the
fact that the way migration affects receiving and sending economies is complex and
can change over time. The empirical research on the cost and benefit of migrations is
related to the surplus migration,which generates through efficiency gains (see Dust-
mann, Frattini, and Preston, 2008). Costs play a role in determining the size and
composition of immigrant flows. Migration costs may include: (i) explicit costs, such
as travel costs and visa fees associated with a move; (ii) implicit costs, such as psy-
chic costs or cultural adjustments that people experience when they move away from
their family and friends; and (iii) associated costs, e.g. learning a new language and
searching for a new job (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). Instead, the net ben-
efits to migration include the increase in income (or “utility”) gained by migration, or
the difference between country where migrants are moving from (origin country) and
destination country (where migrants are moving to) income (Simpson, 2017). Despite
these shortcomings, the standard economic models that are used to analyze migra-
tory phenomena are helpful to systemise the thinking about the costs and benefits
migrations bring to the receiving country, and go a long way to structure and support
empirical analysis (Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls, 2010).
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1.2.1.1 Utility Function and Income Maximization Model
Seeking economic opportunities can be understood as a strategy of income maximiza-
tion. Actual and expected wage differentials and differences in standards of living
between communities of origin and destination are consistently considered as signifi-
cant factors in shaping both internal and international human mobility (Lanau, 2019).
In fact, nearly every economic model of migration incorporates income differentials
and finds them to be an important factor when trying to explain migrant flows in a
given period. Income can serve as a “push” factor: low income levels can push mi-
grants out of their home country. Conversely, high income levels can serve to “pull”
migrants into a specific country or region (Simpson, 2017). Studies of the determi-
nants of migration commonly have been formulated in the context of individual utility
maximization. These studies (Zipf, 1946; Jerome, 1926; Rubin and Kuznets, 1954;
Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Piore, 1979; Clemens, 2011) have considered
migration as driven by the desire to maximize one’s return to human capital invest-
ment. These analysis have highlighted that people respond to spatial differences in
labor market opportunities by migrating if those opportunities dominate the costs
of relocation (Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 2015). In particular, individuals
migrate when their Utility (U), depending on their income in the destination country,
net of migration costs, is higher than the income obtained in the country of origin.
According to this model, people decide to migrate if:
U(IncomeinDestination−MigrationCosts) > U(IncomeinOrigin) (1.1)
Specifically, the “Utility of Income” or “Maximization Model” studies at the micro-












Waget ∗ ProbEmpt − CostLivingt
(1− δ)t
(1.2)
where t is the time horizon, which indicates that migration can occur only for a
certain period; the term δ is the discount rate since the model assumes that migration
costs are a one-time cost paid when a person migrates. In this case, the terms on the
left-hand side represent the destination country, while the terms on the right-hand
side indicate the origin country, where Wage indicates earnings among people who are
employed; ProbEmp is the probability to be employed; and CostLiving represents the
cost of living. This model is mostly applied to economic migrants and predicts that
people will be more likely to migrate as the wage in the destination country increases
and as the probability of finding a job in the destination country increases. Instead,
an increase in immigration costs makes it less likely a person to migrate.
1.2.1.2 The Gravity Model and the Random Utility Model (RUM) of Mi-
gration
In the “Gravity Model of Migration”, Zipf (1946) analyzes at the macro-economic level
how changes in relative economic condition lead a proportion of a country’s popu-
lation to become immigrants. By using aggregate data, the "gravity type" models
suppose that migration is to be directly related to the size of origin and destina-
tion populations, and inversely related to distance. Based on Isaac Newton’s law of
gravity4, according to this model, the volume of migration between two countries is
4The gravity model of migration is based on the Isaac Newton’s law of gravity, which is used to
predict the level of interaction between two bodies. In particular, the intuition behind this model
is that since largest places attract people, ideas and goods more than smaller places, and more
proximate places have a greater attraction, there should be more migration between two places that
are more populated and/or more proximate (Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 2015).
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equal to a constant time the product of those countries’ population, and inversely
proportional to the distance between them:





These studies show that migration diminishes rapidly with increased distance and
that migration is greater between more populous regions. In this respect, migra-
tion did not always appear to be from low to high wage regions nor from those with
high unemployment rates to those with low rates (Davies, Greenwood, and Li, 2001).
This model implies some important economic implications. In fact, (i) it considers
the distance as a proxy for the migration costs; (ii) it predicts that the volume of
migration will be higher for origin and destination countries with large population;
and (iii) including the product of the origin and destination population, the marginal
effect of a change in the origin population on migration will depend on the size of the
destination population and vice versa (Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 2015). In
order to go beyond the limitations of the original gravity model, an "augmented grav-
ity model" has been implemented taking into account the literature on international
trade5. RUM models stem from the income maximization framework developed by
Roy (1951), and on discrete choice models elaborated by McFadden (1974, 1984).
They have been introduced in the economics of migration by Borjas (1987, 1999)
to study the determinants of migration flows. This model is typical of multivariate
quantitative studies and is based on datasets covering as much of a global dimen-
sion as possible, comparative dimensions, or the different levels where decisions to
5The “augmented gravity model” aims to mitigate the omitted variable bias stemmed from the
original gravity model by introducing other variables.
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migrate were made (see Bertoli and Docquier, 2016; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg,
2013; Clark, Hatton, and Williamson, 2007; Hatton and Williamson, 2005; Mayda,
2010). The canonical Random Utility Model (RUM) model of migration compute the
utility of an individual i who was located in country j at time t− 1 decides to move
to a country k belonging to the choice set D at time t as follows:
Uijkt = wjkt − cjkt + εijkt (1.4)
where wjkt represents a deterministic component of utility that can be modeled as
a function of observed variables, cjkt represents the time-specific cost of moving from
j to k, and εijkt is an individual-specific stochastic component of utility. The distri-
butional assumptions on the stochastic term in (1.4) determine the expected proba-
bility that opting for country k represents the utility-maximizing choice of individual
i (Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2008). εijkt is assumed to be an independent and
identically distributed Extreme Value Type-1 distribution (McFadden, 1974). Most
empirical models of international migration have specified regression models based
on the gravity model. However, the use of the gravity models by international trade
economists has revealed some potential sources of bias in the estimation results (see
Lewer and Van den Berg, 2007). Despite the same basic structure, there are neverthe-
less many differences in the empirical models that researchers have used to estimate
the determinants of international migration. Some of these differences potentially in-
fluence the differences in the empirical results that the models generated (Bodvarsson
and Van den Berg, 2013).
1.2.1.3 The Human Capital Model of Migration
Migration as human capital investment is central in most current economic theories
of migration. The development of the human capital investment model have started
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since the 1960s and it was linked to the study of internal migration6 (Van den Berg
and Bodvarsson, 2009). Models that consider migration as a human capital invest-
ment highlight that migrants are expected to maximize their utility by choosing the
location that offers the highest net return to human capital. In other words, these
models at micro-level stress on the spatial differences in labor supply that lead peo-
ple to maximize their utility through the maximization of their income7. This view
of migration stemmed from Becker (1962), which hypothesized that people invest in
their skills in order to maximize the net present value of their future earnings. In this
respect, Sjaastad (1962) introduced human capital theory in the migration frame-
work. According to his view, a migrant calculates the value of the opportunity at
each alternative destination relative to the origin country, net of migration costs, and
chooses the destination that maximizes the highest return. The innovative feature of
this approach is related to the central role gained by personal characteristics in the
evaluation of future earnings and costs following the decision to migrate (Cattaneo,
2007). This framework, in fact, is based on the neoclassical model (Fig.1.1), where
migration is considered as an irreversible decision responding to differences in wages
across labor markets in different geographic locations. As in the Gravity Model of
migration, Sjaastad (1962) uses the distance as a proxy for migration costs point-
ing out that the greater is distance, the greater are the monetary costs of migration
(Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 2015). Therefore, the costs are assumed to be
proportional to migration distance. An attempt to formalize Sjaastad’s idea mathe-
matically has been provided by Van den Berg and Bodvarsson (2009). Specifically,
taking into account a discrete time, if a person lives T years, the present value of the
6Before the late 1950s, theory of internal migration was closely linked to the location models
from regional economics and economic geography.
7These models ignore the fact that people migrate for other reasons rather than income maxi-
mization, like for instance. family reunification, refugee flows or political asylum, etc. In fact, those
reasons are not compatible with a simple assumption of income maximization (Van den Berg and
Bodvarsson, 2009; Bodvarsson, Simpson, and Sparber, 2015).
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(CLMt − CLHt )
(1 + i)t
− C(D,X) (1.5)
where WHt denotes the earnings per period at home; WMt are the earnings per
period if a person migrates to another market; CLHt is an index measuring the cost
of living in the origin country; CLMt is is an index measuring the cost of living in the
destination country; i is the discount rate; C represents the cost of migration; D is
distance between origin and destination; X is a vector of any other determinants of
migration costs.




[WMt −WHt − CLMt + CLHt ]− e−rtdt− C(D,X) (1.6)
According to this framework, people move if: π > 0. Although Sjaastad’ model
has influenced the following studies on migration economics, it presents some limi-
tations that can be summarized as: (i) it is a single period model and it does not
consider why some people migrate on multiple occasions during their lifetimes; (ii)
it takes into consideration the individual as the unit of analysis in the migration de-
cision; (iii) it assumes push and pull factors to be symmetrical not considering the
differential effects; (iv), it assumes that migrants are perfectly informed while it does
not consider the uncertainty in the migration decision; (v) it ignores remittances,
exchange rates and financial sector innovation (see Van den Berg and Bodvarsson,
2009). In the attempt to improve this framework, most alternative models of migra-
tion are developed as extensions of Sjaastand’s work starting from the labor supply
view of migration in which an individual moves in order to improve the rate of the
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return in human capital, net of migration costs8.
1.3 Selection and Assimilation in Immigration
1.3.1 Skill selection in Immigration
The development of theoretical models in economic theory of migration has continued
through the centrality of human capital investment in the migration process. In par-
ticular, some models consider migration as a static decision determined by exogenous
wages that vary across different levels of human capital (see Belot and Hatton, 2008;
Borjas, 1987, 1991, 1999; Zavodny et al., 1997; Chiswick, 1999; Chiquiar and Han-
son, 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005; Hunt, 2006; Ortega and Peri, 2009; Mayda,
2010; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Simpson and Sparber, 2013); other models treat
migration as a dynamic decision with endogenous wage determination and human
capital accumulation (Galor, 1986; Djajić, 1989; Klein and Ventura, 2009; Chiswick
and Miller, 2012; Dustmann, 2003; Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2008; Dustmann,
Fadlon, and Weiss, 2011; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011).
Human capital model offers insights on the determinants of the selectivity. In
this respect, as the expected income, net of migration costs, influences the choice
to migrate, the type of selectivity depends on how the skill levels are sorted in the
alternative destinations and on how they affect the costs of migration (Cattaneo,
8For a review, the development of migration theory has taken into consideration: (i) the migrant
as consumer (see Rosen, 1974; Graves, 1983; Greenwood, 1997; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003; Green,
Deller, and Marcouiller, 2005); (ii) the influence of kinship and migrant networks (see Yap, 1977;
Goodman, 1981; Taylor, 1984; Massey and España, 1987; Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath,
1996); (iii) the migration decisions in a life-cycle context (see Polachek and Horvath, 1977); (iv) the
effects of uncertainty on migration (see Todaro, 1969, 1976; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Pickles and
Rogerson, 1984; McCall and McCall, 1987; Burda, 1993, 1995); (v) the family migration decision
(see Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978; Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark et al., 1984; Stark, 1991); (vi)
the migration as a response to relative deprivation (see Stark et al., 1984; Stark, 1991; Katz and
Stark, 1986; Stark and Taylor, 1989); (vii) the influence of age in the migration decision (Becker and
Capital, 1964; Gallaway, 1969; David, 1974; Schwartz, 1976; Lundborg, 1991).
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2009). While the economic models of migration decision look at the cross-country
differences in the economic conditions to determine the migration flows, the “Selection
Models” focus on immigrants’ skill levels and returns to skill in order to look at
the immigrants’ characteristics. The concept of self-selection is a behavioural term
linked to the statistical concept of selection bias and it implies some deterministic
process to select who does, and who does not, do something (Van den Berg and
Bodvarsson, 2009). In this case, self-selection acts as a mechanism where a group of
migrants present personal characteristics that are distributed differently from that of
the whole origin and destination country population. This is due to many factors that
determine whether people decide to migrate or stay in the home country. For this
reason, because immigrants self select, they are unlikely to be an unbiased sample of
either the origin country’s population or the destination country’s population. The
following paragraphs describe the models developed by the economists to explain the
selection in immigrant flows, by focusing mostly on the Roy model elaborated by
George Borjas and the extensions of this analysis.
1.3.2 Roy Model: Skill Selection in Immigration
The most influential model that predicts how migrants differ from non-migrants is the
“Roy Model” elaborated by Borjas (1987). Based on the canonical model proposed
by Roy (1951)9, Borjas’ version examines where immigrants are likely to be in the
distribution of wages in the origin and in the destination countries, or the direction of
9The Model elaborated by Roy (1951) focused on how the nature of the selection in the occu-
pational choice influenced the distribution of income, providing an algorithm that analyzed how
self selection into occupations affects the distribution of income. In Roy’s (1951) “Thoughts on the
Distribution of Earnings,” he discusses the optimising choices of ‘workers’ selecting between fishing
and hunting. In brief, Roy’s key observation is that there are three factors that affect this choice:
fundamental distribution of skills and abilities and the correlations among these skills in the popu-
lation; the technologies for applying these skills; consumer tastes that impact demand for different
types of outputs. It helps understand the nature, determinants, and distribution of economic rents
in labor markets and the distribution of incomes (Roy, 1951).
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selection, on the basis of unobservable characteristics and skills that potential immi-
grants possess. In his first paper, Borjas (1987) studies the way in which the earnings
of the immigrants may be expected to differ from the earnings of the natives due to
the endogeneity of the decision to migrate. He assumed that individuals compare
the potential incomes in the United States (destination country) with the incomes in
the origin countries, and make the migration decision based on these income differen-
tials, net of mobility costs. Furthermore, the skill distribution of immigrants at the
time of entry depends entirely on the nature of the selection algorithm that separates
who moves from the stayers (Borjas, 2014). His analysis takes into consideration a
two-countries framework denoting the origin country (country 0) and the destination
country (country 1), assuming that the migration decision is to be irreversible. In the
origin country, the earning distribution is given by:
logw0 = µ0 + ε0 (1.7)
where w0 gives the wage in the source country; µ0 denotes the mean (log) earnings
in the origin country; ε0 is the random variable that measures the deviations from
mean earnings and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ20 (ε0 ∼
N(0, σ20)). In this model, workers earn the average wage in their country plus a
random term. In this case, people that present positive value of ε0 earn more than
average, while people who preset negative value of ε0 earn less (Bansak, Simpson, and
Zavodny, 2015).
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If everyone from country 0 were to migrate to the destination country (country
1), their earnings distribution would be:
logw1 = µ1 + ε1 (1.8)
where µ1 denotes the mean (log) earnings in host country for a particular pop-
ulation and ε1 is the random variable assuming that it is normally distributed with
mean zero and variance σ21 (ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21)).
The model assumes then the destination country has higher wages that the origin
country (µ1 > µ0 +π), but the destination country may have a higher or lower return
to skill than the origin country. To sum up, according to this model, people migrate
if:
(µ1 − µ0 − π) + (ε1 − ε0) > 0 (1.9)
where µ1 − µ0 is the average wage in the destination country - the average wage
in the origin country; ε1[(ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21)]− ε0[ε0 ∼ N(0, σ20)] are a measure of how the
natural log of wages vary across individuals relative to the average in the destination
and in the origin country. The correlation between origin and destination country
earnings (ε0, ε1), is ρ = σ01/σ0σ1, where σ01 is cov(σ0, σ1); π is called by Borjas a
“time equivalent” measure of migration costs and it is given by C(migrationcosts)/µ
(wages). In the previous papers, Borjas assumed that π is constant, meaning that C is
directly proportional to w010. Then, the author considers the costs that vary among
persons but, in his opinion, the nature of the correlation between costs and skills
is unclear, making difficult any a priori inferences about this relationship (Borjas,
2014).
10The “time equivalent measure of migration costs” is measured taking into account the wages in
the origin countries.
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In order to implement this model, it is important to consider the coefficient of





This coefficient that establishes a correlation between ε1 and ε0 can range from
1 to -1. Usually, when skills are valuable in the same way both in origin and in the
destination countries, ρ is positive and it generally occurs when the two countries are
more similar. In this case, people that have higher that average earnings in the origin
country will have higher than average earnings in the host countries. On the contrary,
people who have lower than average earnings in the origin country will have lower
than average earnings in the destination country. If ρ is negative, people who have
higher than average earnings in the origin country will present lower than average
earnings in the host country. This can be the case of immigrants that move from
developing countries to more developed countries (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny,
2015). This means that the relationship between earning in the origin and in the
destination countries is higher when bigger are the numbers in absolute value. Taking
into account the equation (1.8), Borjas defines the indicator variable I, equal to 1 if
this selection condition is satisfied, 0 otherwise, such as a person move away if I > 0,
while stay in the origin country otherwise (Borjas, 2014):
I = log(w1/(w0 + C) ≈ (µ1 − µ0 − π) + (ε1 − ε0) > 0 (1.11)
In terms of the probability, a person migrates if:
P (z) = Pr[I > 0] = Pr[ν > −(µ1 − µ0 − π)] = 1− Φ(z) (1.12)
where ν = ε1−ε0; z = −(µ1−µ0−π)/σν ; Φ(z) is the standard normal distribution
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function (Borjas, 1987). The larger is z, the lower is the probability of migration
because z is rising the mean earnings of the origin country and the cost of migration.
According to the model, migration rate falls when: (i) the mean income in the origin
country rises, (ii) the mean income in the destination country falls, and (iii) the mean
of the time-equivalent migration costs rise (Borjas, 2014). Mathematically:
∂P/∂µ0 < 0, ∂P/∂µ1 > 0, ∂/∂π < 0
11 (1.13)
Taking into account the skill differentials between immigrants and natives, this
model considers also the existence of different types of selection in order to determine
which people find worthwhile to migrate. The following equations are the conditional
expectation both in origin and in the destination countries:
E(logw0|I > 0) = µ0 + σ0σ1/σν [(π01 − σ0/σ1)− ρπ0σπ/σ1]λ(z) (1.14)
E(logw1|I > 0) = µ1 + σ0σ1/σν [(σ1/σ0 − π01)− ρπ1σπ/σ0]λ(z) (1.15)
where λ(z) = Φ(z)/(1−Φ(z) ≥ 0; Φ is the density function of the standard normal
distribution; the parameters (µ0;µ1;σ20;σ21; ρ01) are constant; the random variables ε1,
ε0,επ are jointly normally distributed; σπ is assumed to be equal to 0 (σπ = 0) that
means that the time-equivalent migration costs are constant in the population (Borjas,
1987, 2014). Furthermore, in Borjas’s model the direction of selection is influenced
by the income inequality or the relative return to skill. In this respect, the return
to skill is related to the extent of the income inequality, which is measured by the
variance in wages in both countries so that the higher income inequality is, the higher
is the return to skill (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015).
11This result is the same as in Hicksian theory of migration.
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Considering Q0 be the income differential between the average emigrant and the
average person in country 0, Q1, be the income differential between the average
immigrant and the average native person, the model identifies three cases that are of
interest.
In Borjas’ model, "positive selection" occurs when immigrants are from the top
part of the skill and wage distribution both in the origin and in the destination
countries, such as when:
Q0 > 0, Q1 > 0, ifσ1/σ0 > 1, ρ > σ0/σ1 (1.16)
where σ1 > 0 implies that the destination country has a higher return to skill than
the origin country; ρ > σ0 implies that the correlation between the skills valued in the
destination and origin country is sufficiently high; the income inequality is higher in
the destination country than in the origin country. In this case, high skilled workers
want to migrate to take the opportunity to earn high returns in the destination
country. In fact, a skilled worker in the origin country would not want to migrate
to a destination country with a very high return to skills if the skills valued in the
host country were uncorrelated or negatively correlated with skills value in the origin
country (Autor, 2003). A case of positive selection is the so called “brain-drain”
migration. When in the destination country, migration is positively selected and
income inequality continues to increase, migration increases further and becomes less
“positively selected”.
The second case is the “negative selection” that occurs when immigrants are at
the lower end of the skill and the wage distribution both in the origin and in the
destination countries, presenting below-average earnings in both countries:
Q0 < 0, Q1 < 0, ifσ0/σ1 > 1, ρ > σ1/σ0 (1.17)
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where σ0 > 1 means that origin country has higher return to skill than destina-
tion σ1 country;ρ > σ1 the correlation between skills valued in the origin country and
the σ0 in the destination country is sufficiently high. In this case, skills are trans-
ferable but the income inequality is higher in the origin country rather than in the
destination country, so that the origin country becomes unattractive to low skilled
workers because of high wage dispersion. Again assuming that wages are sufficiently
correlated between the origin and destination country, less skilled workers want to
migrate to take advantage from a more equal distribution of wage in the destination
country. Instead, the more qualified workers are encouraged to remain in the origin
country because they have a higher return to their skill. According to Borjas, this is
the potentially unattractive case where a compressed wage structure draws low skill
workers from abroad (Autor, 2003). However, when the income inequality increases
further in the origin country, migration decreases and becomes even more negatively
selected (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). Figure (1.2) shows the direction of
selection in a normal distribution of skill. As said before, when negative selection oc-
curs, low skilled people choose to migrate, while in the presence of positive selection,
high skilled people choose to migrate.
Figure 1.2: The direction of selection in a normal distribution of skill
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A special case of the Roy Model occurs when the correlation coefficient ρ is equal
to 1, such as when skills are perfectly transferable across countries. This assumption
implies also that wages increases linearly with skill. In this respect, the income
distribution in the two countries can be write as:
logw0 = a0 + r0slogw1 = a1 + r1s (1.18)
where s represents the number of efficiency units embodied in the worker; r0
and r1 denotes what are the return to skills in both countries. The two figures
below (1.3A and B) illustrate how the return to skill influences the direction of the
selection, showing a linear relation between a worker’s log wage and skills for each
of the countries and assuming that incomes are perfectly correlated across countries
(Borjas, 2014). Figure (1.3A) highlights that the rate of return to skills is higher in
the destination countries as showed by a more steeply sloped skill-wages curve in the
destination (dashed line) than in the origin country (solid line).
Figure 1.3: The direction of selection and the relative returns to skill
Initially assumed that workers do not incur any costs when they move, people who
present a skill level fewer than s* stay in the origin country because they earn more
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if they stay there, while people with higher level migrates. In this case, considering
that the rate of return to skills is higher in the destination that in the origin country,
immigration is positively selected because workers come from the upper tail of the skill
distribution (Borjas, 2014). Instead, in the Figure (1.3.B) workers whose skill level is
below s* migrate because they will earn more in the destination country, while people
with a higher skill level stay in the origin country. In this case, the return to skill is
higher in the origin than in the destination country as indicated by a more steeply
sloped skill-wage curve in the origin country (the dashed line) that in the destination
country (the solid line). For this reason, the flows are composed by the low-skilled
workers and immigrants are negatively selected (Borjas, 2014; Bansak, Simpson, and
Zavodny, 2015). When migration causes a change in the relative return to skill one of
the skill-wage lines in both figures (1.3 A and B) is pivoted while the other line leaves
unchanged. Figures (1.4 A and B) show the effect of changes in the relative return
to skill or in the average income in the destination that can influence the direction of
selection12. In particular, Fig. (1.4A) highlights that an increase in the relative return
to skill in the destination country decreases the skill threshold for migrating if there is
already positive selection. So that, more people migrate and migration becomes less
positively selected. In Fig. (1.4B), an increase in the average wage in the destination
country decreases the skill threshold for migrating. In this case, migration becomes
less selective because as a result of a change in the average income in already positive
selection, changing s*, this lead to a fall of the skill threshold for migrating and more
people migrate13.
12The direction of selection can change only if the change in the relative return to skill is so large
that the country that previously had the lower return to skill now has the higher return to skill and
vice versa (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015).
13The change in average income does not affect the direction of selection but it leads to a change
in the magnitude of migration and in the skill level of the marginal immigrant and the average of
immigrant due to the change of s* (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015).
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Figure 1.4: The effect of changes in relative return to skills
Taking into considerations the Fig. 1.3 A and B and the assumption that ρ = 114,
the effect of migration costs can be incorporated shifting one the lines related to the
skill- wage profile. For instance, an increase in constant time-equivalent migration
costs would lead to a downwards shift in the skill-wage line in the destination country.
However, according to the analysis provided by Borjas, the costs does not change
the nature of selection rather than the intensity due to a change in the number of
immigrants (Borjas, 2014). Taking into consideration this special case where ρ =
1, Borjas (1992, 2014) extends the analysis from a two country to a multi-region
framework . In this respect, individuals can choose not only if migrate but also
the location that maximize their earnings opportunities (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo,
1992). Assuming that costs are equal to 0 and that the initial distribution of individual
skills is the same in all regions such as people are randomly allocated across regions
in term of skills, the earnings distributions in each of the potential region i is:
logwk = µk + rkν, k = 1, . . . , n; (1.19)
where n is the potential geographical regions; µ is the mean income that would
14The assumption that ρ = 1 denotes a simple separation of the pools of immigrants and stayers.
According to Borjas (2014), this assumption is useful because it permits several generalization.
45
be observed in region k in the absence of any internal migration; rk denotes the
return to skills in region i and for convenience the regions are ranked such that
r1 < r2 < . . . < rn; ν is assumed to be a continuous random variable with mean 0
and a range defined over the real number line. An individual that would maximize




The model assumes that individual earnings are perfectly correlated across regions
(Corr(νi, νj) = 1) for all i, j15. This assumption implies that skilled workers are
attracted to a country that offers a relative higher rate of return to skill because
people who rank highly in the income distribution in one country will also rank
highly in the income distribution of any other regions (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo,
1992; Borjas, 2014). On the contrary, low-skilled workers will move to countries that
minimise their lack of human capital (Borjas, 2014). In this respect, skill prices play
an important allocative role in the internal migration decision as well as in the sorting
equilibrium (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992).
The last case is defined by Borjas as "inverse sorting" or "refugee sorting" and
occurs when immigrants are from the low end of the wage distribution in the origin
country while are in the upper end of the distribution in the destination country. In
this case, the destination country attracts people who have below-average earnings in
the origin country but do well in the destination country:
Q0 < 0andQ1 > 0, ifρ < min(σ1/σ0;σ0/σ1) (1.21)
15The income-maximising behaviour creates a positive correlation between the average skill level
of a country’s inhabitants and the country’s rate of return to skills, given by E(νlchoosej) >
E(νlchoosek)ifandonlyifrj > rk.
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This means that the correlation between earnings in the two countries is suffi-
ciently low, such as when ρ is small or negative (Borjas, 1987, 2014). This might
occur, for example, for a minority group whose opportunities in the host country
are depressed by prejudice like in the case of the refugees. However, because refugee
migration is not motivated by potential economic reasons, this migration is unlikely
to be selected on characteristics that are valued in the destination16. Another case of
inverse sorting concerns the migration from a non-market economy where the set of
skills rewarded is quite different from the economy in the receiving country (Autor,
2003).
There could be a forth case, such as when Q0 > 0, Q1 < 0. But this case would
suggest the existence of an "irrational migration", such as if people leave the up-
per tail of the source country income distribution to join the lower tail of the host
country distribution. This is inconsistent with the income maximisation. In fact,
mathematically, this case would require that ρ > max(σ1/σ0;σ0/σ1) which would
imply that ρ > 1, which cannot be true for a correlation coefficient (Autor, 2003).
The Roy model has more precise predictions about the self-selection of migrants. The
conditions on positive or negative selection in terms of expected earnings also imply
a stochastic dominance relationship between the earnings distributions of migrants
and non-migrants (Borjas, Kauppinen, and Poutvaara, 2018). The main finding of
the Borjas model is that immigration occurs when the destination offers higher rel-
ative returns to the individual’s skills (human capital), assuming mean wages are
higher. Consequently, differences in income inequality and transferability of the skills
are important determinants of immigration. In Borjas (1991), earnings variance is
driven in part by observable characteristics (education and experience) such that the
migration decision varies by the mean educational level in each region, for example.
16In this case, the direction of selection among refugees depends on the nature of the refugee-
producing event and other idiosyncratic factors (Chin and Cortes, 2015).
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This extension allows the model to predict that migration rates rise/fall with the
mean education level of the origin region. This has important implications for what
types of individuals (skilled or unskilled) have an incentive to migrate (Bodvarsson,
Simpson, and Sparber, 2015). In conclusion, the application of the Roy model is
a special case of the human-capital model. The Borjas’s mathematical model is a
close derivative of the neoclassical basic model (Fig.1.1), which is a close relative
of the maximization hypothesis provided by the Sjaastad’s migration model (1962).
However, according to Borjas (1987); Borjas and Trejo (1991), the Hicks-Sjaastad
framework paid little attention to the selection biases and presented too restrictive
predictions focused exclusively on the size and direction of population flows across
regions17. In this respect, Borjas does add some innovations allowing to highlight
the characteristics of immigrants related to those of non-immigrants. In this respect,
the Roy model stresses on regional differences in the returns to skills as well as on
regional differences in mean income so that the skill-price differentials determine the
skill composition of migration flows. Therefore, regions that pay higher returns to
skills attract more skilled workers than regions that pay lower returns (Borjas and
Trejo, 1991).
1.3.3 Roy Model: extensions and alternative frameworks
Although Roy Model has become a canonical model of selection in the economic
literature on migration, some comments stress on the partial equilibrium framework
for identifying the types of workers who find it most worthwhile to move (Borjas,
2014). In particular some comments are related to the prediction that there exist
plausible conditions under which the immigrants may be negatively selected as well
17The Hicks-Sjaastad model is based on the prediction that persons migrate from low-income
regions to high-income regions and that increases in mobility costs deter migration, generate unidi-
rectional migration flows.
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as that migrant selectivity is due to distributional assumptions on wage components.
For instance, Chiswick (1999) highlights that migration costs play an important role in
determining which types of immigrants have an incentive to migrate18. In particular,
the model elaborated by Chiswick shows how immigrants tend to be favorable self-
selected in terms of labor market success due to their higher level of ability, ambition
and hard working. Discussing the Borjas’ findings, the author argues that a larger skill
differential in the origin country than in the destination country does not necessarily
imply negative selectivity, but rather only less favorable selectivity. In brief, assuming
that wages in the origin and destination countries are invariant to the amount of labor
market experience as well as that age is irrelevant, according to Chiswick’s model,





whereWD denotes the destination earnings, WS are the earnings in the source, CI
represents the implicit opportunity migration costs, and CE denotes the explicit out-
of-pocket costs. In this framework, migration occurs when r > i19, such as when the
rate of return r from investing CI + CE in relocation is greater than the opportunity
cost of the interest that could be earned from investing the funds in human capital
(Van den Berg and Bodvarsson, 2009).
Supposing that there are two types of workers (low-skilled and high-skilled work-
ers) and skills are fully observable, Chiswick defines rL as the return to skill for
18One of the main contribution on immigrant selection comes from Chiswick (1978). He presented
evidence that, in the United States, immigrants tended to be relatively more productive and earn
more than American natives. On the contrary, Borjas (1987, 1991) found that immigrants from
developing countries tend to be less productive and earn less than natives in more developed des-
tination countries. These discussions on immigrant labor market performance have become one of
the main debated topic on whether immigration is beneficial or harmful for a destination country
(Van den Berg and Bodvarsson, 2009).
19i is the rate of interest faced by the would-be migrant.
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low-skilled migrants and rH as the rates of return to immigration for high-skilled
persons. If both persons have the same interest cost, the individual with the higher
rate of return will have a greater likelihood to migrate. Considering that the origin
and destination country wages are k percent higher for the high-skilled, then follows
that:
WD;h = (1 + k)WD,1 (1.23)
WS;h = (1 + k)WS,1 (1.24)
where h(l) stands for high (low) skills. Therefore, Chiswick initially assumes that
direct migration costs C do not vary with skill levels. In this case, high-skilled workers
have higher implicit opportunity costs, namely Ci;h(1+k)Ci,1 because they earn more
in their native countries. Therefore, the return to migration for high-skilled migrants
is given by:
rh =
(1− k)[WD,I −WS,I ]
(1 + h)[CI,l + CE]
=
WD,I −WS,I
CI,l + CE,l/(1− k)
(1.25)
Equation (1.25) implies that high-skilled migrants experience higher rates of return
than low-skilled migrants if: (a) mean earnings in the destination are higher (WD,l >
W0,l), (b) the labor market rewards higher skilled workers more (k > 0), and (c)
there are positive out-of-pocket costs of migration (CE > 0). To sum up, given
the three assumptions, the probability of migration is higher for high-skilled and
migrants that exhibit self-selection bias. Chiswick then examines how changes in
various assumptions and variables lead to different type of selectivity20. Therefore,
20Chiswick’s model (1991) shows that under many plausible circumstances, higher migration costs
are associated with a selectivity bias towards those who expect to earn the highest wages in the des-
tination country, which probably is the relatively high-skilled, highly-educated, and well-connected
immigrant (Van den Berg and Bodvarsson, 2009).
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positive selectivity occurs when the greater the effect of ability on lowering the costs
of migration, and the smaller the relative skill differentials in the lower-wage origin
relative to the destination. In this respect, a positive selectivity can be expected to be
less intense for non-economic migrants, such as refugees, tied movers, and ideological
migrants, and for short-term migrants and illegal immigrants (Chiswick, 1999).
Borjas (1987, 1991, 1999) developed several closely-related models to counter
Chiswick’s conclusion that self-selected immigrants tend to be positively selected and
therefore, likely to be highly successful in the destination countries. In particular,
he countered that positive selection is used to explain that immigrant earnings can
overtake those of the natives with the same observed characteristics, such as age and
education (Borjas, 1987). In addition, the “k” in Chiswick’s model which represents
the skill premium varies across countries. In this respect, he finds that immigrants
who self-select in response to the skill premium, the observed distributions of skills
across the source and destination countries’ populations, and their perceptions of
their own skills, cannot earn high incomes in the destination country (Van den Berg
and Bodvarsson, 2009). To sum up, Borjas counters the assumption that positive
selection may be exist for all cohorts of immigrants, finding which determinants and
factors can determine whether immigrants can be positively as well as negatively
selected from a population in the origin country21. (Borjas, 1991).
Borjas’ (1987) model has been extended by relaxing the assumption that a mi-
grant’s cost constraint is unrelated to earnings, skills, or other characteristics. Specif-
ically, the model has been extended to allow for variation in migration costs across
members of the immigrant pool Chiquiar and Hanson (2005); Grogger and Hanson
(2011). Then, the model has been extended to include the credit constraints and the
21Borjas (1986, 1987) discussed that most of the literature in that period used to analyse the
immigrant earnings through the study of single cross-sectional data sets confounding aging and
cohort effects (Borjas, 1991).
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ability of would-be migrants to cover the costs of their investment in migration (Or-
renius and Zavodny, 2005; Hunt, 2006; Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith, 2008; Belot
and Hatton, 2008; Warin and Svaton, 2008; Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2008; Mayda,
2010; Hatton and Williamson, 2011).
Empirically, a large part of the empirical literature has studied migration to the
United States. In particular, most empirical papers on international migrant selection
study settings where migrants face legal barriers to migration and migration costs are
relatively high (Parey, Ruhose, Waldinger, and Netz, 2017). While, different papers
use different skill measures to evaluate selection, other papers study migration flows
between a varying sets of countries. In this respect, while some papers find evidence
for negative selection as predicted by the basic Borjas’s model (Ibarraran and Lubot-
sky, 2007; Moraga, 2011), other papers find intermediate selection22 that suggests that
migration costs vary with skills (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny,
2005). A number of other papers investigate migrant selection between other pairs
of countries (Ramos, 1992; Borjas, 2008; Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson, 2012;
Gould and Moav, 2016), while a number of papers investigate migrant selection be-
tween multiple countries. The evidence of the existing cross-country studies is mixed.
Some papers find support for the model predictions (Borjas, 1987; Poutvaara, Borjas,
and Kauppinen, 2015; Stolz and Baten, 2012), while other cross-country studies find
only partial support for the basic Roy/Borjas model (Belot and Hatton, 2012), or
reject the model predictions (Feliciano, 2005; Grogger and Hanson, 2011). Lastly,
a paper by Parey, Ruhose, Waldinger, and Netz (2017), focuses on the role of in-
equality for the selection of high-skilled migrants in order to understand how they
face low legal barriers to migration and relatively small migration costs. In conclu-
22Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) find intermediate selection. Intermediate selection is when im-
migrants are from the middle of the skill and the wage distribution, if migration costs depend on
skill.
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sion, re-elaborations of the Roy model, (Borjas, 1989; Bratsberg, 1995; Dustmann and
Gorlach, 2014) provide some empirical evidences on selection in return migration.
1.3.4 Assimilation in the Labor Market
Economic assimilation establishes how immigrants’ outcome compare with natives’
soon after immigrants arrive and as their duration of residence in the destination
increases, according to two points of view: (i) labor market assimilation, and in par-
ticular what the economists call “age-earnings” profile; (ii) how the dynamics that
affects the different types of immigrants have an impact on natives’ labor market
(Borjas, 1985, 1995; Duleep and Regets, 1996; Schaafsma and Sweetman, 2001; Barth,
Bratsberg, and Raaum, 2004; Lubotsky, 2007, 2011). Then, the determinants of mi-
grants’ integration are taken into account, focusing on language abilities, education,
enclaves and participation in public assistance programs (see Chiswick and Miller,
1995; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Antecol, 2000; Friedberg, 2000; Zimmermann, Bauer,
and Lofstrom, 2000; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003; Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls, 2010;
Hatton and Leigh, 2011; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Abramitzky, Boustan, and
Eriksson, 2013; de la Rica, Glitz, and Ortega, 2013; Furtado and Trejo, 2013; Ortega
and Verdugo, 2015; Lochmann, Rapoport, and Speciale, 2019). In fact, there are
several factors that negatively affect the economic integration of immigrants in the
host countries. The analysis of language barriers and the literature on evaluation
of the integration plans are considered in most of these studies. Knowledge of the
host country’s language is an important determinant of immigrants’ labor market
outcomes and occupational downgrading. In particular, several works on the rela-
tionship between language skills and labor market outcomes in different immigration
countries have proved the lack of the host country language skills as a main obsta-
cle of immigrants’ economic integration (Chiswick, 1991; Chiswick and Miller, 1995;
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Dustmann and Soest, 2001; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003; Bleakley and Chin, 2004).
These works have highlighted a positive and significant effect of host country lan-
guage skills on immigrants’ wages and on probability of employment. Furthermore,
they focus on the endogeneity of language skills due to the self-reported assessments
of language proficiency (measurement error) and omitted variables correlated with
language skills and labor market outcomes. In order to solve the problem of the en-
dogeneity of language skills, previous literature are developed different methods, like,
for instance, the IV estimation with parents’ education level as instrumental variable
(Dustmann and Soest, 2001). Other methods include the information on whether the
interview was done in the host country language only as IV (Dustmann and Fabbri,
2003), and the age at arrival interacted with a dummy for non-English-speaking coun-
try as instrumental variable (Bleakley and Chin, 2004). To improve the immigrants’
labor market integration, governments may use a wide range of active labor market
programs, such as: (i) the implementation of some language courses; job search as-
sistance (e.g. counselling and monitoring of job search efforts); (ii) training programs
(e.g. computer courses or courses providing specific occupational knowledge); (iii)
subsidised public and private sector employment (e.g. wage subsidies for employers
who hire disadvantaged workers; (iv) temporary job opportunities in community ser-
vices). According to Borjas (2017), if immigrants find it profitable to assimilate, they
will take actions that facilitate the assimilation process rather than immigrants that
find it worthwhile to remain a group apart, facing renewed incentives to acquire new
types of human capital in the destination country. For this reason, assimilation dif-
fers across national origins and fluctuates over times as economic, structural, cultural
and political conditions change and depends on the factors, including skill level, size
of the ethnic group, and geographic clustering, that will speed up or slow down the
assimilation process (Borjas, 2017).
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1.4 Impact of Immigration on Labor Market: Theo-
retical and Empirical Models
1.4.1 Impact of Immigration on Wages and Employment
Public concerns about immigration in developed countries are mostly related to the
impact of immigrants on the labor market outcomes of natives. However, assessing
how much immigrants change the economic opportunities of natives still poses many
empirical challenges. While the standard model of a competitive labor market pre-
dicts that an increase in immigration should lower the wages of competing workers,
how to identify the groups of natives that are competing for the same jobs as immi-
grants remains a controversial issue (Ortega and Verdugo, 2015). The second part
of this chapter stresses how immigration affects the labor market in the destination
country. The literature on the impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes
of natives is presented taking into account the main theoretical models and discuss
the challenges of the empirical models. The effect of immigration on natives’ labor
market outcomes and wages represents one of the main debated topics in contem-
porary economics of migration. In debates concerning immigration, questions on
whether immigrants displace native workers and cause wages to fall are among the
most frequently and controversially discussed topics. While the estimated impacts
of immigration on the labor market are typically small, there is no consensus about
the mechanisms and the distribution of benefits and costs of immigration. A lot of
empirical and theoretical works have been written on the effect of immigration on
local labour market (see Borjas, 1995, 1999; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Card, 2005;
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri, 2010); most of them con-
cern the effect of immigration on US labour market (typically on micro data) and
the main result of these works is that the impact of immigration on national wage
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is negative, rarely positive, but always small (see Card, 1990; Ottaviano and Peri,
2012; Borjas, 2015; Peri and Yasenov, 2015; Card and Peri, 2016; Clemens, Hunt,
et al., 2017). In fact, while adopting certain production functions, immigration ad-
versely affects native wages and employment, with other production functions some
economists find zero, small adverse effects or even a positive effect of immigration on
natives’ labor market outcomes (see Card, 2009; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano
and Peri, 2012; Borjas, 2013). The debate over the wage effects of immigration is
driven by the concern that immigration makes some native groups worse off. On the
whole, immigration increases the wealth of natives, and the difference between what
the winners win and the losers lose is called “the immigration surplus”.
1.4.2 Labor Market effects of Immigration: Theory
This section explores the labor market impact of immigration taking into account the
main theoretical predictions on the demand and the supply of labor. The theoretical
model is, first, explored by looking at the neoclassical model23 by looking at the
difference between substitutability and complementarity in the production process, as
well as the difference between skilled and unskilled labor. Then, the main theoretical
contributions on the effects of immigration on destination countries are showed.
The theoretical framework on the effects of immigration on host countries strictly
depends on the assumptions made in developing the model. These assumptions es-
pecially concern: (i) whether foreign and native workers are assumed to be perfect
substitutes or complements in production process and (ii) how to define immigrants
23Appendix A to this chapter includes the graphical representations of the immigration model,
including when assumptions are relaxed. In particular, the graphical representations consider: (i) the
costs, (ii) the supply and the demand of labor when immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes,
(iii) the labor supply when immigrants and natives are complements, (iv) the skill levels and wages
through the skill premium and the return to skill, and (v) the role of physical capital in the production
process.
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“skilled” or “unskilled” immigrants. The basis model of immigration24 predicts that
an increase of workers in the labor force due to immigration, will have a downward
pressing effect on the price of labor, such as on wages. When immigration occurs, in
fact, immigrants will earn higher wages than in origin countries, while native-born
people will be worse off because they will earn less than the period before migration.
However, the basic model includes strictly assumptions. First of all, the model as-
sumes that there are involved exclusively two countries: origin and destination. Then,
it assumes that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes and labor supply in
both the destination and the origin is perfectly inelastic, which means that workers
will work at any wage. Under these assumptions, theory predicts that an increase in
labor supply due to immigration will result in an increased competition on the labor
market. This competition in the short run will lead to a decrease in wages while
the production will increase. Although native workers sustain a welfare loss due to
the lower wages, total income will increase (immigration surplus), with the welfare
gains accruing to the (native) capital owners (Dustmann, Glitz, and Frattini, 2008).
Then, the model assumes that immigrants move without incurring migration costs or
facing immigration restrictions. However, when migration costs are added, the net
gain of migration is smaller and the wage effects of immigration on native workers is
smaller as well (see Appendix, Fig. A.2). Before migration, wage in the destination
country is predicted to be higher than in the origin country. Once migration occurs,
“unskilled” workers will move from origin to destination countries and the wage in
receiving country will decrease (see Hanson, 2009). In this case, migration leads to
equalize the labor price, such as the wages, between the destination and the origin
countries25 and there is no more incentive to migrate. According to the literature on
24Appendix A (Fig. A.1)
25This process is known as “factor price equalization” and it is common in international trade
models. In these models, the prices of identical factors of production (wage, in case of migration),
will be equalized across countries as a result of international trade.
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international trade, in an open economy, the endowments of each country and the
production functions for goods and services dictate how immigration affects natives’
wages and employment26. In this framework, immigration will lead to an increase in
labor supply but wages may remain unchanged in equilibrium because immigration
leads the host country to export more of the labor intensive good. As mentioned
before, once factor price equalization occurs, there is no incentive for international
migration. In this case, immigration occurs if and only if a wage differential exists,
which exists if and only if trade is not free or when there are some wage rigidities
(Orefice, 2010). Instead, in case of close economy, namely when goods and services
cannot freely move across countries, an increase in labor supply due to immigration
could lead to lower wages for natives. In fact, assuming that in the host economy
there are capital and both unskilled and skilled workers, if an unskilled flow of im-
migration occurs, the wage of this factor of production will decrease, and the effects
on the other two factors are ambiguous. In this respect, the production function
is important as well, because it determines if immigrants and natives are perfect or
imperfect substitutes for natives. In fact, since the assumption of closed economy
is less plausible, the key question in determining how immigration affects natives’
labor market outcomes concerns whether immigrants and natives are substitutes or
complements in the production process.
1.4.3 Immigrants and Natives as Substitutes or Complements
Neoclassical model of immigration assumes that immigrants and natives are perfect
substitutes in the production process. However, the effect of immigration on natives’
labor market depends on how substitutable or complements are immigrants and na-
26In an open economy, trade is driven by difference in factor endowments and factor price equal-
ization occurs. In particular, each country is endowed with an initial amount of labor and capital
and produces goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage based on endowments
(see Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015; Orefice, 2010).
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tives in the labor market (see Appendix, Fig. A.1 and A.5). If natives and immigrants
are perfect substitutes, this means that foreign-born workers can replace native work-
ers. In this case, the increase in the number of workers will push wages down, and
employment of natives should fall as well. Nevertheless, the total employment of
natives plus immigrants may not change although the wages are lower. While, if
immigrants and natives are complement in production, an increase in the number of
immigrants could actually increase natives’ employment and wages. In this case, im-
migration can benefit natives who are complements to immigrants in the production
process. Some of the benefits come from the complementarities between immigrants
and natives: immigrants may make some natives more productive or may increase
the profits of native-owned firms. When relaxing the assumption of a homogeneous
workforce and labor supply presents some elasticity, this means that some workers are
no longer willing to work if wages fall. In this case, the labor supply curve slopes up.
This means that people are willing to work more when their wages increase. When
migration occurs, there is a downward pressure on wages. Nevertheless, in this case,
some natives can decide not work at the lower wage. This is a key difference with
the basic neoclassical model that assumes that natives and immigrants are perfect
substitutes, which means that all workers are willing to work at any wage. In the
literature, the effect of migration on wages and employment is usually analyzed in a
two-sector labor market setting with skilled and unskilled labor. If these two types
are not substitutable, an increase in the unskilled labor supply decreases wages only
in the unskilled sector (substitution effect). It would also increase production, which
could lead to an increased demand and higher wages for skilled labor (scale effect).
The opposite mechanism would take place if there were a strong inflow of skilled
workers. The substitution effect will depend on the degree to which migrants differ
from native workers in their labor market relevant characteristics such as schooling,
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language abilities, attitudes and preferences, creativity, tacit knowledge, reservation
wage and work experience. The size of these effects depends on the elasticity of the
labor demand. A low wage-elasticity entrains smaller losses for native workers, but
also a smaller overall immigration surplus.
Therefore, a key concept in the theoretical framework is whether a migrant is a
complement or a substitute to native worker because immigration of one type is likely
to worsen outcomes for native workers who are similar but improve them for other
types of natives. However, evidence on the substitutability of migrants and native
workers remains mixed. There is a large literature testing the degree of complementar-
ity/substitution between native and foreign workers at different level of analysis. For
instance, exploiting variations across US cities, Kerr and Lincoln (2010); Peri, Shih,
and Sparber (2015) reject the substitution hypothesis between native and foreign
workers. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) provide evidence for imperfect substitutability,
whereas Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2011) finds perfect substitutability between
immigrants and low-skilled native workers. Most of these studies are focused on the
United States. Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) suggest that immigrants
and natives are imperfect substitutes in the UK and that immigration has no impact
on the returns to education of native workers. Moreover, they show some evidence
for the substitutability between former and recent immigrants.
In order to measure if the effects of immigration on natives’ outcomes are positive
or negative, some economists have developed a “Constant Elasticity of Substitution”
(CES) production function (Card, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Borjas, 2013). The
form of CES production function is:
Y = A[µLσN + (1− µ)Mσ]1/σ (1.26)
where Y is the output of the destination country; LN represents the numbers of
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the native-born workers; µ is the share income of the native workers and 1/1−µ rep-
resents the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrant. Furthermore, it
is important to highlight whether a country is an open or a closed economy, because
the endowments of the country and the production functions for good and services
give an account of the immigration impact on wages and employment. The “CES
Approach” initially proposed by Borjas (2003) and inspired by Katz and Murphy
(1992); Card and Lemieux (2001) on the wage structure, was initially motivated by
understanding the skilled biased technological change, using mostly OLS to identify
elasticities of substitution between groups. Using estimates of the elasticity of substi-
tution between skill groups, Borjas (2003) compares the actual supplies of workers in
particular skill groups to those that would have prevailed in the absence of immigra-
tion. Then, he computes the change in wages of native workers through the estimates
for the elasticity of substitution between skill groups (Dustmann and Preston, 2012).
In this respect, crucial is how to define the groups and “nests” of the CES (?). In fact,
the idea is that different types of labor, different nests, allows for complex patterns of
substitution and complementaries. The recent literature explicitly strives to estimate
the various elasticities of substitution that are mainly responsible for the presence
or absence of an impact of immigration on the native wage structure. In particular,
a more complicated model has been extended by Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Mana-
corda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012), with three elasticities of substitution. Some
criticisms (Dustmann and Preston, 2012) highlight that this approach imposes strong
assumptions about the separability among groups of inputs. It also relies on assump-
tions about the nesting structure and about the definition a priori on who’s competing
with whom across cells. Some elasticities are hard to estimate because of the lack of
degree of freedom (Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2008), downgrading immigrants and
natives that can be assigned to education–experience cells, based on their observed
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characteristics even though immigrants typically downgrade upon arrival (Dustmann
and Preston, 2012). In this way, this approach does not identified the total effects of
immigration but the effect of similar immigrants in a particular cell.
In order to demonstrate how native and foreign-born workers with little formal
education are imperfect substitutes in production, Peri and Sparber (2008) develop
a new theory performed by an empirical analysis. “Task approach” is rooted in the
literature on skilled biased technological change (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003).
This method takes into account not only the concept of skilled and unskilled workers.
They extend this concept distinguishing among (i) routine manual tasks, (ii) non-
routine manual tasks, and (iii) abstract tasks. In their seminal work, production
combines the different tasks, classifying the comparative advantages of immigrants









These tasks combine to produce YL according to the CES function in equation
(1.26), where βL ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative productivity of manual skills, and
θL ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of substitution between M and C (Peri and Spar-
ber, 2009). The authors show that immigrants with little educational attainment have
a comparative advantage in manual and physical tasks, while natives with similar
levels of education have a comparative advantage in communication and language-
intensive tasks. When immigration generates large increases in manual task supply,
the relative compensation paid to communication skills rises, thereby rewarding na-
tives who progressively move to language-intensive jobs (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
Therefore, unskilled immigration leads to a change in the productive specialization
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and to increase the overall labour productivity. In this respect, immigration may
influence the host economy performance by increasing the labor productivity by task
specialization. Peri and Sparber (2009) also provide empirical evidence to show that
immigration changes the task specialization in the host country.
Finally, the canonical model has been described by Dustmann and co-authors in a
recent JEP (2016) as “a partial equilibrium model that combines one or various types
of labor with capital in a constant-returns-to-scale production function”. This model
combines one or various types of labor with capital in a constant-returns-to-scale
production function (see Altonji and Card, 1991). This implies that an expansion
of a certain type of labor will lead to a decrease in the wage of native labor of the
same type, in absolute terms and relative to other types of labor, and an increase
in the marginal productivity of capital. This model has led to the common view of
immigration being potentially harmful for individuals whose skills are most similar
to those of immigrants, but possibly beneficial for those whose skills are different.
Moreover, this is used to take into account the downgrading and allows to measure
the total effect of immigration by estimating the total effect on different groups of
natives (Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2017). However, when this canonical
model is implemented through empirical models, some studies find a sizeable effect
of immigration on wages of native workers, while others do not.
1.5 Empirical Approaches: The Methodologies to es-
timate the Labor Market Effects of Immigration
Although basic economic theory suggests that immigration increases the labor sup-
ply, leading to an adjustment of employment and wages, the empirical literature
shows more complex evidences. This last part of the chapter focuses on the empirical
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strategies and the main findings on the labor market impact of immigration in the
destination countries. A review of the main methodologies used by the researchers
is showed by presenting the four main strategies, namely: (i) spatial correlation ap-
proach, (ii) natural experiments approach, (iii) skill cells approach and (iv) factor
proportions models. While the estimated effects of immigration on labor markets
through the first two approaches are usually close to zero (see Card, 1990; Borjas,
1994, 2014; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Hanson, 2009; Kerr and Kerr, 2011; Longhi,
Nijkamp, and Poot, 2005, 2010), the last two approaches tend to find that immigra-
tion can result in a negative impact on the employment prospects and wages of native
workers (see Borjas, 2003; Bonin, 2005; Aydemir and Borjas, 2007; Orrenius and Za-
vodny, 2007). However, there are some exceptions (see Card, 2009; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012). One reason for these contrasting results is that different studies use differ-
ent methods, each of which with several potential problems and limitations (Bansak,
Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). Schematically, a brief survey of empirical findings is
provided, highlighting the different empirical approaches along the discussion in the
literature.
The most used approach in the literature is the "spatial correlation approach",
which exploits the cross-sectional variations in the density of immigrants across cities
or regions within a country to identify the effect of immigration on the outcome of
interest. The definition of “spatial correlation” (see Borjas, Freeman, Katz, DiNardo,
and Abowd, 1997; Borjas, 2003), refers to a method that measures the relationship
between the native wage in a locality and the relative number of immigrants in that
locality27. In particular, this approach examines the correlation, or relationship, be-
tween the number of immigrants in an area and the labor market outcomes of natives
in that area, using the comparison between local labor markets and appropriate con-
27The empirical studies in the literature, which exploit the “demographic” feature to identify the
labor market impact of immigration started with Grossman (1982).
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trols (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). The way in which they compare the
wages across those labor markets can be summarized as:
wk = θρk +
∑
ahzkh + νk (1.28)
where wk indicates the log wage in labor market k; ρk is the fraction of the labor
force in the labor market; z1k, ..., zHk are control variables that may include period
fixed effects, region fixed effects, skill fixed effects and/or any other variable that
generates differences in wage levels across labor markets; and νk is an i.i.d. error term
with zero mean and variance σ2 (Aydemir and Borjas, 2011). The wage elasticity to
immigration can be obtained as ε = θ/(1 +m)2, where m = ρ/(1 + ρ) is the average
ratio of immigrants over natives (Borjas, 2003). Early studies defined labor markets
in terms of geography. Seminal papers by Grossman (1982); Borjas (1987) estimated
elasticities from different production functions using Census data variation (Llull,
2011). The idea of this approach is that the additional variation within regions28
allows for conditioning on region specific fixed effects. In addition, this approach is
used to study the distributional effects of immigration both between education and
experience groups, and about its absolute effects. The main strengths related to this
model can be summarized as follow:
• It is straightforward and it is credible as an erogenous shocks to local labor
market and the use of instrumental variables based on « shift-share » (identifi-
cation);
• Researchers find a region that experiences immigrant inflows and look to see
what happens in that labor market. Then, they compare it to what happens in
a nearby or in a similar region;
28The additional variation within regions is obtained by observing outcomes as well as immigrant
ratios at two points in time.
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• Researchers use a regression analysis to estimate the impact of an increase in the
immigrant share on wages or employment, holding constant the other variables;
• Typically, there is only one parameter of interest , such as the elasticity of wages
or employment with respect to immigration.
In absence of longitudinal data, other approaches are possible to eliminate such
permanent region specific effects if additional variation within regions is available. For
instance, Card and Lemieux (2001) “shift share” approach exploits historical distri-
bution of immigrants across destinations and allocates immigrants and natives in six
different skill groups, assuming that within each skill group, immigrants and natives
are perfect substitutes (Dustmann, Frattini, and Glitz, 2007). Using this approach,
Altonji and Card (1991) find total wage estimates for white male high school dropouts
of about –1.1, while Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2012) find negative total wage
effects of about –0.5 at the 10th percentile, and positive wage effects of 0.4 at the
90th of the earnings distribution. Card (2009) finds small positive total wage effects
(0.06) for natives on average (Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2016). However,
this approach does not consider the interaction between wages and employment and
the cross-effects of labor supply shifts in different segments of the labor market (Edo
and Rapoport, 2019). Table 1.1 reports the main techniques, problems and weakness
of this approach.
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The “natural experiments approach” is often a variant of the spatial correlation
approach (see Table 1.2). In this approach, researchers find a plausible “control group”
or an area that is similar to the treatment group in all ways except for the immigration
inflows (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). The main estimation methodology
used to analyze a natural, or quasi- experiment is a “difference-in-differences” (DD)
estimator, which allows to estimate the change or difference in an outcome, such
as the average wage, in the treatment group before and after the immigrant inflow.
A number of studies that use "natural experiments" in immigration are able to re-
duce the problem of biases in cross-section analysis rising because immigrants choice
the location based on their labor market needs (Hunt, 1992). The seminal work in
this respect is considered the paper elaborated by Card (1990) that analyses the im-
pact of the Mariel boatlift from Cuba to the metropolitan area of Miami during the
1980s. In particular, Card asks whether the Mariel immigration, which increased
the Miami labor force by about 7% between May and September of 1980, reduced
the employment or wages of non-immigrant groups. An important component of
this identification strategy is the selection of comparison cities that can be used to
estimate what would have happened in the Miami labor market if the Mariel immi-
gration had never occurred. In this work, although this exogenous shock raised the
local workforce quite dramatically, Card (1990) found this influx had no adverse effect
on natives’ employment and wages (see also Hunt, 1992; Friedberg, 2001; Borjas and
Monras, 2017; Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2017) .
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Table 1.2: Natural Experiments
STRENGTHS LIMITATIONS
DD is computationally straightforward. It may not be truly exogenous. If this
is the case, the results of D-in-D esti-
mates may be biased. Finding a true
natural experiment is quite difficult. If
government policy creates the variation
in labor market outcomes, the timing of
the policy enactment, implementation
and impact are not always clear. The
spatial approach may yield biased re-
sults. In fact, immigrants tend to arrive
in areas where the potential return to
their particular skills is especially high
(Borjas, 2001). This may lead to a spu-
rious positive correlation between the
share of immigrants and the labor mar-
ket outcomes of locals, which is difficult
to control (Altonji and Card, 1991).
It aims to avoid endogeneity by exploit-
ing exogenous sources of variation.
It is difficult to find a valid control
group. The labor supply shift may not
be the only response to immigration.
There may also be variations in supply
and demand across regions that create
confounding results (see Angrist and
Krueger, 1999). Furthermore, the ef-
fects of a local supply shock from inter-
national migration may spread beyond
the locality, if capital or native workers
respond by relocating.
This approach tells a story and gives
economists, policymakers and students
the opportunity to make a convincing
argument as to why the labor supply
shift is truly exogenous.
Concerns when natural experiments are
used to make cross-area comparisons.
The “skill cell approach” is used to exploit the distribution of immigrants across
age and education groups that is different from the distribution of natives. There-
fore, immigration increases the labor supply more in some skill groups than in other
skill groups (see Table 1.3). Arguing that the spatial correlation approach may lead
to an underestimation of wage and employment effects, Borjas (2003) suggests to
use an analysis based on the national level and therefore robust to the problem of
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out-migration or, for that matter, other ways of adjustment of local labor markets
(Dustmann, Frattini, and Glitz, 2007). In order to measure the effect of immigration
on local work opportunities, Borjas (2003) looks at how the relative remuneration
of different skill groups is affected as a response to changes in supply within these
skill groups. He uses the skill groups defined by education and experience at the
national level to examine the impact of immigration. In particular, his paper focuses
on the relative supply shifts within skill groups, identifying the relative wage effect
of immigration by experience. He, in particular, calculates the correlation between
the magnitude of immigration and the effect on the wage level of competing native
workers, as in the equation 1.29.
∆logwgat = θ
skill∆pgat + ∆πt + (sg ∗∆πt) + (xa + ∆πt) + ∆ϕgat (1.29)
∆logwgat denotes the change in native wage (in logs) in education group g, ex-
perience group a at time t, andl ∆pgat is the education-experience specific immigra-
tion shock, defined as the difference in the ratio of immigrants to all labor in each
education-experience group ga between two time periods. The variables sg , xa ,
and πt are vectors of education, experience, and time fixed effects. In the case of
two education and experience groups, the parameter=θskill is thought of as a triple
difference estimator where differences are given by time, experience groups, and ed-
ucation groups (Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston, 2011). The underlying idea of this
approach is that workers with the same level of education take part in the national
labor market, becoming imperfect substitutes if they are endowed with different levels
of work experience. According to this assumption, if the immigrant supply shock is
not evenly balanced across schooling and experience cells, and over time, there may
be sufficient exogenous variation to identify an effect on competing natives. Using
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this methodology, the size of the native workforce in each skill cell is almost fixed
(Bonin, 2005). Using this national-level skill cells approach, Borjas finds evidence of
a sizable adverse impact of immigration on natives’ wages, suggesting that the move-
ments by natives and firms in response to immigration cuts the national estimate of
the impact of immigration. Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) through a skill-cells ap-
proach find evidence that immigration has had an adverse impact on the wages of
workers in manual labor occupations but not in the wages of workers in service or
professional occupations. Llull (2017) proposes a new approach to identify the ef-
fect of immigration on native male wages correcting for the non-random allocation
of immigrants across skill cells. His identification strategy considers an exogenous
variation obtained from the interaction of three sources: (i) the push factors provide
a time-series variation. In particular, four push factors are separately considered:
wars, political regimes, natural disasters, and economic variables; (ii) the distance,
which mitigates the effect of push factors, adding a destination country variation;
(iii) the skill-cell dummies to capture that the mitigating effect of distance after push
factor is more severe for specific groups of workers. Empirically, this is the case for
less educated and middle-aged/ middle-experienced individuals. In essence, the re-
sulting interactions provide an exogenous variation in immigration across skill cells,
destination countries, and over time, which allows identification of wage elasticities
to immigration in very demanding models (Llull, 2017). He estimates the following
equation:
pijqkt = αij + λrqt + γlngqk + ϑi + ϕj + ξk + ζq + %t + (ξk ∗+%t)+
(ξk ∗ ζq) + (ζq ∗ %t) + (ϑi ∗+ξk) + (ϑj ∗ ξk) + (ϑi ∗ ζq)
+(ϕj ∗ ζq) + (ϕj ∗ ζ) + (ϑi + ϕj) + νijqkt
(1.30)
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where pijqkt is the share of the population with education i and experience j living
in a country/region k in year t that is from country q (for q=1,. . . , Q); lngqk is the
log of the physical distance between origin country q and destination country/region
k; rqt is an exogenous push factor; âij is the coefficient associated to rqt lngqk for
education-experience cell i j;ϑi + ϕj + ξk + ζq + %t, and all pairwise combinations
are fixed effects; and νijqkt is a zero mean error term, potentially correlated withνijkt
in equation; E [νijqktνijkt|fixedeffects] 6= 0 (Llull, 2017). As said before, the four
different push factors taken into account are presented by wars, political regimes,





Table 1.3: Skill-cell approach
STRENGTH LIMITATIONS
By dividing workers into groups,
it may better focus on natives and
immigrants who are substitutable
for each other.
It requires to assuming that na-
tives do not change their skill lev-
els in response to immigration.
This is reasonable in the short run
but perhaps not in the long run.
It can be performed at the na-
tional and regional level.
Like the spatial correlation ap-
proach, it requires assuming that
immigrant inflows are exogenous
or finding a good instrument to
use in order to control for the en-
dogeneity bias. However, endo-
geneity is far less of a concern at
the national level than at the re-
gional level.
The skill cells approach does not
account for possible complemen-
tarities between cells.
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The spatial correlation, the natural experiments and the skill cells are called “re-
duced form” approaches because of the economists decide on a linear relationship to
estimate and then turn to the data (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). Further-
more, these approaches impose very little structure on the equation that economists
estimate. An alternative approach would impose more structure by specifying the
technology of the aggregate production function (Borjas2003).
The last approach deals with the structural estimates and it includes the “factor
proportion models” (see Table 1.4). In order to estimate the cross effects, researchers
need to make assumptions about the production process to make the estimation
tractable, or possible given the data available. The intuition at the basis of the
model concerns three assumptions that have some huge consequences for the estimated
effects of immigration. First, the choice of a production function, which specifies how
many types of labor there are and how many types interact with each other and with
capital. The production function has elasticities of substitution between the various
types of labor and capital. Second, the assumption that workers are paid the value
of their marginal product of labor and estimate or simulate a complete set of cross
effects. Third, although the assumption that workers earn the value of their marginal
product is standard, there is a considerable disagreement about how many types of
labor there are and what the various elasticities of substitution should be (Bansak,
Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). According to Borjas (2003), this structural approach
would make it possible to estimate not only the effect of a particular immigrant
influx on the wage of competing native workers, but also the cross-effects on the wage
of other natives. Empirically, this approach assumes that the aggregate production
function can be represented in terms of a three-level CES production function:
1. The elasticity of substitution across experience groups within an educational
group;
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2. The elasticity of substitution across educational groups;
3. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Formally:
Qt = f(Kt, Lt, λt) (1.32)
Lt = g(L1t, L2t, ...Ljt; θt) (1.33)
Let = h(Le1t, Le2t, ...LeKt;α) (1.34)
whereKt represents the capital in year t;Lt represents the aggregate labor input;
L1t, L2t, ....Ljt, are the aggregate amounts of labor in each of J education classes;
LeKt is the amount of labor in education/experience class ex in year t (for e=1,..J
and x=1...K), λt represents a 2- dimensional vector of technology parameters; θt is
a J-dimensional vector of education- group specific technology parameters, and αt is
a JK-dimensional vector of experience- group specific parameters. For his baseline
simulations, Borjas assumes that f is Cobb-Douglas (with labor’s share equal to s), g
is a CES function with elasticity of substitution parameter σe, and h is a CES function
with elasticity of substitution parameterσx (Card and Peri, 2016). According to this
model an increase in labor supply, regardless of skill mix, has no long run effect
on average wages in the economy if the cost of capital is held constant. Instead,
the elasticity of average wages regarding the aggregate labor supply is −(1 − s), in
the short run with fixed capital, which Borjas sets to −0.3. The skill-group specific
impacts of different labor inflows depend on the two parameters σe and σx. Once
these elasticities are computed, the next step is to simulate how immigration affects
the wage structure (Card and Peri, 2016). This leads to a wide variety of wage effects
in factor proportions models (See Borjas about the US high school dropouts). Studies
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using these models usually simulate the impact of historical immigrant inflows. These
simulations are typically conducted for both the short run and the long run. The
capital stock is held constant in the short run, but in the long run the capital stock can
change in response to changes in labor supply or wages. Ottaviano and Peri (2012);
Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) change the assumption that immigrants
and natives are highly substitutable even with education and experience groups. They
introduced the idea that, using a 4-level nested production function, it is possible to
incorporate an imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives. Furthermore,
they show that even a small degree of imperfect substitution can alter the conclusions
about the wage impacts of immigration. To do so, they introduce a 4-level of nesting
to allow for complementarities (or imperfect substitution) between immigrants and
natives within cells. They find evidence of complementarities in this framework as
seen by an increase in the wages of natives within a skill cell in response to an influx of
immigrants (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). Meanwhile, Borjas, Grogger, and
Hanson (2012) report opposing results. In particular, their results indicate that there
is a significant substitutability between immigrants and natives within a skill cell.
Other studies have pointed out the importance of treating high school graduates and
high school dropouts as different education groups versus pooling them together. For
instance, Card (2009) suggests to add yet another level of nesting to the theoretical
model because not all skill groups are equally substitutable. In particular, he argues
that high school dropouts are highly substitutable for high school graduates (ex. in
US). For this reason, determining the elasticity of substitution between high school
dropouts and graduates is difficult. Results are sensitive to the specification used and
to the assumption made about the relative demand for the two groups. As a result, it
is unclear what elasticity factor proportions models should use for these two groups.
In conclusion, the identification of empirical models is one of the main problem
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Table 1.4: Factor proportions model
STRENGTH LIMITATIONS
It is strongly rooted in economic
theory.
The results of these models de-
pend critically on the assumption
made about the substitutability
of different groups of workers.
It estimates a general equilibrium
model of the labor market and
then use the parameter to simu-
late the impact of immigration on
the wage structure.
These models tend to be sensi-
tive to the form of the production
function.
The construction of this models
reduces the dimensionality of the
parameter space and built a closer
link between the key theoretical
concepts and the variables that
are actually used in the empirical
research.
in the literature. The main econometric issues in the estimation of the labor market
effects of immigration include: (i) the diffusion effect caused by the native migration
response; (ii) the endogeneity of immigration to labor market conditions, and (iii) the
institutional factors that limit wage flexibility, which may prevent wage adjustments
to immigration (Edo and Rapoport, 2019). While studies that consider labor markets
as spatial units typically use past settlement of immigrants as an instrumental variable
(see Altonji and Card, 1991; Card and Lemieux, 2001), studies that imagine labor
market into skill groups typically assume that immigrant inflows are exogenous (Llull,
2017). Typically, the skill-cell approach tends to produce more negative wage effects
for natives in response to immigration than the mixture approach. Instead, empirical
results obtained from the spatial approach vary widely depending on which skill group
is studied. However, the skill-cell and the mixture approach identify a relative wage
effect of immigration, while the spatial approach recovers the total wage effect of
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immigration on a particular native skill group that consider complementarities across
skill cells and across labor and capital (Dustmann, Glitz, and Frattini, 2008).
1.6 Conclusions
Since assessing the overall net gains or losses to the economy from immigration is one
of the most debated issue, the first chapter of the Thesis has provided an overview
of the main theoretical and empirical contributions for explaining the socio-economic
impact of immigration from the receiving country perspective. Starting from the
basic model of immigration, the chapter has provided a synthetic review of the lit-
erature on the determinants of migration starting from the basic models elaborated
by Hicks (1932); Lewis (1954); Sjaastad (1962); Harris and Todaro (1970) until the
recent contributions. Economic models of the migration decision predict that cross-
country differences in economic conditions play a central role in determine whether
people move. The first part has presented the economic model of individuals’ decision
to migrate, which answers to the question about why people migrate and who are
the immigrants. This model of immigration considers immigrants as workers and it
focuses on the wage differences across countries which motivate people to migrate.
The models of migration decisions considers then both the micro level, which explore
whether a person benefits from migrating (utility-or-income maximization model),
and the macro level, which respond to the question about how many people become
immigrants (gravity model). These models show that differences in relative economic
conditions lead to change in migration flows.In particular, the utility-or-maximization
model and the gravity model predict that changes in relative economic conditions lead
to changes in migration flows, such as how changes in relative economic conditions
affect the number of people who migrate. The Hicks-Sjaastad model emphasizes that
mean income levels differ across regions, and these income differentials, net of migra-
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tion costs, lead to unidirectional migration flows. Sjaastad (1962) pioneered the ap-
plication of human capital theory in order to understand migration which has become
the most fundamental idea underlying most current economic theories of migration.
According to the human capital model, migration is the act of maximize utility by
choosing the destination that offers the highest return to the skill. Then, the chapter
has described the selection models in which people decide whether to move based on
their income in the origin and in the destination countries. If their income will be
higher in the destination, net of migration costs and adjusted for the cost of living,
they move (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). The aim of these models is, in
fact, to describe how changes in relative economic conditions affect the composition
and the characteristics of immigrants. The most influential model on skill selection in
immigration was elaborated by Borjas (1987). It is based on a canonical model by Roy
(1951). His application (1987, 1991), shows that international migration is not only
influenced by net earnings differences between countries, but also by factors such as
international differences in income inequality and the degree of skills transferability.
In particular, Borjas examines where immigrants are likely to be in the distribution
of wages in the origin and in the destination countries, or the direction of selection,
finding the existence of a positive selection, a negative selection, and an inverse sort-
ing. In particular, according to Borjas, the skill distribution of immigrants at the
time of entry depends entirely on the nature of the selection algorithm that separates
who moves from the stayers (Borjas, 2014). Using this framework, Borjas (1987,
1994, 1999); Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) find that the adjusted wage differen-
tial for recent immigrants to the US depends negatively on origin country inequality
and positively on average origin country income. This implies that immigrants from
poor and unequal countries are negatively selected relative to immigrants from other
origin countries. This last finding that there exist plausible conditions under which
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the immigrants may be negatively selected has been criticized as well as that migrant
selectivity is due to distributional assumptions on wage components. For instance,
Chiswick (1999) highlights that a larger skill differential in the origin country than
in the destination country does not necessarily imply negative selectivity, but rather
only less favorable selectivity. In the Roy model, the number of immigrants depends
not only on relative incomes in the origin and destination countries, but also on the
variances of those income or the relative return to skill. This model stresses on the
nature of the selection that generates a non random sample of immigrants, taking into
account, not only the number of immigrants, but also their composition and their skill
levels. To sum up, less-skilled people are better off in countries with a lower return to
skill and less income inequality while more-skilled people are better off in countries
with a higher return to skill and more income inequality. The Roy model has more
precise predictions about the self-selection of migrants than previously realized. The
conditions that result in positive or negative selection in terms of expected earnings
also imply a stochastic dominance relationship between the earnings distributions
of migrants and non-migrants. Although the Roy model has become the most used
framework in literature on selection in immigration, other recent models elaborated
by economists have captured some of the additional complexities of immigration.
Traditionally, economists considered the labor market as the main channel through
which immigration affects the host economy: immigrants increase the unskilled labor
supply decreasing its price. The debates concerning whether immigrants have adverse
effects on native workers and cause wages to fall are among the most frequently and
controversially discussed topics. While the estimated impacts of immigration on the
labor market are typically small, there is no consensus about the mechanisms and
the distribution of benefits and costs of immigration. Although basic economic the-
ory suggest that immigration increases the labor supply, leading to an adjustment
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of employment and wages, the empirical literature shows that the estimated effects
of immigration on labor markets are usually close to zero (Borjas, 1994; Friedberg
and Hunt, 1995; Hanson, 2009; Kerr and Kerr, 2011; Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot,
2010; Borjas, 2014). However, while some studies find a positive effect on local labor
market, other some studies find that migration results in a negative impact on the
employment prospects of native workers (even if close to zero). More broadly, the
extensive literature on the economic effects of foreign worker flows mostly focuses on
uneducated migrants and still lacks a consensus. Economic theory usually predicts
that immigrants flows harm at least some workers because immigration changes the
balance of skills in an economy. However immigration can have different effects de-
pending on the assumptions made about demand and supply of labor. Under the
case of a small economy with competitive markets and a fixed capital stock, theory
predicts that the increase in the labor supply due to immigration will result in in-
creased competition on the labor market. This will lead to a decrease in wages but
to an increase in production in the short run. Although native workers will suffer a
welfare loss due to the lower wages, total income will increase (immigration surplus).
The size of these effects depends on the elasticity of the labor demand, namely a low
wage-elasticity lead to smaller losses for native workers, but also a smaller overall
immigration surplus. As showed in the chapter, the effect of immigration on natives
in the labor market depends on how different types of labor are considered. The
survey of theoretical and empirical models have showed ambiguous results, which
mostly depend on two factors: (i) how to define skilled and unskilled workers; and
(ii) whether migrants and native-born workers are substitutes or complements for
each other. The chapter has discussed the main theoretical models and empirical










A growing number of OECD countries are likely to adopt more restrictive and in-
creasingly quality-selective immigration policies, with the aim to confer better chances
of admission to those applicants with a higher level of education. The changes in im-
migration law, which favor high-skilled immigrants relative to less educated ones, are
considered among the most important and robust factors affecting the selection of
immigrants. Countries typically want to attract immigrants whose skills are in rel-
atively short supply and who are relatively wealthy. The aim of this chapter is to
review the admission policies within the European Union (EU) that affect the size
and the characteristics of the immigrant inflows. Within the EU, countries currently
allow the EU citizens to enter freely to work but they have relatively strict policies
for immigrants from non-EU countries. This chapter focuses on the attempts of the
European Commission (EC) to harmonize the selection policies for purposes of labor,
research and study, by promoting the immigration of highly skilled people in order to
compensate the labor shortages in the face of a growing global competition. The last
part discusses the different approaches to selecting and admitting immigrants both
in the UK and in Germany.
2.1 Introduction
During the last decade, most high-income countries have adopted policies aimed at
attracting highly educated immigrants. As many scholars show (see Brücker, Bertoli,
Facchini, Mayda, and Peri, 2012), economic immigrants should be potentially more
successful in host-country labor markets, positively contributing to the economy by
bringing valuable skills, stimulating investments and growth, promoting innovation,
and raising productivity. According to Borjas (2000), skilled immigrants are likely
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to be more beneficial for the host country’s economy because (i) they pay higher
taxes, (ii) they require fewer social services and (iii) they integrate faster than un-
skilled immigrants. In fact, economic immigrants who rationally decide to maximize
their lifetime utility should be more ambitious and risk taking individuals (Constant
and Zimmermann, 2013). Economic immigrants are said to be positively selected
not only with regard to unobserved determinants of labor market success but also
to observed characteristics, such as higher levels of education or the ability to speak
the destination country’s language (Chiswick, 1978, 1986, 1999). Similar positive se-
lection patterns could be expected from student migrants, even though their utility
maximization should be primarily directed towards skills’ accumulation and then for
long-term labor market success (Kogan, 2011). Responses to these crucial challenges
require evidence on the economic mechanisms of migrant selection and policy analyses
about potential selection strategies. To answer to the question if the new immigrants
are skilled or unskilled, it is important to know what kind of workers, consumers,
and innovators are among the immigrants arriving in the countries, such as how they
self-select and how they fare in the destination countries (Bodvarsson and Van den
Berg, 2013; Borjas, 2016). On the other hand, highly educated immigrants move in
relation to better incentives, such as the wage structure at destination, lower costs of
moving and, in general, better opportunities in the destination country. In presence
of externalities, natives may benefit from immigrants’ set of knowledge and abili-
ties1. In addition, an inflow of skilled immigrants may have favorable effects on the
distribution of income. An increase in the supply of skilled workers might decrease
the wage of highly educated workers due to the higher supply of skilled labor, and
1This may happen if, for instance, native and immigrant workers are complements in the produc-
tion function. As mentioned in the first chapter, native and immigrant labor are complements in the
production function means that the additional input of one production factor raises the marginal
productivity of the other.
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consequently reduce income inequality2. The influence of immigration policies on mi-
grants’ selection on education has been analyzed both from a theoretical (see Bertoli
and Brücker, 2011; Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri, 2012; Bertoli and
Rapoport, 2015; Bianchi, 2013; Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2008) and from an
empirical perspective (Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo, 2003; Aydemir, 2011; Belot
and Hatton, 2012; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2008; Bertoli, Dequiedt, and Zenou, 2016).
As showed by Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri (2012), the change in im-
migration law which favor high-skilled immigrants relative to less educated ones are
among the most important and robust correlates which affect the positive selection of
immigrants. Moreover, they find that laws that limiting the access of immigrants to
welfare benefits and increasing the restrictions for residence permits or the require-
ments for political asylum produce a small total inflow of immigrants and a stronger
selection bias of the immigrant population towards the highly educated. However,
some negative factors may emerge from the introduction of a selective immigration
policy. The latter is probably considered the best way to maximize the economic well-
being of the native population. But, according to Speciale (2010), the introduction of
policies that screen applicants by education is not a Pareto improvement, because it
may negatively affect the welfare of other groups of people. For instance, the origin
country may lose its best individuals, a phenomenon that is known as “brain drain”.
A recent study by (Docquier, Ozden, and Peri, 2010) highlights that immigration in
Europe from 1990 to 2000 had a positive effect on the average wage of native workers,
2Borjas, Freeman, Katz, DiNardo, and Abowd (1997) show that the growth of unskilled migra-
tion may exacerbate the income gap between high-skilled workers and those less educated. Other
researches have shown that an inflow of low-skilled immigrants that reduces low-skilled wages would
increase income inequality while an increase in high-skilled immigrants would reduce income in-
equality, depending on the relative return to skill (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). However,
empirical results are ambiguous under different assumptions. Therefore, immigration can have a
very little or zero effect on income and wage inequality (see e.g. Card, 2009) or that it generates a
downwards pressure on inequality, especially when the levels of education and professional experience
of immigrants are very high (see e.g. Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2011).
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while the extent of wage losses due to emigration was close to or greater than the
gains generated by immigration (Villani, Ferrara, and Liotti, 2016).
Labor migration policies differer in the ways in which they try to attract workers.
In this respect, countries use a variety of admission policies in order to affect the size
and the characteristics of their immigration inflows. A growing number of OECD
countries are likely to adopt more restrictive and increasingly quality-selective immi-
gration policies, with the aim to confer better chances of admission at destination to
those applicants with a higher level of education3. These policies become to be clear
from the gradual introduction of points-based immigration systems, first in Canada
in 1967. Countries with a long history of point-based systems include Australia and
Canada and New Zealand. These countries awards points to potential permanent
immigrants based on various characteristics, such as age, education and occupation.
Elsewhere, immigration policies have also evolved towards becoming more restrictive
quantitatively and more selective qualitatively, through the introduction of specific
visa categories for highly skilled professionals (e.g., the H1-B visa category in the US,
or the European “Blue Card”) or through the introduction of biased selection crite-
ria, making low-skill immigration more difficult while at the same time encouraging
permanent high-skill immigration. Countries within the EU currently allow citizens
to enter freely to work within the territory of the Member States but have relatively
strict policies for non-EU nationals. The United States admits permanent immigrants
primarily on the basis of family ties to US citizens or permanent residents. It also ad-
mits some immigrants, particularly relatively highly-skilled immigrants, temporarily
and permanently based on employment (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015).
The policy argument that immigration is required because of "skills needs" in the
3The decline in the level of education of immigrants (Borjas, 1999), with its possible contribution
to rising inequality and increased pressure on underprivileged segments of the native population,
has prompted proposals to increase the degree of selectivity of immigration policies (Bertoli and
Rapoport, 2015).
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domestic economy is connected to the presence of a high level of "human capital" in
order to promote long-term economic growth and competitiveness. This argument
is typically based on endogenous growth models that emphasize the importance of
human capital, knowledge, research and development for economic growth (Romer,
1986). Therefore, human capital models suggest that the immigration of highly skilled
workers is to be encouraged4. In these supply-driven, immigrants themselves launch
the admission process and pass it based on their education, abilities and potential
to successfully integration. A number of countries have labor immigration policies
for admitting highly skilled migrant workers that are, in part, based on a human
capital model. Canada and Australia’s point-based system are examples of a labor
immigration policy based on the human capital model. Instead, demand-driven sys-
tems5 that are usually based on the principle of job contingency and which are often
supplemented by a labor market test or on shortage lists assessments of labor market
needs, are shown to have rather little, and potentially even a negative effect. However,
these policy tools differ across the countries. The argument that there is a "need"
for migrants’ skills is related to the aim of using migrant workers to reduce perceived
specific labor and/or skills shortages. This issue has been addressed by a number
of countries by establishing special government units and/or independent advisory
bodies that are tasked to help in the analysis of shortages in the domestic labor mar-
ket6. Studies on the role of immigration policy on the socio-economic performance of
4The human capital model offers insights upon the determinants of the selectivity. In brief,
given that the expected income, net of migration costs, influences migration, the type of selectivity
depends on how the skill levels are rewarded in the alternative locations and on how they affect the
costs of migration (Cattaneo, 2009)
5Demand-driven policy means that an employment offer and contract triggers the decision to
admit a migrant.
6For instance, the UK has established the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) in 2008, which is
a small independent body of economists that advises the government on migration issues, addressing
the immigration from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) in the areas of skilled labor
shortages (OECD, 2014). Other countries include Australia, Canada and Spain.
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immigrants in their destination countries and how has immigration impacted these
countries’ economies have highlighted the importance of skill and geographic com-
positions of immigrant cohorts and how it can be affected through policy tools 7.
Despite the concurrent rise in the number of high-skilled immigrants worldwide and
the proliferation of selectivity immigration policies, the degree to which high-skilled
immigration policies have been effective remains contested (Bhagwati and Hanson,
2009).
In Europe, both the EU-wide and national legislations are reflected by the im-
plementation of demand-driven systems that prioritize labor market outcomes over
the numbers of migrants actually recruited (Czaika and Parsons, 2017; Burmann,
Perez, Hoffmann, Rhode, and Schworm, 2018). Several Member States are address-
ing their policies on efforts to facilitate admission and stay of highly qualified workers
as part of the global competition for talent. These include: (i) amending legislation
to attract highly qualified third-country nationals, (ii) establishing services for these
third-country nationals to enable easier access to information and giving additional
rights such as access to self-employment, but also (iii) restrictions on routes for highly
qualified third-country nationals (European Migration Network, 2017). In order to
foster the cooperation between Member States and the EU, one of the main argu-
ment at the center of the debate is the need to make Europe more attractive to highly
skilled migrants as favourite migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and
the USA. However, labor migration in the European Union (EU) has altered in recent
7Borjas (1991) finds that immigration policy can be one of the reasons why the earnings of im-
migrants and natives in Canada are more similar than in the US. Green and Green (1995) find that
changes in Canadian immigration policy in 1960s account for shifting the immigrant composition
from low skilled to high skilled in Canada. Constant and Zimmermann (2005) advocate the intro-
duction of a selective immigration policy that addresses the demands of the labor market in EU.
Czaika and de Haas (2017) find strong evidence that supply-led systems, like points-based systems,
aim to increase both the absolute numbers of high- skilled migrants and the skill composition of
international labor flows.
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years due to a number of reasons. The decline and aging of the European population
has contributed to an increased awareness concerning the need for immigration. In
combination with increasing demand for skilled workers due to demographic chal-
lenges and growing innovation pressures, key sectors of the EU’s economy suffer from
specific labor and skill shortages (European Commission, 2019). These factors, which
has dramatically changed but the nature, scale and direction of the migration flows,
coupled with its foreseeable implications has provoked increased debate concerning
immigration within EU institutions and Member States (Barslund and Busse, 2016).
The rest of the chapter focuses on the review of the admission policies within the
European Union (EU) that affect the size and the characteristics of the immigrant
inflows. Within the EU, countries currently allow EU citizens to enter freely to work
but have relatively strict policies for immigrants from non-EU countries. The first
part focuses on the development of the EU internal mobility Law, which allows EU
citizens to move freely within the EU and to benefit from the right to free movement.
In this respect, EU citizens are entitled: (i) to look for a job in another EU country;
(ii) to work in another EU country without needing a work permit; (iii) to reside in
another EU country for that purpose; (iv) to stay there even after employment has
finished and (v) to enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment,
working conditions and all other social and tax advantages. The second part provides
an analysis of the regulation of labor immigration for third-country immigrants within
the EU. In this respect, migration policy is more restrictive and limited to specific cat-
egories of third-country nationals, such as: (i) long-term residents, (ii) highly skilled
workers, (iii) researchers and students. They may benefit from the possibility to move
within the EU, but under defined conditions. This chapter focuses on the attempts
of the European Commission (EC) to harmonize the selection policies for purposes of
labor, research and study, promoting the immigration of highly skilled people in order
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to compensate the labor shortages in the face of a growing global competition. The
last part aims to discuss at least two different approaches to selecting and admitting
immigrants in the EU by looking at the UK and Germany skill-selective immigration
systems.
2.2 Skill-Selective Immigration Policies in the EU
Framework
European Union has been shaped by a long history of internal migration flows, often
occurred in response to the constant shifts of economic and geopolitical power across
Member States (de la Rica, Glitz, and Ortega, 2013). Immigration policies at the
EU level have been traditionally characterized by a dualism: while internal labor
mobility is subjected to the EU jurisdiction as it is one of the cornerstones of European
integration, immigration from third-countries is primarily a responsibility of each
Member State (Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri, 2012). In this respect,
intra-EU mobility8 is characterized by the presence of two different schemes. The
first scheme includes the EU citizens who benefit from the right to free movement.
The second scheme is more restrictive and limited to specific categories of third-
country nationals. The legal migration Directives provide specific provisions solely
for the following categories of third-country nationals and their families: (i) long-term
residents; (ii) highly skilled workers; (iii) researchers; and (iv) students. Each of these
categories of workers may benefit from the possibility to move from one Member State
to another, but under defined conditions. However, non-EU immigrants face strong
legal obstacles in exercising freedom of movement (Pascouau, 2013).
Free movement of persons for reasons of work is one of the fundamental freedoms
8Intra-European mobility means the possibility for one person to move to another member state
in order to seek a job, and reside there for this purpose.
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set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome: the free movement of people, capital, goods and
services. These freedoms are also closely interlinked when it comes to the completion
of the internal market. Under Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU), EU citizens have the right to look for a job in another Member
State and to receive assistance from the employment services when looking for a job.
In addition, they have the right to be treated equally in access to employment and
with regard to working conditions and all other social and tax advantages. Finally,
EU workers have a right of residence for themselves and their family members. The
idea behind EU mobility was to create a dynamic labor market where work and skills
are allocated more efficiently in sectors and occupations where labor shortages need
to be filled, so that shortages in one country can be offset by unemployed workers
from other countries (Holtslag, Kremer, and Schrijvers, 2013). Although the mobility
of workers within the EU is free and not skill-selective, the EU has initiated programs
that contribute to improve the mobility of labor between Member States. Earlier
programs were focused on culture, training, education and language. Policymakers
in EU, in fact, aimed to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of European
higher education, especially through enhanced mobility of students and staff. The
so-called “Bologna Process" was an attempt to defines a new model of mobility in
higher education across Member states. It was an agreement between 48 European
countries in the field of higher education. Under the Bologna Process, European gov-
ernments engage in discussions regarding higher education policy reforms and try to
overcome obstacles to create a European Higher Education Area. In particular, a core
mission of the Bologna Process is to harmonize the study programs and the mutual
recognition of study periods and qualifications earned abroad. However, the Euro-
pean Commission has promoted learning mobility for many decades. Since 1980s, the
Erasmus Program, now part of the EU’s Lifelong Learning Program, has been pos-
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itively affecting learning mobility thanks to the support to people wishing to study
or train abroad and to projects fostering cross-border cooperation between higher
education institutions. More recently, programs have been introduced to improve the
portability of skills. In particular, the European Commission adopted a renewed EU
agenda for building inclusive and connected higher education systems in May 2017,
in line with the "Education and Training 2020 strategy" (ET2020). The Commis-
sion’s Europe 2020 Strategy considers learning mobility as a means to address future
skills mismatches and promote excellence in skills development. However, since this
process is ongoing and many of the decisions are relatively recent, the Commission
receives a number of complaints from citizens who encounter difficulties having, for
instance, their academic qualifications recognized9. Since 2000, European countries
have been experiencing both an increase in the average level of education of the labor
force and an increase in emigration rates, mainly concentrated among the young and
highly educated cohorts (OECD, 2013). The main drivers of this process have been
identified in several factors including: (i) the internationalization of labor markets
and educational systems; (ii) the enlargement and integration processes of the Eu-
ropean Union; (iii) the asymmetric consequences of the economic crisis in European
countries; and (iv) the diffusion of policies for acquiring human capital from abroad
in many high-income countries (Antonelli, Binassi, Guidetti, and Pedrini, 2016).
The EU has recognized the economic importance of labor mobility in driving
economic development in the long term and in addressing current and future demo-
graphic challenges. For this reason, European Commission has worked on a number
of measures which cover the conditions of entry and residence for certain categories of
non-EU workers such as highly qualified workers, seasonal workers and intra-corporate
transferees. The strategy of the European Commission become to create a package
9SEC(2010) 1047, Commission Staff Working Document - Youth on the Move: A Guide to the
Rights of Mobile Students in the European Union.
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of multiple directives targeted at specific subjects for purposes of labor, research and
study in order to move forward with the harmonization efforts in this area (Boeles,
den Heijer Maarten, and Kees, 2014). Attempts in this respect were focused on the
promotion of immigration of highly skilled people and to provide for measures and
sanctions against the illegal employment.
Figure 2.1: Number of first residence permits issued by reason
Figure 2.1 shows that 2.6 million single permits were issued in the EU in 2017.
First permit refers to a single procedure and a set of rights based on a common set
of rights for third-country workers legally residing in an EU Member State. About
1.8 million single permits were issued in the EU in 201310. This number increased
during the following two years reaching its peak in 2015, at 2.9 million. During 2016,
the number of single permits decreased and in 2017 it were at 2.6 million (Eurostat,
2019b).
After the Treaty of Amsterdam (May,1999) and the Tampere Conclusions (Octo-
ber, 1999), the Commission recognized the necessity of a common approach in the
10At the end of 2013, the EU Single Permit Directive was transposed into the Member States’
national systems. Single permit is not as such a permit but rather a single procedure, which includes
a number of rights that apply to: (i) third-country nationals who apply to reside in a Member State
for the purpose of work; (ii) third-country nationals who have been admitted to a Member State
for purposes other purposes in accordance with Union or national law, who are allowed to work and
who hold a residence permit; (iii) third-country nationals who have been admitted to a Member
State for the purpose of work according to the Union or national law (EUROSTAT, 2019).
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matters of immigration and asylum11. On 11 July 2001, the Commission presented a
draft directive on the conditions of entry an residence of third country nationals for
the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities (COM (2001)
386, 11 July 2001), where proposed a common admission procedure for a single per-
mit valid both for residence and work, considering yet the degree of flexibility of the
Member States in the admission criteria related to their labor markets. However,
in order to go beyond the concerns expressed by the Member State, the Commission
proposed a new Communication in 2003 on immigration, integration and employment
in order to provide a common pathway for residence and work permit. Although it
did not affect the Member States’ responsibility in terms of admission procedure12,
the Communication did not receive sufficient support. For a common migration pol-
icy targeting the admission of economic immigrants, the Commission launched the
Policy Plan on Legal Migration in 2005, but only in 2006 the Commission decided to
formally withdraw the proposal for a draft Directive on the conditions of entry and
residence of third-country nationals for work purposes in the European Union and the
rights in employment of a third-country national once admitted in the territory of a
Member State. Three new Directives followed the Policy Plan of 2005: (1) a proposal
for a Directive providing for sanctions against illegal employment (COM (2007) 249
final, 16 May 2007); (2) a draft Directive concerned a “Blue Card” work permit for
highly qualified employment (COM (2007) 637 final, 23 October 2007); (3) a proposal
for a set of common rules for a single permit and rights for third-country nationals
to reside and work in the territory of a Member State (Boeles, den Heijer Maarten,
and Kees, 2014). However, most Member States are reluctant to harmonize rules on
access of third country nationals to their labor markets in order to preserve their
sovereign discretion.
11Communication on a Community immigration policy (2000), 757 final, 22 November 2000.
12COM (2003) 336 final, 3 June 2003, 1.1.
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2.3 Overview of Intra-EU Mobility Policy and Law
The right to free movement granted to all EU citizens has been part of the European
project since its inception. The 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community referred to the free movement of workers as (i) the right to accept
job offers, (ii) the right to move freely within the territory of Member States to seek a
job, (iii) the right to reside in a member state for the purpose of employment13 (Pas-
couau, 2013). In the history of the European Union such assimilation has represented
not only an objective of legislative policy, but also an instrument of affirmation of the
Union as a unitary and identity space (Adam and Tizzano, 2017). The right of free
movement and residence for persons in the EU represents the cornerstone of Union
citizenship. It was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and implemented
by the gradual phasing-out of internal borders under the Schengen agreements. The
rights of the EU citizens to move and reside freely within the EU become central by
the adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC.
2.3.1 The Development of the EU Internal Mobility Law
Before 2004, a patchwork of several Regulations, Directives and European Court
of Justice (ECJ) judgment represented the law governing the free movement of EU
citizens. Article 18 of the EC Treaty (TEC) emphasized the right of the Union
13Article 48 Treaty of Rome states: (1) Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within
the Community by the end of the transitional period at the latest; (2) Such freedom of movement
shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment; (3) It
shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security
or public health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the
territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of
employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member
State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in
implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
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citizens “to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States". The
TEC guaranteed the free movement of workers (Articles 39-42), of self employed
persons wishing to settle in another Member State (Articles 43-48) and the freedom
to provide cross-border services (Articles 49-55). Furthermore, Article 39 provided
the right for equal treatment in working conditions. This principle was marked also
with the adoption of Regulation 1612/68/EC, which prevent discrimination among
workers based on nationality. In addition, EC adopted a secondary legislation that
provided corollary rights of residence and aimed to remove administrative formalities
in employment, such as the mutual recognition of diplomas and qualifications.
The development of free movement rights has followed the judgments of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, which clarified and expanded the scope of the right to freedom
of movement and to legal residence in the host Member State14. Although only the
movement of economically active persons was pursued in order to create a “common
market”, the evolving ECJ case law and the gradual adoptions of several directives
have resulted in the extension of free movement rights to other category of nationals,
as in the case of students (Directive 90/366, 1990 replaced by Directive 93/96, 1993),
pensioners (Directive 90/365, 1990) and a general category of nationals who are able
to financially support themselves (Directive 90/364, 1990).
One of the key milestone in establishing an internal market with free movement of
persons was the conclusion of the two Schengen agreements (1985 and 1990), which
14The case law on free movement of workers can be found in the Reyners judgment (ECJ 21
June 1974, Reyners, Case 2-74), where the Court established that having regard to the fundamental
character of freedom of establishment and the rule of equal treatment, all restriction on the freedom
of movement must be restrictively interpreted. The same conclusion can be found in ECJ 4 December
1974, Van Duyn, Case 41/74; and in ECJ 12 February 1974, Sotgiu, Case 152/73. In addition, ECJ
established that the terms connected with fundamental freedom must have a community meaning
and may not be interpreted by the Member States within the national legislation, as in the case of
the term “worker” (meaning and purposes can be traced in ECJ 3 July 1986, Lawrie-Blum, Case
66/85; ECJ 26 November 1998, Birden, C-1/97; ECJ 23 March 1982, Levin, Case C-53/81; ECJ 26
February 1992, Raulin, Case C-357/89) determined within the meaning of the Community Law.
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abolished the Union’s internal border controls. In this respect, any person, irrespec-
tive of nationality, may cross the internal borders without being subjected to border
checks. The concept of “nationality” of a Member State was marked with the in-
troduction of Citizenship of the European Union by Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.
The adoption of the Directive 2004/38/EC “on the right of citizens of the Union and
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States” marked an important development in the integration process. The Directive
consolidated most of the existing regulations on free movement of Union citizens and
considered the large body of ECJ case-law linked to the free movement of persons.
In particular, the Directive introduces EU citizenship as the basic status for EU na-
tionals when they exercise their right to move and reside freely in the EU territory15.
Specifically, the Directive states that workers who are citizens of another Member
State cannot be treated differently from national workers on the basis of their na-
tionality. Migrant workers’ right to reside for more than three months remaining
subject to certain conditions, which vary depending on the citizen’s status16. In ad-
dition, the Directive was designed to reduce administrative formalities, to provide a
better definition of the status of family members, and to limit the scope for refusing
entry or increasing protection against expulsion17 (Marzocchi, 2017). The Directive
15Directive 2004/38 entails that for the first three months, every EU citizen has the right to reside
in the territory of another EU country with no conditions or formalities other than the requirement
to hold a valid identity card or passport. For longer periods, the host Member State may require to
register the presence of the citizen within a reasonable and non-discriminatory period of time.
16In Article 7(1) Directive 2004/38 self-employed persons are granted the same rights as workers, in
accordance with Article 43 TEC. The right of residence depends on their having sufficient resources
not to become a burden on the host Member State’s social assistance system, and having sickness
insurance (Articles 6-18). EU citizens acquire the right of permanent residence in the host Member
State after a period of five years of uninterrupted legal residence (Art. 16).
17According to the Directive 2004/38, nationals of one Member State working in another have the
same social and tax benefits and access to housing as national workers, and are entitled to equal
treatment in respect of the exercise of trade union rights. Concerning the right to remain in the host
country after stopping work, job seekers have the right to reside for a period exceeding six months
(see ECJ, Case C-292/89, Antonissen) without having to meet any conditions if they continue to
look for an employment in the host Member State and during this time they cannot be expelled.
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allows a Member State to refuse an EU national the right of entry or residence on
the grounds of public policy, public security or public health, providing for a series
of procedural guarantees (Articles 27-33). However, although the importance of this
Directive, substantial implementation obstacles persist. The Commission reports and
Parliament studies on the application of the directive highlights the serious shortcom-
ings in implementation and continuing obstacles to free movement. Different serious
deficits in national transposition in the framework of protection provided by Directive
2004/38 has opened infringement proceedings against Member States, which apply a
whole range of exceptions to the granting of EU rights on free movement (Carrera
and Atger, 2009).
2.3.2 Mobility of EU Workers: Facts and Recent Develop-
ments
Today, the bulk of labor mobility within the EU, which guarantees EU citizens the
right to look for a job and work in another Member State, is laid down in Article 3(2)
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); Articles 4(2)(a), 20, 26 and 45-48 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). These Articles entails the
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Mem-
ber States. This principle guarantees EU citizens the right to equal treatment in
accessing employment, working conditions and all other social and tax advantages.
In particular, free movement of workers includes the right to benefit from the same
treatment as citizens of that country as regards access to: (i) employment; (ii) work
conditions, such as salary and grade; (iii) recognition of professional experience and
seniority; and (iv) any other social or tax advantage, as well as (v) the right to stay
After acquiring the right of permanent residence in the host Member State, EU citizens are no longer
subject to any conditions but can, if necessary, rely on social assistance in the host Member State
in the same way as its nationals can (Kraatz, 2018).
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even after occupying this post. Therefore, European citizens have the right to seek
employment in another EU country and to work there without requiring a work per-
mit18. Article 21 of the TFEU expressly provides that the right of EU citizens to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to
give them effect19. Member States are authorized to reserve certain public service
employments for their own nationals. Article 45 of the TFEU establishes that free
movement of workers entails the right to accept job offers made within the territory
of Member States, with the exception of certain jobs in public service. This principle
was recognized by the EU Court of Justice: the rights of nationals of a Member State
to enter the territory of another Member State and to reside there for the purposes
mentioned in the Treaty follows [...] directly from the Treaty20. Nevertheless, the
mobility of EU workers remains limited (Menghi and Quéré, 2016). In fact, only the
3.8% of EU citizens working age take advantage of this right, and reside and work in
another EU Member State.
Mobility patterns within the EU have changed considerably during the last decade.
Whereas intra- EU mobility remains low among the older Member States, the process
of enlargement (EU-15 and eastern enlargement) has been accompanied by a substan-
18EU citizens do not need a work permit both for purposes of salaried employment and of self-
employment. When a European citizen works in another EU country automatically acquires the
right to reside there. Family members also have the right to reside and work in that country.
19The purpose of the freedom of movement for workers is to allow European citizens to have access
to employment in another Member State other than their own. Article 1 of Regulation 492/2011/EU
of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 2011, on freedom of movement for workers
within the Union stipulates that: Any national of a Member State shall, irrespective of his place of
residence, have the right to take up an activity as an employed person, and to pursue such activity,
within the territory of another Member State in accordance with the provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action governing the employment of nationals of that State. He shall, in
particular, have the right to take up available employment in the territory of another Member State
with the same priority as nationals of that State.
20ECJ, 14 July 1977, Concetta Sagulo, Gennaro Brenca and Addelmadjid Bakhouce, case 8/77,
Rec. p. 1495, point 4.
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tial increase in intra-EU mobility as people from new Member States are moving to
work in the older Member States (see Fig.2.2).
Figure 2.2: EU mobile citizens of working age (20-64), by country of citizenship
Tertiary graduates result to be more mobile than the rest of the population. Fig.
2.3 shows that the share of people with tertiary education for working age citizens
living outside their Member State exceeds the tertiary education share of the resident
population by 2.3 pp (Eurostat, 2018).
Figure 2.3: Tertiary educational attainment of persons aged 20-64, by country of
citizenship
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2.3.3 The Right of Learning Mobility in the EU
The right for EU citizens to stay in another Member State for the purposes of study
is established in Article 7 (1)(c) of the Directive 2004/38. However, the grounds
for establishing students’ right to free movement have evolved over time. Initially,
learning mobility in the EC Treaty were limited to vocational training (Article 128
EEC). Since 1980s, the Court of Justice judgments have progressively stressed the
right of EU students, whether in general, vocational or university education, to move
freely across the Union for purposes of study21. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which
introduced the concept of European citizenship, extended the EU action on educa-
tion, encouraging cooperation between Member States and the mobility of students
and teachers. Considering the students’ right to equal treatment in access to educa-
tion, the Court found in the Raulin case the right to access and residence in another
Member State for the purposes of studying, invoking the principle of non discrimina-
tion22. The rights for students and their family members to move and reside within
the Union are set out in Directive 2004/38/EC, which guarantees to any EU student
the right to study and to stay in another Member State under certain conditions23.
21ECJ, Forcheri, Case 152/82, ECR 1983 02323; ECJ, Gravier, Case 293/83, ECR 1985 00593;
ECJ, Blaizot, Case 24/86, ECR 1988 00379; ECJ, Grzelczyk, Case C-184/99 ECR 2002 I-00663;
ECJ, Bressol, Case C-73/08.
22ECJ, Raulin, Case C-357/89, ECR 1992 I-01027. Following the case law establishing the right
to equality of treatment regarding the conditions of access to vocational training, higher education
and university education, the Court held in the early 1990’s that this right applied not only to the
requirements laid down by the educational establishment in question, such as enrollment fees, but
also any measure that may prevent the exercise of that right. The Court decided that the principle of
non-discrimination with regard to conditions of access to vocational training deriving from Articles
18 and 166 TFEU (ex Articles 7 and 128 EEC) implied that a national of a Member State who has
been admitted to a vocational training course in another Member State enjoys, in this respect, a
right of residence for the duration of the course.
23According to the Directive 2004/38/EC, any EU student has the right to stay in another Member
State for longer than three months, but under certain conditions that include (i) be enrolled in a
course of study at an educational establishment, whether private or public, accredited or financed
by the host Member State; (ii) have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member
State, and must inform the relevant national authority in line with the national rules; and (iii) have
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A Member State can require the student to register with the authorities. Like any
other EU citizen, a student who has resided legally for a continuous period of five
years in the host Member State acquires the right to live there permanently (Article
16). In addition to labor migration policies, regulations aimed at retaining students,
since the international mobility of students can benefit a country from their skills
since transitioning into the labor market. While learning mobility can benefit the
EU by fostering a sense of European identity and contributing to the internal mar-
ket, education and training are responsibility of each Member States. Although any
EU citizen should be able to practice the profession freely in any Member State, the
practical implementation of this principle is often hindered by national requirements
for access to certain occupations. The rights of students have developed and broad-
ened progressively over time24. As mentioned before, early attempts to encourage
mobility by the Commission included exchange programs for students and staff from
educational institutions to study or work in another member state (see Par. 2.2). Re-
cently, Directive 2005/36/EC (now Directive 2013/55/EU) has reformed the system
for recognition of professional qualifications to encourage more automatic recognition
of qualifications and to make labor markets more flexible25. Under the Regulation
(EU) 2016/589 (replacing former Regulation (EU) No 492/2011), European Employ-
ment Services (EURES) has become a real Europe-wide job mobility portal. This
introduces automated matching of job seekers’ skills and job openings thanks to the
enough resources not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host
Member State.
24The rules are generally based on Treaty provisions interpreted by Court decisions. Since this
process is ongoing and many of the decisions are relatively recent, the rights of mobile students are
not always clear (COM(2010) 477 final).
25Directive 2005/36/EC (now Directive 2013/55/EU) on the recognition of professional qualifi-
cations consolidates and updates the 15 existing directives, covering most all recognition rules and
provides for innovative features. It introduced measures as the European professional card and the
mutual evaluation of regulated professions.
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self-service tools on its digital platform26. In addition the portal aims to provide
general information on living and working conditions in the country of destination,
including language courses, and provide more personalized career and recruitment
advice. However, Member States should make an effort to improve the mechanism by
making all job vacancies and job applications published at national level. Recently,
the EU has made several efforts to create a more favorable framework for workers
mobility, including: (i) a European health insurance card and a Directive on cross-
border healthcare; (ii) a coordination of social security schemes (Regulation (EC)
No 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) No 987/2009); (iii) the adoption of the Directive
2014/50/EU on minimum requirements for enhancing worker mobility by improving
some supplementary pension rights; (iv) the adoption of the Directive 2014/54/EU
on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of
freedom of movement for workers. In addition, the European Commission proposed
to the European Parliament and the Council a Regulation for a European Labor Au-
thority in March 2018. This new decentralized EU agency ensure better enforcement
of EU law and provide supporting services for workers and employers. In conclusion,
to strengthen labor mobility, the Commission is working on a proposal to establish a
European Social Security Number (spring 2018), aiming to facilitate administrative
cooperation across national borders.
26The EURES (European Employment Services) cooperation network involves the Commission,
the public employment services of the EU and EEA Member States and other partner organizations,
and Switzerland.
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2.4 High-skilled third-country mobility within the
European Union
The regulation of labor immigration is one of the most controversial public policy is-
sues in the EU. European countries have been confronted for many years to the task
of balancing the need for a qualified young labor force and the fear that large inflows
of workers may create unemployment, lower wages and generally increase the compe-
tition for natives. While the immigration of non-EU workers is at the competence of
the national member states, various EU policies and directives have been introduced
to make the European Union more attractive for highly skilled third-country nation-
als. Labor immigration is considered an important means in an overall economic and
social context characterized by a number of skill and labor shortages, an accelerating
demographic ageing and a competition for the "best and brightest"(Frattini, 2005).
Therefore, the EU encourages several initiative to make the Union internationally
more competitive in the face of a worldwide race to attract talents (Boeri, Brücker,
Docquier, and Rapoport, 2012). At the 1999 Tampere (Finland) Council meeting,
leaders of the EU Member States discussed a common immigration policy, including
to improve the EU’s capacity to attract the highest skilled migrants. The underlying
idea was to enable EU to respond quickly and efficiently to labor market requirements
at national, regional and local level. In this respect, third-country workers should en-
joy the same working conditions, rights and responsibility as the EU nationals27.
In January 2005, the Commission launched a new debate on the need to build up
a European migration policy regarding the admission of third-country nationals. The
European Commission published a Green Paper (EC, 2004) on economic migration
following a proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
27COM (2000) 757 final, 22 November 2000.
103
country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic
activities28 (Münz, 2008). The Green Paper on economic migration has triggered
a debate29 on what rules should apply to the admission of migrants for economic
purposes. The Commission proposes a European system of selection, according to
criteria of experience, education, language skills and job offers in order to meet the
needs of specific skills30. It proposed a list of several approaches to the management
of economic migration. One of this approach would take into account the competi-
tion between the EU countries to attract migrants and the needs of their economies
to address specific labor and skills gaps (Friðriksdóttir, 2017). In June 2005, the
Commission launched a discussion, involving EU institutions, Member States and
civil society actors in order to adopt a common immigration policy for admitting
economic migrants. However, the Green Paper failed to get sufficient support in the
Council. Eventually, the Commission decided on a sectoral approach31, such as a
‘partitioning strategy’ where its initial proposal had to allocate into various drafts on
particular labor migration categories, including a directive on migrant workers’ rights
(Carrera, Guild, and Stefan, 2017). The consultation promoted during the Green
Paper discussions led to the adoption in December 2005 of a Policy Plan on Legal
28The idea behind both the Green Paper and the he proposal for the Directive was: both to
provide a pathway for third-country workers which could lead to a more permanent status for those
who remain in work, while at the same time giving a secure legal status while in the EU to those
who return to their countries of origin when their permit expires (European Commission 2003a).
29The European Commission set out several options for further discussion, including a horizontal
approach on the conditions of entry and residence or a series of sectoral regulations focusing on
different types of labor migrants. The horizontal approach, which could be complemented by specific
provisions to cover the particular needs of certain groups, aimed to create a common framework on
economic migration, with a high degree of flexibility. Instead, a sectoral approach expected to
develop a series of sectoral legislative proposals on admission of third-country nationals, especially
on highly qualified workers.
30Green paper - on an EU approach to managing economic migration presented by the Commission,
COM(2004) 811 final, available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/c11331_
en.htm
31CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (2004) Green paper on an EU approach to
managing economic migration (Brussels), COM(2004) 811 final, 1 November 2005
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Migration (EC 2005). The Commission prepared a proposal for a directive on a single
application procedure for a single work and residence permit and a common set of
rights for third-country nationals legally residing in an EU Member State, including
admission procedures able to respond to fluctuating demands in the labor market.
Three goals can be traced back to the 2005 Commission Policy Plan on Legal Migra-
tion: the first was to address the decline in working age population; the second was
to meet current and future labor demand; the third was to build a more dynamic
knowledge-based economy. In fact, the Policy Plan described the EU labor market as
a “need” scenario where some Member States were experiencing a substantial labor
and skill shortages in different sectors of the economy, “which cannot be filled within
the national labor markets”, by asserting the need of labor immigration for the EU
economic growth. The Policy Plan proposes several measures to regulate the entry
and the residence conditions of admission for few selected categories of economic im-
migrants including (1) a directive on the conditions of entry and residence of highly
skilled workers, (2) a directive on the conditions of entry and residence of seasonal
workers, (3) a directive on the procedures regulating the entry into, the temporary
stay and residence of intra-corporate transferees; and (4) a directive on the conditions
of entry and residence of remunerated trainees. Therefore, the Policy Plan proposed a
selective approach, by considering (1) few selected categories of economic immigrants
and (2) granted the rights only to immigrants belonging to each group (Friðriksdót-
tir, 2017). The policy development on the selection of the high-skilled immigrants
have been take through two initiatives, which are considered particularly relevant.
The first one involves two Council directives in order to regulate the admission of
third-country students (European Council, 2004) and researchers (European Coun-
cil, 2005). The second important initiative concerns the adoption of the European
Council Directive 2009/50/EC (“Blue Card Initiatives”). More recently, the Directive
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2016/801/EU “on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for
the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes
or educational projects and au pairing” was adopted to improve provisions and pro-
tection for intra-EU mobility. To conclude, in June 2016, the European Commission
suggested a number of proposals to revise the Blue Card Directive in order to increase
the attractiveness of the EU highly skilled migration scheme.
2.4.1 The Admission of Highly-Qualified Students and Re-
searchers
“One of the objectives of Community action in the field of education is to promote
Europe as a whole as a world center of excellence for studies and vocational training.
Promoting the mobility of third-country nationals to the Community for the purpose
of studies is a key factor in that strategy. The approximation of the Member States’
national legislation on conditions of entry and residence is part of this”32.
The Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 “on the conditions of
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unre-
munerated training or voluntary service” promotes the mobility of students as a key el-
ement in the strategy of the European Union33. The immediate purpose was to create
a common legal framework to promote EU as a world center of educational excellence
(OECD, 2016). In this respect, Member States should facilitate the participation of
third-country students in EU mobility programs. These programs were considered,
by definition, temporary and were not explicitly related to the labor-market situation
32Council of European Union, Preamble of the Directive 2004/114, 6.
33The Directive 2004/114/EC does not apply to: (i) asylum seekers; (ii) those whose expulsion
has been suspended; (iii) family members of union citizens who have exercised their right to free
movement; (iv) those with long-term resident status; and employed or self-employed third-country
nationals; (v) third-country nationals who fall into the categories of unremunerated trainees and
volunteers and who are considered as workers under the national legislations.
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in the host country. To be admitted to the EU for the purpose of study, third-country
applicants must meet a number of general conditions34 and of certain further specific
conditions. In particular, students were required to fulfill certain specific conditions,
including sufficient resources to cover subsistence, study and travel costs, and suf-
ficient knowledge of language of the higher education course35. Students’ residence
permits are to be valid for at least one year, and are to be renewable. They can be
withdrawn where the holder does not respect conditions, or where the holder does
not make acceptable progress in the studies36. While the directive lays down binding
rules on admitting students who are nationals of third-countries, it leaves it up to
EU countries to decide whether or not to apply its provisions to the other categories,
such as for school pupils, trainees, and volunteers. For non-EU nationals who are
secondary school pupils, the Directive covers only organized travel through exchange
schemes run by specialized organizations37. However, the admission of school pupils
participating in an exchange scheme may be confined by Member States to nationals
34Under the Directive, general conditions require to a third-country applicant: (i) to present a
valid travel document, (ii) to present parental authorization, in case of minors, (iii) to have a sickness
insurance, (iv) not to be regarded as a threat to public policy, security or health, and (v) to provide
a proof, if requested, that any processing fee is paid (Directive 2004/114/EC , Article 6).
35To be admitted, applicants who are not EU citizens must: (i) have been accepted by a higher
education establishment; (ii) have enough resources to cover their subsistence, study and return
travel costs; (iii) have enough knowledge of the language of the course to be followed; (iv) pay the
fees charged by the establishment concerned before traveling to the EU (a flexible condition left
to the discretion of individual EU countries). Some flexible conditions are left to the discretion of
individual EU countries (Directive 2004/114/EC , Article 7)
36A third country national who has already been admitted as a student and applies to follow in
another member state part of the studies already commenced, or to complement them with a related
course of study in another member state, shall be admitted by the latter member state within a period
that does not hamper the pursuit of the relevant studies, whilst leaving the competent authorities
sufficient time to process the application (Directive 2004/114/EC, Article 8).
37According to the Article 9, school pupils must not be below the minimum age nor above the
maximum age set by the Member State and must provide evidence related of: (i) a secondary
education establishment; (ii) a recognized pupil exchange scheme program operated by an organiza-
tion recognized by the Member State national legislation; (iii) a subsistence, study, healthcare and
return travel costs responsibility accepted by pupil exchange organization (iv) accommodation in
accordance with the rules of the pupil exchange scheme. School pupils’ permits can last for no more
than one year (Directive 2004/114/EC , Article 9 (2)).
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of third countries which offer the same possibility for their own nationals (Article 9).
The directive sets out the conditions for admitting non-EU nationals to take up remu-
nerated traineeships that need a training agreement for an unremunerated placement
with a public or private sector enterprise or vocational training establishment38. The
directive provides also for the conditions where a non-EU national applies to be ad-
mitted to a voluntary service scheme39. In this case, Member States can specifically
requires a basic introduction to the language, history and political and social struc-
tures of host country (Article 11). The main innovation under the Directives was the
provisions to allow students, already admitted by a Member State, to be granted a
right to mobility in the other Member States. However, Member States are allowed to
impose a number of restrictions (OECD, 2016). EU countries may withdraw or refuse
to renew a residence permit when the holders did not longer meet the conditions for
residence and when a third-country national is considered as a potential threat to
public policy or public security40. Moreover, Member State may take into account
the situation of the labor market, and may restrict access to economic activities for
the first year of residence. In addition, the length of procedures for delivering visas
to enter EU countries has sometimes prevented students from benefiting from EU
38Article 10 includes the specific conditions for unremunerated trainees that need a training agree-
ment for an unremunerated placement with a public or private sector enterprise or vocational training
establishment approved by the relevant authority, according to a Member State legislation. Further-
more, they must provide evidence about sufficient resources to cover the subsistence, training and
return travel costs and, if required by the Member State, they may receive a basic language training
needed for the purposes of the placement. Trainees’ permits can be for one year, extendibles once
only for as much time as is needed to acquire a vocational qualification.
39Volunteers, that may not be below the minimum age nor above the maximum age set by the
Member State, must produce an agreement giving a description of tasks, supervision, working hours,
resources for his travel, subsistence, accommodation costs and pocket money available during the
voluntary service. They must also provide evidence that the organization is responsible for the vol-
untary service programs, including subsistence, healthcare and return travel costs and has subscribed
a third-party insurance policy. Volunteers’ permits can be for one year, extendibles in exceptional
cases to correspond to the period of the relevant program (Directive 2004/114/EC, Article 11).
40The notion of public policy may cover a conviction for committing a serious crime. Furthermore,
this notion also may cover cases in which a third-country national belongs or has belonged to an
association which supports terrorism, or has or has had extremist aspirations.
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programs41.
The Researchers Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research aimed to make the European
Union more attractive for researchers from around the world. In line with the ob-
jective of a most competitive knowledge-based economy agreed in Lisbon European
Council (March 2000), the Directive was conceived for third-country nationals who
apply to be admitted to the territory of a Member State for more than three months
for the purpose of carrying out a research project42.
Any public or private research organization wishing to host a researcher under
the admission procedure approved by the Member State can make a host agreement
with a researcher granted the right to residence43. If the conditions for admission
are met, a Member State shall be admitted the researcher in its territory, granting
a residence permit for a period of at least one year44, if they prove to have sufficient
financial resources and are not considered to pose a threat to public policy, public
security or public health45. Unlike for Student’s Directive, researchers are afforded
more EU-mobility rights (OECD, 2016). Although the Directive does not include a
specific right for family reunification, for instance, if a Member State grants a resi-
41COM(2010) 477 final.
42Directive 2005/71/EC does not include: (i) third-country nationals that apply for international
protection or temporary protection; (ii) third-country students applying for a doctoral degree (Di-
rective 2004/114/EC); (iii) third-country nationals whose expulsion has been suspended for reasons
of fact or law; (iv) researchers seconded by a research organization to another research organization
in another Member State (Article 3).
43Directive 2005/71/EC, Article 5(1) and (2).
44In the case of a research project is scheduled to last less than one year, the residence permit
shall be issued for the duration of the project (Directive 2005/71/EC, Article 8 on the Duration of
residence permit).
45A third-country national who applies to be admitted shall: (i) present a valid travel document,
as determined by national law; (b) present the hosting agreement together with a statement of
financial responsibility according Articles 6(2) and 6(3); and (iii) present a statement where he/she
does not pose a threat to public policy, public security or public health (Directive 2005/71/EC,
Article 7).
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dence permit to the family members of a researcher, the duration of validity of their
residence permit shall be the same as that of the permit issued to the researcher46.
Moreover, Chapter IV of the Directive lays down other researchers’ rights, includ-
ing the activity of teaching (Article 11); equal treatment with nationals regarding
recognition of qualifications, working conditions and social security (Article 12); and
mobility between EU countries (Article 13). Member States may withdraw or refuse
to admit or renew a residence permit for a number of reason. They may refuse to re-
new a residence permit when it has been fraudulently acquired or wherever it appears
that the holder did no longer meets the conditions for entry and residence (Articles 6
and 7); or if residing for other purposes than for which the applicant was authorized;
or for reasons of public policy, public security or public health. However, the Di-
rective was designed to make EU a more competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
destination rather than to improve the rights for third-country researchers already
resident (OECD, 2016). For this reason, Member States are concentrated more on
the admission of certain third-countries nationals and they maintain a high degree of
discretion in the process of harmonization of admission policies.
2.4.1.1 The New Directive on Immigration of Students and Researchers
In 2011, the EU Commission produced two implementation reports on the 2005 Re-
searchers’ Directive and the 2004 Students’ Directive, identifying the weaknesses of
the existing legislation for admitting third-country nationals for research or study
purposes47. The assessment provided for by the Commission demonstrated that both
46Directive 2005/71/EC, Article 9. In some justified cases, however, a Member State may short-
ened the duration of the residence permit of the family member (Article 9).
47Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of
Directive2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes
of scientific research. COM(2011) 901 final; Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the application of Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission
of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or
voluntary service. COM(2011) 587 final.
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Directives had a modest impact on attracting more students and researchers to the
EU due to some problems of transposition in some Member States. The implementa-
tion reports identified a number of areas where transposition was insufficient mainly
in relation to admission conditions, rights, procedural safeguards, students’ access to
the labor market during their studies and intra-EU mobility provisions. Specifically,
the 2011 implementation reports highlighted: how lengthy and complicated adminis-
trative are the procedures for admission; the lack of opportunities to be integrated in
the labor market of the EU; difficulties in exercising intra-EU mobility. In addition,
they pointed out certain limitations in the rights for researchers (teach and family
reunification); and for students (restricted economic activities). For all these reasons,
the Commission proposed to review the existing legislation in March 2013 and to
merge the two Directives into one single text. The European Parliament adopted a
first position on 25 February 2014, including several amendments to improve the sit-
uation of students and researchers48. The Parliament and the Council only recently
agreed on the text of this proposal. Moreover, the European Parliament and the
Commission approved a joint statement on the ground for rejection49. The aim of
this statement was to clarify the provision which allowed Member States to reject
an application only on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circum-
stances of the third-country national and the principle of proportionality, as well as
on the basis of evidence or serious reasons. Highlighting the positive implications of
48The amendments to improve the situation of students and researchers proposed by European
Parliament included: (i) extending to 18 months the period during which students and researchers
can look for work after the end of their study or research period (the Commission had proposed 12
months); fees for handling applications should not be as excessive or disproportionate as to hinder
the aims of the legislation, adding that if fees are paid by the person concerned, he or she should
be reimbursed by the host entity or the host family; Extending the right to volunteers to move to
other EU countries and carry out their activities there; 30-day deadline (compared to the 60 days
proposed by the Commission) for member states to accept or refuse applications. They also added
a 30-day deadline for deciding on an appeal against a refusal.
49Article 20(2), point (f).
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international student mobility and the importance of their transition into the labor
markets, the European Parliament and the Council Directive on “the conditions of
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies,
training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au
pairing” (Directive 2016/801) was officially adopted in May 2016 (EU Publications
2016). Member States had two years to translate the Directive into their national
laws (before 24 May 2018). Moreover, some Member States - the UK and Denmark
and Ireland - did not take part in the adoption of the new Directive50. The final ver-
sion of the Directive is part of the effort to address shortages in specific skills, as well
as to make the EU a more attractive destination for talents. It provides harmonized
conditions of entry and residence in the EU for third-country researchers, students,
trainees and volunteers taking part in the European voluntary service scheme. It also
improves the situation of researchers and students in several aspects including mobil-
ity, entry of family members and access to work. In addition, the Directive extends
its purposes to two new categories of third-country nationals, such as remunerated
trainees and au pairs.
While in the previous Directives, each Member State decides whether students and
researchers could stay on after their studies or research have ended, the new Directive
makes easier for students and researchers to move within the EU during their stay51.
Moreover, the Directive is more explicit in terms of labor market aspect. It provides
students the right to work while studying for a minimum of 15 hours a week. In
50The UK and Denmark opted out of both 2004 Student’s Directive and 2005 Researcher’s Direc-
tive, while Ireland opted in to the Researchers’ Directive. All three countries have opted out of the
new law (Peers, 2015).
51Under the new rules, they will have to notify only the Member State to which they plan to move,
instead of submitting a new visa or residence permit application and wait for it to be processed.
Researchers will also be able to move for longer periods than those currently allowed and have the
right to bring their family members with them, also when they move within the EU, and these family
members will also have the right to work during their stay in Europe.
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addition, it allows both students and researchers to stay at least nine months after
finishing their studies or research to look for a job or to set up their own business. It
also includes some provisions for interns, school pupils, volunteers under the European
Volunteer Scheme, and au pairs. This is the first time that third-country au pairs
have been included in a EU law52. In addition to obtaining a job-search permit,
countries may incorporate additional incentives into their national policies to make it
more attractive for students to stay in their country. Common incentives among EU
member states include simplified application procedures to stay for working, which
could entail the exemption from labor market tests or examinations; lowered salary
requirements; full access to the labor market without restrictions, or limitations in
terms of working hours; additional incentives like reducing the number of years one
must reside in the country to qualify for a permanent residence permit (Burmann,
Perez, Hoffmann, Rhode, and Schworm, 2018).
2.4.2 The Blue Card Directive 2009/50 on the Admission of
Third-Country Workers
The second important initiative in the field of labor migration was the European
Council Directive 2009/50/EC, mostly noted as “Blue Card Initiatives”53. It was
adopted by the Council on 25 May 2009 (European Council 2009a, 2009b)54. This
initiative represents a EU attempt to attract high-skilled workers from non-EU coun-
tries in a context of a more and more high international competition. It aimed at
adopting a common policy for the entry and the residence of high skilled third-country
52European Parliament (2018), Legislative train schedule: Towards a new policy on migration,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/.
53This visa is inspired by the US Green Card, and the “Blue” comes from the color of the EU flag.
54Directive 2009/50/EC was adopted by the Council once obtaining the opinion of the Parliament
under the legislative procedure set forth in Article 251 of the TEC (now Article 294 TFEU). The
legal basis for the Directive is stemmed from Article 63(3) (a) and (4) of the TEC which now is the
Article 79(2)(a) and (b) TFEU (Friðriksdóttir, 2017).
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nationals, leading to the introduction of a temporary work permit (the blue card) for
the purpose of highly qualified employment55. In particular, the main goal is to de-
velop a legislation for increasing the contribution of economic immigration in the EU
economic growth through a set of policies and measures for a full economic and social
integration of highly qualified workers. Furthermore, in order to respond to fluctu-
ating demand for high-qualified workers, to offset skill shortages and to address the
problem of demographic ageing, the Directive would facilitate and harmonize the ad-
mission of highly skilled workers “by promoting the allocation and re-allocation on the
EU labor market”56. Specifically, the Directive aims to create a common integration
policy on third-country highly qualified workers on a needs-based approach in order
to promote their economic and social integration, to foster intra-EU mobility, remove
barriers and allow a more efficient allocation within EU57 (Friðriksdóttir, 2017) by
making their legal status fully transferable within the EU58. The Directive include a
fast-track procedure for admission based on common criteria: (i) non-EU citizenship;
(ii) completed higher education; (iii) a work contract or a binding job offer in at least
one year in the member state (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). In addition,
it provides several provisions for the access to the EU territory59. The scheme is
55The Directive refers to high qualified employment of a person that “has the required adequate
and specific competence, as proved by higher professional qualifications” (Article 2(b)). In fact, after
some reservations among the member states about both higher education qualifications and years of
professional experience, the definition does not establish a common set criteria applying to highly
qualified employment (Friðriksdóttir, 2017).
56Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country na-
tionals for the purposes of highly qualifies employment, COM (2007) 637, 23 October 2007, 2.
57Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council
Directive on the conditions for entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of
highly qualified employment, Summary of the Imparc Assessment, SEC (2007) 1382, 23 October
2007, 4.
58Before the introduction of the Blue Card, some EU member states adopted policies aimed in
attracting skilled immigrants. In 2008, UK became the first European country to discuss for a point-
based system. Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands have used “green card” or work permit
systems, in partnerships with employers, to attract and select highly educated workers (Brady, 2008).
59According the Directive, the conditions of admissions require to provide: (i) documents attesting
the higher professional qualifications; (ii) a valid travel document as established by national law and
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demand-driven, which means that a job offer by an employer determines admission.
Therefore, the main element for admission is a valid one-year work contract with a
gross annual salary that is not inferior to a relevant salary threshold defined by the
Member States. After a controversial discussion, Article 5 (3) establishes that the
gross minimum salary threshold must not be inferior at 1.5 times the average gross
annual salary in the state as set by national law (Speciale, 2010).
The EU Blue Card is valid for up to two years and can be renewed. However, the
provision in the Article 7(2) leaves the Member States a great flexibility in setting the
standard validity of the EU Blue Card between two and four years60. More freedom of
movement is established after period, including the possibility of the migrant gaining
access to a second member country’s labor market. Immigrants may gain permanent
residency after five years (article 16). Once receiving a blue card, workers can benefit
from the right to equal treatment, family reunification rules and geographic mobility
within EU. According to the Commission’s proposal, equal treatment with nationals
must be recognized by the Member States in order to establish the “most favorable
conditions possible”. However, the right to equal treatment was restricted by the
Member States during the negotiations61. Therefore, the Directive allows for several
derogations from the principle of equal treatment, especially for education and good
and services. In addition, it does not provide for equal treatment with respect to tax
if required evidence for a valid residence permit; (iii) evidence of a sickness insurance for the applicant
and his/her family members; (iv) evidence that the applicant is not a threat to public policy, public
security or public health.
60After some concerns expressed both by some member states and the Commission about the
duration of the work permit, the Presidency suggested that the “initial validity of an EU Blue Card
shall be of two years and shall be renewed for at least the same duration with a maximum of four
years” and if “the work contract covers a period less than two years, the EU Blue Card shall be issued
or renewed for the duration of the work contract plus three months” (Council of European Union,
Note from the Presidency to the Working Party on Migration and Expulsion 7(2) of the Directive).
However, the adopted Directive leaves the Member States greater flexibility than suggested by the
Presidency, diminishing the level of harmonization regarding Blue Card program.
61The most discussed topics among the Member States were related to equal treatment with
respect to education, housing, pensions, tax benefits and social assistance.
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benefits and social assistance (Friðriksdóttir, 2017). The rights of family reunification
for a EU Blue Card holder in the territory of a Member State stem from the Family
Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC with some important derogations in terms of
duration of the residence permit, integration measures and access to labor market,
in order to foster the integration of third-country nationals who could reasonably
become permanent residents62. As mentioned before, the Directive was introduced to
address an identified “needs” context of the EU labor market and to relieve the labor
shortages in certain areas/sectors. For this reason, one of the most discussed aspect
by the Member States was the access for highly qualified third-country nationals
to the national labor markets. The Proposal for a Council Directive elaborated by
the Commission included three Articles, which regulated the labor market access
(draft Article 13), the temporary unemployment (draft Article 14) and the access
to the labor market if the second Member State (draft Article 20)63. During the
negotiations, however, Member States granted a high degree of discretionary and
derogative power. The most important concession was that the Blue Card may not
prevent any parallel national programs for the same category of workers (OECD,
2016). Moreover, Member States may decide on the numbers of admissions. Article
(8) of the Directive which provides the grounds for refusal shows that a Member
State shall reject an application for a number of reasons including: (1) when the
documents have been fraudulently acquired, falsified or unauthorized changes; (2)
whenever the concerned vacancy is not filled by national or Community labor market;
(3) when the application is inadmissible in accordance the Article 664; (4) when the
62Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country na-
tionals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, COM (2007) 637, 23 October 2007, 11.
Article 18 of the Directive states that after 18 months of legal residence in the first member state
as a EU Blue Card holder, the person concerned and the family members may move to another
member state for the purpose of highly qualified employment.
63Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third country
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, October 2007,3.
64Article 6 determines the volume of admission of third-country nationals entering the territory
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application avoid an ethical recruitment65 in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified
workers in the countries of origin66; (5) if the employer has been sanctioned by the
national law for undeclared or illegal employment (Art.8 of the Directive). For the
same reasons, the EU Blue card can be revoked or refused to renew by a Member
State67. In addition, a withdrawal or a non-renewal can occur for reasons of public
policy, public security or public health (Friðriksdóttir, 2017). Since 2014, all Member
States except for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have taken part in the
EU blue card program. These countries has favored their own visa systems over
the EU-wide program. In this respect, UK and Denmark have adopted a point-
based work visa system in order to select high-skilled workers, while Ireland grants
work permits in skilled occupations experiencing labor shortages. The other Member
States, many with considerable delay, have transposed the Blue Card Directive into
national legislation. Therefore, while all Member States must comply with the blue
card’s central principles, the implementation of the Directive has been very divergent
because each country is allowed to retain high margins of discretion.
for the purpose of highly qualified employment.
65In the adopted Directive, ethical recruitment has replaced “brain drain” as suggested by the
European Parliament (Report on the proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and
residence of third country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment 10 November
2008, 23.
66The Directive condors the “brain drain” as dangerous and costly for developing countries. In
order to solve this inconvenience, the article 22 states that EU countries should refrain from pursuing
active recruitment in developing countries in sectors suffering from a lack of personnel and key sectors.
Moreover, the directive encourages the development of appropriate mechanisms to facilitate both
circular and temporary migration.
67A Member State can be revoked or refused to renew the Blue Card first of all, in the cases of
fraudulent acquisition, falsified or unauthorized changes, then, when the holder has not respected
the conditions for entry and residence laid down in the Directive (Articles 5 or 6) and the limitations
set out in the Article 12 (1) and (2) and 13. In particular, Article 12 concerns the access to the
labor market, while Article 13 regulates the temporary employment.
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2.4.2.1 Impact of the Blue Card and the Proposal for a Revised Directive
Attracting highly skilled immigrants to Europe has been one of the EU’s key prior-
ities. However, the EU Blue Card Directive had been evaluated as not sufficiently
successful. This limited application is due to a number of reasons including the high
costs it imposes on both employers and migrants and in part to the coexistence and
competition with national schemes for highly-qualified migrants. According to EU-
ROSTAT data (2019), the number of Blue Cards issued remains low. In the majority
of Member States, permits issued under national programs for highly qualified workers
exceed the Blue Cards.
A considerable exception is Germany, which issued 84.5 percent of all the EU Blue
Cards that were granted EU-wide in 2017. The others (Fig.2.4) were accounted for
by France (4.3%), Luxembourg (2.8%), Poland (1.9%) and Italy (1.2%).
Figure 2.4: Top Countries issuing the EU Blue Card
This generally very low number of granted Blue Cards especially compared with
national immigration schemes highlights that the Blue Card program has failed to
facilitate high-skilled immigration into the EU.
Since the Blue Card Directive was negotiated and adopted before the Lisbon
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Treaty entered into force68, the Directive provided Member States with wide discre-
tion regarding its implementation in national law69. As a consequence, the imple-
mentation of the Blue Card Directive in Member States has been very heterogeneous.
As mentioned before (Section 2.4.2), the Blue Card is a demand-driven system where
both the principle of Community preference and the Member States’ jurisdiction
decide on the numbers of persons admitted (Barroso, 2007). However, since labor
market needs differ in each Member State, the common system was flexible and no
coordination was considered about the actual migration quotas(Brücker, Bertoli, Fac-
chini, Mayda, and Peri, 2012). In addition, the Blue Card has been criticized for the
presence of high eligibility standards, including the high salary threshold, lengthy
bureaucracy, and limited harmonization concerning the intra-EU mobility. Not all
Member States, for example, recognize the five years of professional experience or
have set their salary thresholds at above or below 1.5 times the average gross annual
salary. Other variations include the periods of validity of the card, which in some
EU countries vary between one and five years, and the option to renew or withdraw
the card if the holder does not have sufficient resources to maintain themselves or
their family. Most countries require immigrants to make the application, while oth-
ers the employer, or both of them. Most of the countries allow equal treatment in
access to highly qualified employment after two years, while require the authoriza-
tion of a competent authority if the card-holder changes employer in the first two
years. Other differences are in respect to the application of provisions for residence
in other Member States 70 and on the provisions on temporary unemployment71 (EU
68In this case, the adoption required unanimity in the Council, while the European Parliament
was only consulted.
69European Parliament (2017), Revision of the Blue Card Directive, Briefing: EU Legislation in
Progress.
70The directive stipulates that the Blue Card holder may move to a second Member State after
18 months of legal residence in the first Member State, and may apply for a second Blue Card in
the first Member State or within a month of entering the second Member State
71The directive states that the beneficiary may be unemployed for less than three consecutive
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Parliament, 2017). Therefore, high salary threshold, job offer prerequisite and labor
market test have created additional barriers for high-skilled immigrants to work in
the European Union. Furthermore, from the perspective of firms, national schemes
look more beneficial(Giesing and Laurentsyeva, 2016).
For all these reasons, in the framework of the European Agenda on Migration
(2005), the European Commission has launched a review process of the EU Blue
Card Directive. On 7th June 2016, the Commission proposed to replace the Blue
Card Directive because it had showed an “intrinsic weakness”, restricting admission
conditions and limiting the intra-EU mobility. The aim of the Commission is to
make it easier and more attractive for highly skilled third-country nationals to come
and work in the EU, thus supporting European businesses in attracting qualified
and talented people. The proposal included improvements provisions to make less
stringent admissions criteria, such as lower salary threshold and shorter required
length of work contracts, better family reunification conditions, facilitated mobility,
and the abolishment of parallel national schemes.
In particular, regarding the access to the territory of a Member State and its
labor market, the Commission proposed several provisions in order to wide the def-
inition of highly qualified/highly skilled employment, and to relax the requirements
for admission72. By acting “as a single player towards the outside world” to “create
months and not more than once.
72Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM(2016)
378, 6 June 2016,6 The Commission has proposed (i) to lower the salary threshold for highly skilled
workers (Draft Article 5); (ii) to abolish parallel national programs for issuing permits to highly
skilled migrants (Draft Article 3); (iii) to permit changes in employer without prior authorization
(Draft Article 13); and (iv) to relax the conditions for the intra-EU mobility (Draft Article 227). In
addition, the access to the EU Blue Card is granted to the third-country national family members
of EU citizens, beneficiaries of international protection and third-country nationals to be resettled
under future EU schemes to engage in highly skilled employment (Draft Article 3). However, no
substantive changes have been proposed to equal treatment of EU Blue Card holders with nationals
(Friðriksdóttir, 2017).
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economies of scale and hence better compete with other major destinations for the
limited supply of highly skilled workers”73, the proposal includes several goals that
include: (i) attracting more high- skilled non-EU citizens through the Blue Card
Scheme; (ii) reducing costs for EU employers; (iii) enhancing mobility; and (iv) com-
peting with the National Schemes (Giesing and Laurentsyeva, 2016). However, being
based on measures proposed in order to facilitate the intra-European mobility and
the harmonization between the Member States, the Council achieved no compromise
on the inclusion of many provisions included skills and the recognition of professional
experience equivalent to education qualifications, due to some resistance by several
Member States (Friðriksdóttir, 2017).
A number of developments concerning the legal migration started in September
2017, involving inter-institutional negotiations for the revision of the EU Blue Card
Directive, leading to an agreement on a number of technical points. The evaluation
of the current EU framework on legal migration (REFIT Legal Migration Fitness
Check) continued and will be completed in 2018. The European Commission also
started developing pilot projects to enhance cooperation with third countries of origin
on the comprehensive management of migration, aiming to create a legal pathway for
economic migration to both address shortages in EU labor markets and to provide
opportunities for migrant to acquire new skills. Furthermore, in 2017, the European
Court of Justice provided judgments on three preliminary references: one related
to the long-term residents Directive 2003/109/EC (judgment in case C 636/16 on
protection of Long-Term Residence holders against expulsion); one related to the
Single Permit Directive 2011/98/EU (judgment in Case C-449/16 interpreting the
equal treatment Article of this Directive); and one related to the Students Directive
73Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM(2016)
378, 6 June 2016,6.
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2004/114/EC (judgment in case C-544/15 clarifying the interpretation of the public
security clause in this Directive). In its communication on managing migration in
all its aspects: progress under the European Agenda on Migration from 4 December
2018, the Commission reiterated the importance of the revision of the Blue Card
Directive and called on the Council to swiftly agree on a position which brings real
added value compared with the current Blue Card.
2.5 The Mobility of Turkish Workers into the EU
The relationship between Turkey and the EU could be traced back to the early years
of the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the appli-
cation of Turkey’s association membership in July 1959. The legislative framework
on the right of Turkish nationals to free movement within the EU is mainly drawn
by two legal sources. The first one included the EU legislation regulates the rights
of free movement of workers across the Union. The second framework relies on the
agreements concluded between Turkey and the European Community.
Ankara Agreement, also known as Association Agreement, was signed on 12
September 1963 and came into force on 1 December 1964. The Agreement is con-
sidered as the first piece of legal document in terms of Turkey-EU relations and the
foremost legal source on the free movement of Turkish workers at Community level.
On the one hand, in fact, the Agreement was considered as a legal document which
aimed to secure Turkey’s membership in the EEC through the establishment of a
Customs Union. On the other hand, the framework represented a political and an
economic agreement determining the basic principles of the association. It introduced
rights and obligations based on the concept of the reciprocity. The Agreement was
signed in a period (1960s) where the level of labor migration to the European countries
was increasing. In fact, some founding Members were experiencing labor shortages
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in the post-war period. The labor migration which had begun with individual ini-
tiatives in the early 1960s and turned out to be a flow in the mean time, led to the
conclusion of bilateral labor and social security agreements between Turkey and the
host countries, including some Community members (Halat, 2010)74. In this respect,
Association Agreement introduced a broader and comprehensive framework to the
issue of movement of Turkish workers. However, the Association Agreement itself
does not contain many provisions that are of immediate relevance to the freedom of
Turkish workers in the EU countries 75. The solely reference to free movement of
workers is made in Article 12 (Chapter Three of Other Economic Provisions), which
states that “The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of
the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing free-
dom of movement for workers between them”. However, the Additional Protocol and
Financial Protocol, signed 23 November 1970, annexed to the Agreement establish-
ing the Association between EEC and Turkey, is more explicit on issues of migration.
In fact, the Protocol includes more detailed provisions concerning the regulation of
the free movement of Turkish workers. The provisions were listed in the Articles 36-
40, which gradually established by progressive stages, the free movement of workers
between EEC and Turkey according to the principles of the Association Agreement
(Article 36)76. Other provisions included the non-discrimination principle on the ba-
74The aim was to ensure that migration would be systematic and Turkish workers would be
protected with regards to their working conditions and social security rights.
75Relevant Articles in the 1963 Association Agreement are the following: Article 7 (broadly similar
to the Article 10 TEC), is a principle of the Community loyalty and obliges the contracting parties
to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular nature, to ensure fulfillment of the
obligations arising out of the Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of this article, the
competence to take relevant decisions upon which the parties would take necessary measures was
given to the Council of Association (Article 22). Article 9 (broadly similar to the Article 12 TEC),
prohibits discrimination on ground of nationality, within the scope of application of the Agreement
and without prejudice of any special provisions contained therein.
76Article 36 gradually established the free movement of workers between EEC and Turkey within
12 and 23 years after the entry into force of the Protocol. In addition, the article states that the
Association Council would be responsible for establishing relevant rules for the achievement of free
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sis of nationality (Article 37); social security rights of the workers and their family
members (Articles 39); and a program to facilitate the exchange of young workers
across the EU (Article 40). In this respect, the Association Council was designed
to be the responsible for Turkish workers in respect to work and residence permits
(Article 38). In respect to self employment, Article 41(1) Additional Protocol: the
contracting parties refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions
on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services77.
However, the historical context of Turkey-EU relations have suspended the process
of enabling Turkish workers to freely move within the Community. Free movement of
workers between Turkey and the EU has not at all been achieved and, for this reason,
it it is not possible to consider the current legal situation as an extension of the internal
market with respect to free movement of workers78 . The Association Council has
to date adopted three important decisions on the rights of Turkish migrant workers,
namely Decisions 2/76, 1/80 and 3/8079.
Decision No. 1/80 of the Association Council was signed on 18 September 1980
and establishes a legal position for Turkish nationals to work in a Member State once
admitted under a national immigration law(Friðriksdóttir, 2017). It also gradually
increases the right of access to the labor market of a Member State of Turkish workers
movement of workers.
77In this respect, three interpretations by the ECJ are relevant: ECJ 11 September 2000, Savas,
Case C-37/98; ECJ 20 September 2007, Tum and Dari, Case C-16/05; ECJ 2003, Abatay and Sahin,
Joint Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01.
78Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union
within the Association Council set up by the Agreement establishing an association between the
European Economic Community and Turkey with regard to the provisions on the coordination of
social security systems, COM/2012/0152.
79Decision 2/76 was adopted at the twenty-third meeting of the Association Council, on December
20,1976. Decision No. 1/80 of the Association Council of September 19, 1980 on the development
of the Association. Decision No. 3/80 of the Association Council of September 19, 1980 on the
application of the social security schemes of the Member States of the European Communities to
Turkish workers and members of their families.
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(Article 6) and their family members (Article 7)80. Although the Decision contains
a clause according to which both Member States and Turkey may not introduce
new restrictions on the conditions of access to employment for workers and family
members who are legally resident in their respective territories (Article 13), limitations
to this clause may be justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health (Article 14). Decision 1/80 does not provide a right to family reunification.
Member States decide under what conditions family members are eligible for joining
a Turkish worker resident on their territories. The legal framework on free movement
of Turkish workers has developed by the cases brought in front of the ECJ, which has
considered the application of legal rights derived from the Ankara Agreement, and
its Additional Protocol and the 1/80 Association Council Decisions81. To date, the
position of Turkish workers regarding employment and free movement is stated on
Article 6(1) of Association Council Decision 1/8082. The ECJ interpreted the right
to access the labor market as provided for Article 6, as necessarily implying a right
to legal residence. In particular, according to the ECJ, the word "worker" must be
80Relevant provisions were listed in the Articles 6 to 16 (Chapter II, section 1). Article 6(1):grad-
ually increase the right of access to the labor market of a Member State of Turkish workers. Article
7 extends the gradually increasing right of access to the labor market to family members of workers
duly registered as belonging to the labor force of a Member State.
81The most important ECJ Interpretations of the Decision 1/80 on the access to labor market are
represented by the following case law: ECJ 20 September 1990, Sevince, Case C-192/89, para.29;
ECJ 6 June 1995, Bozkurt, Case C-434/93, paras 29-30; ECJ 30 September 1997, Günaydin, Case
C-36/96, para. 49; ECJ 30 September 1997, Entanier, Case C-98/96, para.55; ECJ 26 November
1998, Birden, Case C-1/07, para 65; ECJ 16 March 2000, Ergat, Case C-329/97, paras, 41, 56, 58;
ECJ 19 November 2002, Kurz, Case C-188/00; ECJ 21 October 2003, Abatay and Sahin, Joint Cases
C-317/01 and C-369/01, paras. 84, 85.
82According to the Article 6(1), a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labor force
of a Member State: (i) shall be entitled in that Member State, after one year’s legal employment, to
the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, if a job is available; (ii) shall be entitled
in that Member State, after three years of legal employment and subject to the priority to be given
to workers of Member States of the Community, to respond to another offer of employment, with an
employer of his choice, made under normal conditions and registered with the employment services
of that State, for the same occupation; (iii)shall enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid
employment of his choice, after four years of legal employment (Association Council Decision 1/80).
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interpreted according to the Community Law as "being duly registered as belonging to
the Labor Force"83. ECJ interpreted the 1/80 Decision in respect to the termination
of a residence right of a worker on 7 July 2005. In this case (Dogan, Case C-383/03),
ECJ states that the right ceases to exist when Turkish worker definitively ceases to
belong to the legitimate labor force of the host Member State84.
The Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol envisaged the necessary steps
for the full achievement of the free movement of workers. However, certain political
and economic developments hampered the establishment of full freedom of movement
in the EU for Turkish workers (Halat, 2010). Today, Turks are the largest immigrant
community in Europe. The total population of Turkish people living abroad exceeds
6 million people, around 5,5 million of which live in Western European countries
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Since 2004 accession negotiations with Turkey,
the question of Turkish immigrants in the EU countries become a major issue. This
is seen as exacerbating anti-immigrant feelings in a number of EU countries and is
fueling concerns about further immigration relations.
2.6 Skill-Selective Immigration Policies in the UK
and in Germany
There are many debates about the interaction between EU and national policies.
Although the competencies of the EU in the matter of immigration policies have
83According to the Article 6, the provisions must be regarded as applying to all workers who have
complied with the requirements laid down by legislation in the Member State concerned and are
thus entitled to pursue an occupation in its territory; and "legal Employment" presupposes a stable
and secure situation as a member of the labor force of a Member State and, by virtue of this, implies
the existence of an undisputed right of residence (Friðriksdóttir, 2017)
84Article 6 (second sentence) states that: Annual holidays and absences for reasons of maternity
or an accident at work or short periods of sickness shall be treated as periods of legal employment.
Periods of involuntary unemployment duly certified by the relevant authorities and long absences on
account of sickness shall not be treated as periods of legal employment, but shall not affect rights
acquired as the result of the preceding period of employment.
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increased over the years, the decisions on the actual selectivity of immigration con-
tinue to be a domain of national governments. During the last years, a policy shift
has occurred both at EU level and at that of its Member States. At the EU level,
several action plans are attempts to attract highly skilled immigrants and to facili-
tate the mobility of third-country nationals once thy have been admitted to an EU
member state. Nevertheless, the scope of this efforts is limited, because the immi-
gration policies continue to remain by and large in the national domain. Member
States at national level have restrictive and different rules on the admission of third
country nationals. As mentioned before, EU Member States integrated the EU di-
rective into their national legislation up to June 2011, and since 2012 most member
states have started to issue Blue Cards. However, the criteria used to determine the
admission for high-skilled immigrants - educational qualifications, work experience,
salary thresholds and job offers - vary across Member States. The EU Blue Card
program left parallel national admission scheme unaffected (OECD, 2016). Several
European countries have introduced a point-based system (PBS) to select migrant
workers. Since 2008, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria
have introduced PBS in their migration selection channels. In a climate of increased
global competition for talent, most countries have adopted measures aimed at at-
tracting highly skill individuals. For instance, they have launched reforms aimed at
encouraging international students to remain in the country after their graduation,
mostly by issuing work permits to ease their transition into the labor market. This
has been the case of France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (de la Rica,
Glitz, and Ortega, 2013). However, they fall far short of being radical policy shifts
(Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri, 2012). Triggered by concerns that Eu-
rope may fall back in the contest for talent, the EU has harmonized study programs
in order to encourage the intra-European flows of students. This in turn has lead to
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a higher intra-EU labor mobility, particularly among the highly educated. However,
many countries have increased the education costs for students and the restriction for
workers to enter their labor market.
The following paragraphs aim to present the admission policies in Germany and in
the UK, which present a different approach in selecting immigrants. While Germany
have full transposed the EU Blue Card Directive in its national legislation, the UK
has adopted a points-based system.
2.6.1 Point-based system in the UK
Point-based systems are a form of skill-based preference system proposed by countries
in order to make them more attractive to potential immigrants85. A point system
is essentially a selection tool that provide for the possibility of selecting immigrants
on the basis of more than one characteristic including age, educational attainment,
language ability, occupation, wage level, experience and wealth. Although different
point systems are used around the world, in general, countries allocate points for cer-
tain characteristics, and if a potential immigrants earns enough points, this receive
a permanent or a temporary visa, depending on the country (Bansak, Simpson, and
Zavodny, 2015). When several selection criteria are involved, one has to weight each
of them, that is, assign different points to each criterion and define an overall point
threshold to determine whether an applicant will be accepted. Exactly how points are
allocated and what the passing threshold is different across the countries. Tradition-
ally, points systems have been implemented in countries, such as Australia, Canada
and New Zealand, under whose migration system candidates were not required to
have a job offer in order to be eligible for immigration. A number of countries, in-
cluding Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Sweden and the
85In this case, the term “skill” is used as a synonym for “ability” acquired through formal education
and work experience (Tani, 2014)
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United Kingdom, have introduced a point system in recent years. However, points
systems have also been implemented more recently in regimes which select econom-
ically desirable immigrants depending on a job offer and skills shortages, such as in
the United Kingdom Tier 2 system. They also provide more flexibility in identify-
ing appropriate candidates, who can be highly skilled without necessarily having, for
example, a university qualification. In this case, self-selection works to attract the
most able and motivated workers because the distribution of income between coun-
tries remains unequal over time. According to the Roy model, income inequality
and a selective immigration policy work together by screening in favor of observed
(skills) and unobserved characteristics , such as innate abilities and motivation (Bor-
jas, Kauppinen, and Poutvaara, 2018). A point system becomes relevant if the host
country has a relatively high average income compared with the home country but a
compressed income distribution and possibly a comprehensive welfare system for its
low-income earners. Based only on observed individual characteristics to screen desir-
able immigrants, the host country keeps out low-skilled immigrants in favor of skilled
immigrants in order to “protect” the host country’s welfare system and address its
domestic employers’ needs. Such a measure may also offer an automatic mechanism
to stabilize income inequality trends between skilled and unskilled native workers.
This is because the earnings growth of skilled immigrants will be constrained (due to
the additional supply of skilled immigrant labor), whereas unskilled (native) workers
will be in shorter supply and therefore command higher wages (Tani, 2014). Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand are high-income, high-tax, high-welfare countries with
relatively compressed income distributions, and their point system is thus likely to
filter out prospective low-skilled and low-ability immigrants. Points systems may suc-
ceed in selecting economically desirable immigrants because of their association with
migration regimes, such as Canada’s, which are generally viewed as successful ones.
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They can be a useful tool in screening potential migrants, but are complementary to
job offers to employers. Indeed, Australia and Canada are according more and more
importance to job offers in their points systems, because outcomes for immigrants
selected under the points system without a job offer have not been as good in those
countries as used to be case in the past (OECD, 2014). A point system is a tool for
selecting would-be settlers who, because of increased international mobility and their
transferable skills, can enhance their income or quality of life by moving to another
country. Historically, the point system has been implemented to limit and regulate the
in inflow of migrants when they exceed the cap set by host countries. While effective
in screening and altering an excess supply of immigrants, the system requires large
data collections and regular policy evaluations. If this is not implemented, admitting
unemployable immigrants becomes more likely, leading to substantial financial and
social costs for the host country. Point systems do not guarantee immigrants’ im-
mediate economic integration, particularly in the early years after migration (Tani,
2014).
The UK manages its migration flows through its own national immigration law.
Since 2008, in fact, the UK governments have published an immigration policy frame-
work that has marked a shift in the priorities on immigration policy through the adop-
tion of a points-based system. The points-based system replaced a large range of work
and study visa categories which had evolved over time. These included the Highly
Skilled Migrants’ Programme, work permit schemes, and quota-based schemes for cer-
tain types of low-skilled work. These schemes granted non-EEA economic migrants
temporary permits to work in the UK. Before the introduction of the PBS, skilled
labor immigration was managed by permits granted to specified UK-based employers
that sponsored named individuals to fill defined jobs at particular locations. Permits
were administered by Work Permits (UK), part of the UK Border Agency (UKBA),
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which was replace by the “UK Visas and Immigration” in 2013. An additional route
for highly skilled labor was the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, which was imple-
mented to encourage highly skilled people to come to the UK to work. While, since
the UK became a member of the EU, there has been an unrestricted right of free
circulation to any citizen of the EU member states (Aldin, James, Wadsworth, 2010).
Before 1962, any Commonwealth or Irish citizen had right of entry to the UK. In
1962, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was introduced through a voucher scheme,
and the principle of right of entry to Commonwealth citizens was abolished in 1972
(Dobson, Koser, McLaughlan, Salt, et al., 2001). In that period, the existing work
permit system was extended to all citizens outside of the EEC, Denmark, and Norway.
Since the late 1990s, the British government has significantly increased the number
of work permits issued to skilled and highly skilled non-EU migrants. The increase
in labor immigration to the UK was further accelerated by the British government’s
decision to allow so-called A8 nationals to enter and work without any restrictions
in May 2004 (see MAC, 2009). In 2008, the UK adopted a Points Based System for
managing the migration of non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals into the
country for work, training or study.
The UK’s new points-based system was organized along several tiers, which iden-
tified five categories of immigrants to be admitted under a point-based system. Each
tier contains several different visa sub-categories (and some sub-sub-categories), with
varying associated conditions and eligibility requirements. The first two categories
included highly skilled immigrants, which are grouped in the Tier 1 programme and
a Tier 2 scheme. Under the first programme, high skilled workers could apply for
an entry permit, without needing an existing job offer. Tier 2 scheme should serve
as main route for medium and high skilled workers who have already received a job
offer. Tier 4 was devoted to the entry of the international students, who need to be
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Figure 2.5: Migration to the UK by categories
sponsored by a licensed educational institution. While the last two tiers should serve
as routes for temporary immigrants and for low skilled workers. Specifically:
• Tier 1: high-value immigrants (entrepreneurs, exceptional talent, post-study
employment and investors;
• Tier 2: skilled workers with a job offer in an area where there is a labor shortage.
Categories under this route include: 1) intra-company transferees (ICT); 2)
elite sportspeople; 3) Ministers of Religion 4) general category that covers the
admission of people coming to the UK with a job offer to ll a gap that cannot
be filled from within the resident labor force;
• Tier 3: low skilled workers designed to fill temporary low-skilled shortage;
• Tier 4: foreign students;
• Tier 5: persons coming to the UK to satisfy primarily non-economic objectives,
such as those entering on youth mobility schemes and temporary workers, or
asylum seekers.
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Since its introduction, the idea of the Labor Government was to attract “the
brightest and best” immigrants. For several years the UK government policy has em-
phasized the need to prioritize skilled over unskilled migration. The UK system was,
in fact, specifically designed to select individuals with skills regarded as beneficial to
the national economy. Similar to the Australian and Canadian point systems, the UK
first version system awarded points based on age, work experience and qualifications
and there were no pre-specified numerical limits (de la Rica, Glitz, and Ortega, 2013).
However, the application requirements become substantially stringent over time. Fol-
lowing the 2010 election, the Coalition Government reviewed the Points Based System
for non-EEA migrants. The overall ambition aimed to reduce net-migration by the
restriction of inflows of non-EEA net migration and to boost outflows of non-EEA
nationals in order to affect the size and the composition of UK migrant workforce86.
Controls on labor migration were introduced from April 2011, when the government
announced a numerical immigration limit. Major reforms have included: (i) the clo-
sure of the Tier 1 general route due to a mismatch between education and occupations;
(ii) the introduction of a permanent limit of 20,700 on skilled labor migration from
outside the EU (Tier 2-General); (iii) strengthening the resident labor market test
and successive updates to the Shortage Occupation List.; (iv) introducing financial
requirements for those wishing to settle in the UK. Since 2011, furthermore, the UK
Government has added a multiple checks for international students’ compliance with
visa rules, stabbing restrictions on permission to work for international students and
closing the Tier 1 Post-Study Work route, which allowed non-EEA university stu-
dents to stay in UK and work two years after graduations. Since 2012, restrictions
have affected also the family migration by increasing the minimum income threshold
86One of the main promises by the former Prime Minister David Cameron during the 2010 General
Election campaign was to decrease net migration to less than 100,000 migrants per year by 2015
General Election, and migration policy has since been focused on this goal (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva,
2015).
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for British nationals to bring non-EEA partners and children to the UK and addi-
tional restrictions such as the need to demonstrate English proficiency (Rienzo and
Vargas-Silva, 2015). In general, the tiers system is considered to be demand-driven
since a valid job or, proof of investment capital or self-employment is a requirement.
Although applicants are selected based on their overall score, the scores achieved in
various sub-criteria also matter. This means that applicants cannot compensate for
missing points in one criterion by scoring higher in another (Burmann, Perez, Hoff-
mann, Rhode, and Schworm, 2018). The requirements for the resident permit are
stringent and allow only for a temporary admission into the country. Furthermore,
most of the tiers require that the applicants must have a job offer and be sponsored
by an employer licensed by the UK Home Office87. Another important feature of
this system is its reliance upon previous earnings as a measure of expected labor
market performance of the perspective migrants, emphasizing that the labor shortage
determines the job offer in each occupation (Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and
Peri, 2012). As opposed to Australia, Canada and New Zealand, United Kingdom
allows immigrants to grant a temporary visa in order to work in the UK for a few
years but not to grant permanent resident status. The latest estimation provided by
the Office for National Statistics (ONS), suggest that 627,000 people arrived in the
UK (immigration) and 345,000 people left the UK (emigration) over the 2018. There
are different patterns for EU and non-EU migration to the UK. According to the
ONS estimates (2019), non-EU migration for both work and study follows a gradual
increase in immigration of non-EU citizens from 2013 to an estimated 340,000 in the
year ending September 2018. The UK has closed down or never opened a few of tiers.
The largest category of work visas issued to non-EU citizens was Tier 2 route in 2018,
which counted the 45% of all work visas. Details of the Tier 2 system can be found
87Employer sponsorship means that employer is responsible for the foreign worker and must notify
the UK Home Office if the employee stop working.
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in the next chapter. The second largest category was Tier 5, which includes various
temporary workers coming for cultural exchange and other work-related purposes and
represented the 31% of work visas, while Tier 1 visas for main applicants remained
below the 3% of work visas issued in 2018 (Sumption, 2019).
Figure 2.6: Visa issued by applicants type in the UK
According to ONS (2019), the population of EU net migration has sharply de-
creased since 2016 referendum. In particular, ONS estimated 57,000 more EU citi-
zens coming to the UK than leaving in the year ending September 2018. In 2017,
EU population stood at almost 3.7 million, where approximately 2.4 million EU born
were employed in the UK labor market. In 2016, inflows of EU nationals migrating to
the UK stood at 250,000, down from 269,000 in 2015 (ONS, 2018). The post-Brexit
seems to call for a system where future immigrants (i) are likely to be more skilled
than their predecessors; (ii) they will probably stay in Britain for only a few years,
rather than settle; and (iii) largely will come from outside the EU (Sumption, 2019).
In December 2018, the UK government published a White Paper, which outlines pro-
posals for the future border and immigration system88. The future system predicted
88In September 2018, the MAC published a comprehensive analysis of the economic and social
impacts of EU migrants in the UK.
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in the White Paper will apply in the same way to all nationalities, such as there
will no longer differences between non-EU and EU citizens immigrants. Furthermore,
the UK government will prioritize skilled migrants through a skilled-based migration
policy. When the Government published its white paper on the UK’s post-Brexit
immigration system, one of the main questions that has received much attention was
the salary thresholds that EU and non-EU citizens would both have to meet after
Brexit if they want to come here for work. In the proposed system, migrants planning
to live and work in the UK long term would have to be doing a skilled job and receive
a minimum salary, as non-EU citizens currently have to do when they come to the
UK on ‘Tier 2’ work visas. As mentioned above, currently, the general minimum
salary for most experienced workers coming from non-EU countries is £30,000. The
White Paper does not commit the Government to a specific level in the future system,
but in an annex to the White Paper does take £30,000 as the baseline (Migration
Observatory, 2019).
As the UK leaves the EU and the free movement will be to an end, different rules
to the current ones to migration are proposed in the White Paper (UK Parliament,
2018). The future system will apply in the same way to all nationalities - EU and
non-EU citizens (White Paper, 2018). The proposed new system should require all
EU citizens coming to the UK for work or study to have authorization. Following the
advice of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), the new system will prioritize
skilled migration.
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2.6.2 Policies for High-Skilled Immigrants in Germany
Since the end of the Gastarbeiter period in 197389, German immigration policy limits
immigration to skilled or highly skilled workers and admits low skilled workers only
for short periods. Until recently, the most popular temporary worker programs there
admitted seasonal workers and workers used by foreign contractors. These programs
brought short-term labor to Germany from Eastern Europe but became obsolete as
more countries ascended into the EU (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015). In
order to prevent low skill levels in the immigration population and to increase the
shortage of highly skilled labor, German government launched the New Immigration
Act in 2005 where Germany declared itself as a country of immigration, putting
integration as a legal duty90. Furthermore, in addition to the regulation measures
aiming to improve integration, this Law was an important step in the regulation
of labor market, identifying three types of legal residence permits: Permit of stay;
Settlement permit; and Residence permit or Aufenthaltserlaubni for the economic
activities (Constant, Tien, et al., 2011). The new Immigration Act replaced the
former German Green Card Initiative in order to encourage the access in labor market
for highly skilled workers to move to Germany. The reform that explicitly targeted
highly skilled workers focuses on two groups perceived as highly skilled. The first
group includes scientists and teaching personnels with excellent qualifications like the
University Professors, outstanding sportsmen, and artists. Instead, the second group
includes managers and specialists. Although both groups are entitled to permanent
89Starting from the early 1950s began the recruitment of foreign workers, the so-called Gastar-
beiter, who were hired for a temporary period. The 1973 represented a turning point in the migration
history of many countries due to economic recession triggered by the global oil crisis. In particular,
Germany experienced an increase in unemployment as well as a contraction in mass production. For
this reason, the government of GFR established the so-called Anwerbestop, that is the interruption
of recruitment policies.
90Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und
der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern, 2005.
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stay, a resident permit is granted to individuals who are self-employed if they invest
e500,000 and employ at least five persons. The new German Immigration Act allows
highly qualified persons to be granted permanent residence and permission to work
from the outset instead of five-year work permits as was previously. For instance,
whereas according to the Green Card regulation initiated in 2000, foreign computer
experts had to leave Germany after five years, the new law allows them to stay
permanently (Grassler, 2005). This Law has marked an important development in
Germany also regarding to the foreign students. While previously it was quite difficult
for foreign students to remain in Germany upon the completion of their studies, since
2005 foreign graduates of German universities can have a year to look for a job if
they wish to stay in the country. However, only since 2005, Germany has begun
to gradually address its immigration policy toward labor immigration of high skilled
foreign workers, by introducing other changes and reforms along the last years. The
most important attempt in this respect was the introduction of the EU Blue Card in
2012 , namely the EU-wide work permit that allows highly skilled immigrants with a
job offer to work in European Union (Burkert and Haas, 2014).
The EU Blue Card is an important type of combined residence and work per-
mit under the German immigration law, which was formally introduced in Germany
on 1 August 2012 on the basis of the Act Transposing the Highly Qualified Em-
ployment Directive (Directive 2009/50/EC) on highly-qualified employment. It is a
self-contained residence permit, which was introduced to facilitate the recruitment of
highly-qualified applicants from the non-EU countries. Among other things, this Act
has resulted in the introduction of a new residence title as outlined in section 19a
of the German Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz). Blue Card Initiative specifically
targets third-country nationals who enter Germany directly from a non-EU state91,
91Residence Act, section 19a subs. 1.
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or who already have an EU Blue Card as a resident in another EU Member State92
and who come to Germany for the purpose of taking up highly qualified employ-
ment93. The entry visas are mainly issued under the same requirements as final EU
Blue Cards and have a validity of 90 days. Those requirements include: (i) work in
Germany related to a local employment contract; (ii) have a German (or equivalent
foreign) university degree; (iii) earn a salary that complies with the salary criteria. In
terms of salary, German immigration law differentiates between shortage occupations
and other occupations. The salary criteria stipulated by the EU Blue Card regula-
tion are a mandatory requirement. In these cases of occupations in which there is a
shortage of applicants, the EU Blue Card may only be issued with the consent of the
Federal Employment Agency, unless they graduated in Germany94. If the laws change
between filing the application and the decision to issue a permit, the latest laws have
to be considered. Third-country nationals already living in Germany under a different
type of residence permit may also apply for an EU Blue Card, under several condi-
tions95. People living in non-European countries must first apply for a visa for the
purpose of employment in their home country before they enter Germany in order to
submit an application for an EU Blue Card. Third-country nationals who have been
in possession of a EU Blue Card issued by another EU Member State for at least 18
months and who wish to migrate from that country to Germany may also apply for
an EU Blue Card in Germany. The application must be submitted within one month
of entry into German (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2019). Holders of
92German Residence Ordinance (Aufenthaltsverordnung – AufenthV), section 39 No. 7.
93All foreigners except nationals of Australia, Canada, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea,
and the Unites States are entry- visa required for employment-related stays in Germany.
94Employment Ordinance, section 2 subs. 1 No. 2b and subs. 2.
95The conditions include: (i) the proof that they have graduated from university-level studies
and the qualification must be comparable to a German higher education qualification96 and (ii) the
evidence of an employment contract or a binding job offer with a specified minimum salary (Federal
Office for Migration and Refugees, 2019).
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the EU Blue Card in Germany may be issued with a permanent national residence
title (settlement permit) once they have been in highly qualified employment for 33
months during which they have paid into a retirement scheme. Holders of the EU
Blue Card who can prove adequate German language skills at level B1 can apply for
a settlement permit for Germany after only 21 months. This visa route enable the
entry of family members97.
Figure 2.7: EU Blue Card issued in Germany by years
Nevertheless, the EU Blue Card is not the only type of combined residence and
work permit for third-country nationals locally employed in Germany. Another type
of permit for highly-skilled specialists exists and, additionally, nationals of the seven
countries listed above can apply for a combined residence and work permit. For these
types of permits, definite salary criteria do not exist. Amongst other requirements,
the salary must be equal to the salary of local workers with a comparable professional
background and working in a comparable position 98. Since 2013, the Federal Min-
97Residence Ordinance, section 39 No. 7. The EU Blue Card has several advantages for family
members. In particular, spouses are entitled to be granted a residence permit even if they do not
possess any knowledge of German prior to entering the country (Residence Act, section 30 subs. 1
sentence 1 No.3g and sentence 3 No. 5). In addition, spouses are immediately entitled to take up
dependent and independent employment without any restrictions (section 27 subs. 5).
98The salary criteria for EU Blue Cards in 2017 calendar year issued by German authorities have
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istry of Labor and Social Affairs (FMLS) has promoted a campaign in order to attract
high skilled workers especially young individuals from EU countries suffering from the
economic and financial crisis. It is organized into two steps: the first one concerns the
country of origin through an introductory course of German language supported by
FMLS itself; the second one is linked to the support in the search of employment or
apprenticeship position in Germany and to take part in language classes in Germany
in order to prevent communication barriers. Both prospectives involve immigrants,
who are between 18 and 35 years old as well as interested employers, who can ap-
ply for support under this campaign. Furthermore, the Federal Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs (FMET) together with the Federal Employment Services (FEA)
launched the website “Make in Germany” in order to make easier foreign workers to
take up employment in Germany (Constant, Rinne, et al., 2013). One of the main
obstacles to job mobility in Germany resulted to be the insufficient language skills
and the recognition of qualification. For this reason, both federal state and local
governments, as well as the employers have tried to introduce some services for im-
migrants. At the first level, the institutions have spread solutions in order to improve
the labor integration of immigrants through counselling, vocational training and lan-
guage courses. In this way, federal governments are shaping their integration policies
towards the coordination of training and employment services at regional level to
improve employment advisors’ intercultural competence. Altogether, the reforms of
the immigration legislation in Germany did not fundamentally change the conditions
for selection of high-skilled immigrants (Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri,
2012).
increased. For shortage occupations, the new criterion is EUR 39,624, while in 2016, was EUR
38,688 and for all other occupations it is EUR 50,800 (in 2016: 49,600). In addition, the general
minimum wage requirement arising for all work performed in Germany increased from EUR 8.50 to
EUR 8.84 gross/hour (Klaus and Wolf, 2017).
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2.7 Conclusion
The EU labor market is expected to experience important future challenges. While
the ageing population is expected to affect the quantity of the labor supply, the in-
creasing demand for certain skills and for technological innovations will change the
way how work is conceived and organized, affecting professions and occupations re-
quired in the labor market. Therefore, attracting highly qualified labor has become a
key priority of most Member States, which view migration as part of a wider strategy
to address labor shortages in the domestic workforce. Generally, two systems have
been identified to linking economic migration to labor market needs: demand-driven
systems, where an employment offer influences the decision to admit a migrant seeking
employment in previously identified shortage occupations; or supply-driven systems,
where admission frameworks are adjusted in order to attract migrants with character-
istics like education, abilities and potential to successfully integrate. Often countries
also implement a hybrid structure merging both supply-driven and demand-driven
approaches in their migration policies. To date, efforts at Union-level to attract high-
qualified workers from third countries have had a limited impact due mostly because
of the limited application of the EU’s Blue Card Directive. Statistics show that la-
bor migration into the EU is relatively low in comparison to other OECD countries.
These flows from third countries differ greatly across European host countries, both
in terms of size and composition (de la Rica, Glitz, and Ortega, 2013).
While today’s intra-European migration is largely unrestricted, the regulation
of immigration flows from outside the EU remains primarily the responsibility of the
individual national governments. Migration policy includes both laws and regulations,
as well as specific programs.
Currently, the EU’s approach to labor migration has so far been implemented
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through individual Directives focusing on the conditions of residence and entry of
specific categories of third country workers, including highly- skilled workers, sea-
sonal workers, intra-corporate transferees (ICTs) and students and researchers. In
addition, a number of instruments have been developed at the EU level to monitor
and forecast labor migration across Member States, for instance the European Em-
ployment Observatory, the European Vacancy Monitor, EU Skills Panorama, and the
EU Labor Force Survey. However, the impact of both directives and instruments are
considered to be limited due to problems in relation to their implementation.
In May 2009, the Council Directive "on the conditions of entry and residence
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment" was ap-
proved with th aim to increase internal labor mobility to improve the match between
labor market supply and demand, but also foresees a growing need for more migrants
from outside the EU (Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan, 2012). The so-called Blue
Card Directive put in place a specific demand-driven migration scheme for highly
qualified non-EU workers by introducing a new procedure and common admission
criteria for issuing a special residence and work permit. The EU Commission pre-
sented three main arguments in favor of the Blue Card: (1) EU enterprises have
growing difficulties in filling their labor market shortages; (2) the EU was no longer
producing sufficient numbers of workers to meet its labor market needs; and (3) the
high-skilled regime was failing in international competition for the "best and bright-
est" (Commission, 2007). This Initiative sought to make the EU internationally more
competitive by facilitating the access to the labor market and providing the holders
some socio-economic rights, like favorable conditions for family reunification and fa-
cilitated movement around the EU. However, Member States were reluctant to cede
responsibility for labor market access regulation. For this reason, the EU Blue Card
Directive has had a limited application due to a number of reasons, including the high
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costs it imposes on both employers and migrants and the coexistence and competi-
tion with national schemes for highly-qualified migrants. In addition, the Directive
was criticized for the presence of high eligibility standards, including the high salary
threshold, lengthly bureaucracy, and limited harmonization concerning the intra-EU
migration. For these reasons, the Commission made a review of the EU Blue Card
one of its top priorities, with the goal of making the EU Blue Card a more attrac-
tive and relevant scheme across Member States. In June 2016, the Commission put
forward a proposal for a new EU Blue Card Directive that offers a more harmo-
nized, simplified and streamlined approach to attract highly skilled workers through
a EU-wide scheme, which intends to introduce more inclusive and flexible admission
conditions, faster and more flexible procedures, improved rights and enhanced facili-
tation of intra-EU mobility. At the same time a new dedicated EU Blue Card section
was launched on the EU Immigration Portal in order to provide practical informa-
tion for potential EU Blue Card applicants. Some researches have shown that the
Blue Card in the EU would only be effective in case of an increase in the share of
employment-based immigrants in the population (Hatton, 2008; Speciale, 2010).
While the majority of policies is employment-based, the implementation of poten-
tial oriented schemes is increasing. Another potential-oriented policy is the EU-wide
directive aimed at increasing of foreign graduates and researchers. With a view to
retaining a higher number of third-country national students after graduation, the
Students and Researchers Directive was adopted in 2016. This was the result of the
recast of the 2004 Directive on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals
for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, remunerated training or voluntary service
and the 2005 Directive on researchers. An endorsement for a high-skilled mobility
within the EU has been provided also for EU citizens under different regulations in
order to harmonize the study programs and to recognize the university degrees among
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the Member States.
The review of the main developments for mobility of high-skilled immigrants across
the EU has showed a fragmented framework. The EU presents several directives
covering different types of migrants. The reasons for such fragmentation has been
due to Member States’ reluctance to cede sovereignty to the EU level in this policy
field. Member states at the EU-level appear to be reluctant to adopt EU rules on
admission of third country nationals and in this respect the decisions on the actual
selectivity of immigration continue to be a domain of national governments.
During the last years, a policy shift has occurred both at EU level and at that
among its Member States. In a different way to the EU member countries, the
immigration system of the United Kingdom does not include the EU Blue Card.
Instead, the UK manages its migration flows through a national immigration law.
Since 2008, UK governments have published the immigration policy framework that
marked a shift in the priorities on immigration policy through the adoption of a points-
based system. Work and study result to be the main determinants of migration to the
UK, partly explained by (i)the introduction of a relatively open work permit system
for third-country workers in the early 2000s, (ii) by the government’s decision to open
the UK labor market to East European workers in May 2004, and (iii) by policies
to increase the number of foreign students coming to UK (Czaika and De Haas,
2018). However, since 2010, the main goal of the UK’s immigration policy has been
to decrease net migration, making migration more restrictive, including the routes
for high-skilled migrants. Germany has reported a shortage of skilled workers and
highly qualified people. To encourage such people for Germany immigration, foreign
immigration authorities have relaxed the stringent requirements to go to Germany
and work. Attempting to go beyond these limits, Germany introduced the Blue Card
in 2012 , such as the EU-wide work permit that allows highly skilled immigrants with
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a job offer to work in European Union (Burkert and Haas, 2014). The EU Blue Card
is given to foreign third-country national workers who have high qualifications and
want to work in Germany and apply those skills. To qualify for the EU Blue Card,
the applicants need to have already found a job in Germany, and the minimum annual
salary must be EUR 50,800. The EU Blue Card grants its holders the right to stay
in Germany for four years, with a possibility of changing their residence permit into
a permanent settlement. To qualify for permanent settlement the holder must show
enough German proficiency, meet certain financial requirements, as well as must have
worked in Germany for more than 33 months in their place of employment which
requires the skills gained with the highest qualifications.
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Chapter 3




Since 2011, the UK migration policy has focused on the reduction of net-migration
by the restriction of inflows of non-EEA net migration. Tier 2 visa route restricts such
numbers to a cap of 20.700. The UK has shifted much of its emphasis on having a job
offer in an occupation determined to be experiencing a labor shortage. This chapter
focuses on this issue, relying on a new source of data created by merging administra-
tive labor force data with a Certificate of Sponsorship (CoS) and Minimum Salary
data. The identification strategy is based on a difference-in-differences approach. It
allows exploiting how an exogenous shock made by the Government in the selection of
people in the labor market has influenced the access to some professional categories.
Such categories are observed according to market priority and divide them into treated
and control groups before and after the event of interest. Then, a triple-difference
estimation exploits variation across occupations in some different groups, namely EU
and non-EU immigrants, compared to the UK-born workers. Finally, the announce-
ment of Brexit is exploited observing whether this event may indirectly influence the
labor market conditions as it changes the status of EU citizens. Results for the period
2009-2013 show that immigrants selected based on skill priority on shortage are not
the top-level of skill distributions. The results for 2014-2018 show that the Brexit
referendum has already had an impact on the high-skilled labor market and show an
increase in the average salary of shortage occupations over time1.
1This analysis is conducted with G. Pignataro (giuseppe.pignataro@unibo.it) and S. Fiore
(s.fiore@unibo.it), Department od Economics, University of Bologna. The results in this chap-




United Kingdom’s immigration system is undergoing its most radical reform in half
a century. As the UK leaves the European Union (EU) and they bring free move-
ment to an end, Brexit is going to mark a big shift which will lead to a new system.
However, since 2011, the UK policy has aimed to reduce net-migration by restricting
inflows of non-European Area (EEA) net migration and encouraging the outflows of
non-EEA nationals to affecting the size and the composition of UK migrant work-
force. Immigration to the UK depends on a tiered system substantially revised after
its first approval in 2008. It is a hybrid immigration system, consisting of both points-
based and demand-led elements. For several years, the UK government policy has
emphasized the need to prioritize skilled over unskilled migration. Government pol-
icy to increase selection based on skills was evident in the introduction of the Points
Based System (PBS, hereafter) in 2008. Labor government’s choice was to control
the quality rather than the number of migrants to attract ’the brightest and best’
immigrants. Nevertheless, since 2010, the Coalition government has aimed to reduce
net migration from the ’hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousand’. The reform
was implemented in April 2011, when the Government announced a numerical immi-
gration limit. The target of these measures has included migration restrictions of the
three main migration inflow routes for non-EEA nationals, namely work, study and
family, and efforts to boost outflows of non-EEA citizens. Such a policy has influ-
enced the size and composition of the migrant workforce. In particular, it induces a
selection process for the highly skilled migrants, since there is no route open to low-
skilled labor migration to the UK from outside of the EEA (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva,
2015). This category was limited to the job in graduate level occupations based on
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), which has a more significant effect
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on numbers. Shortly after the May 2015 general election, the Government asked to
restrict the quantities of Tier 2 migrants further. This followed from a commitment
in the 2015 Conservative party manifesto to "Maintain our cap at 20,700 during the
next Parliament. This will ensure that we only grant visas to those who have the
skills we need in our economy" (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015). In this way,
net migration has become the way to measure the success or the failure of policies
that intend to control immigration (Vargas-Silva, 2017). Since 2012 there has been a
significant increase in the numbers of both entry clearance and extension visas issued.
However, until recent years, the route has been under-subscribed, and therefore the
limit not reached. The cap was reached for the first time in June 2015. In December
2017, probably due to the ’announcement’ impact of the Brexit referendum, the cap
had started to bite again. The demand for Certificates of Sponsorship (CoS) made by
employers was higher than the supply threshold made by the Home Office. According
to the Office for National Statistics (2018), migrants from non-EU countries were the
largest since 2004. Higher demand means that fewer visas are allocated, with an
increase in the minimum salary required to apply. Thus, the cap started to prevent
some non-EU skilled workers from taking positions in the UK labor market. Tier 2
has become much more selective since its introduction. Skill requirements have been
ratcheted up, and minimum pay thresholds raised. The Migration Advisory Commit-
tee in the UK is the responsible to produce independent advice and recommendations
on the shortage in the labor market. The National Employer Skills Survey (NESS)
defines skills shortage as "hard to fill vacancies". It depends on either a low num-
ber of applicants with the required skills, or a lack of candidates with the necessary
work experience, or a lack of candidates with the required qualifications. Different
approaches in the literature study how to define and measure skills and their selection
in the labor market. Although the term "skill shortage" is frequently used by gov-
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ernments and employers, there is no universally accepted definition for it. Typically,
shortages occur when demand exceeds supply at a given wage, and there is a lack of
equilibrium in the labor market. However, there does not exist direct evidence about
the relationship between labor shortages and inflows of high-skilled foreign workers
in the literature. It represents a significant gap. While the existence of labor short-
ages can theoretically reconcile different results of the research, empirical evidences
do not have a clear vision of this phenomenon. The explanation of this gap seems
to be due to the scarcity of the data and the difficulty of measuring the impact of
shortage in the labor market. To the best of my knowledge, this analysis represents
the first exercise filling this gap in a EU context. It exploits an exogenous reform in
2011 intending to understand the impact of an institutional change at national level.
In this setting, this implies to quantify how a policy change in the VISA selection
affects the group of shortage occupations compared with the differences in the other
Tier 2 occupations before and after the 2011 Reform. Moreover, this analysis exploits
the Brexit referendum to observe if it has caused an impact and to which extent,
on the same professional categories. This analysis builds on the Labour Force Sur-
vey (LFS) quarterly data released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). It is
the official source of information on labor market outcomes in the UK. This analysis
pays attention to tier 2 occupations by focusing mainly on shortage and no short-
age information. The second source concerns confidential data on the Certificate of
Sponsorship (CoS) collected through a Freedom of Information (FOI) Requests pro-
cess from the UK Home Office. These specifically concern the occupation breakdown
of restricted CoS granted from years from 2009 to 2018 to identify the CoS demand at
the professional level. We have also created a dataset on minimum salary thresholds
at the professional level by looking at the Codes of practice for Tier 2 Sponsors. It
sets out the skill level and the appropriate salary rate for jobs. The contribution of
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this analysis mostly relies on a merged dataset that exploits variations in high-skilled
and especially in labor shortages at the occupation level conditioned on information
on CoS granted as well as on minimum salary thresholds. The question of how to
regulate migration flows to favor the destination economy is not new in the policy
debate within the European Union. Previous studies have investigated the role of
immigration policy on the selection process of migrants and their socio-economic per-
formance in the destination countries. However, rare studies look at the impact of
selective-policies on skilled migration (see Docquier and Rapoport, 2007; Constant
and Zimmermann, 2005; Czaika and Parsons, 2017; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). How
immigration affects the labor market in the destination country is a question that has
been extensively explored by the literature without reaching a definitive consensus.
As shown in the first chapter, there is a vigorous debate among academics. Some
research finds that immigration flows harm at least some workers, as economic theory
predicts when immigration changes the balance of skills in an economy. Nevertheless,
there is little direct evidence about the relationship between labor shortages and the
inflow of high-skilled foreign workers in the economic literature. This chapter takes
advantage of a ’natural’ experiment in the UK by investigating how tightness in a
selective policy affects the selectivity and the quality of immigrants and the effects on
real shortages in the labor market. This chapter expands the existing literature by
examining whether the implementation of the Tier 2 policy had a substantial impact
on labor shortages for the demand of foreign workers. The last part of the thesis is
organized under two parts to understand the sophisticated setting of the UK policy.
The first part explores in detail the institutional environment and presents the data
sources. The second part will focus on theoretical and empirical findings. The rest
of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional setting by
discussing (i) the reform and how it has evolved over time, (ii) the central element
152
of the Tier 2 system, and (iii) how migration flows to the UK changed after its in-
troduction; Section 3 focuses on the debate in the literature and the contribution of
this analysis; Session 4 describes the data and the descriptive statistics essential to
understand both the setting and the empirical results. The second part of the chapter
is organized as follows. Section 5 begins from a theoretical framework that relies on
two hypotheses on the selection and the quality of immigrants; Section 6 presents
the identification strategy; Section 7 shows the empirical results and the robustness
checks. The last section includes a conclusion and a discussion of the observed effects.
3.2 Institutional Setting
3.2.1 The Legal Context
Tier 2 (General) system was announced on November 2008. It regulates the selection
mechanism of job offerings towards the high-skilled profiles from the non-European
Economic Area (EEA, hereafter). A Points Based System (PBS) characterized the
system giving priority in the VISA selection to some job categories particularly ap-
preciated in the labor market2. It replaced the previous Work Permit scheme which
was an immigration category used to encourage skilled workers to enter the UK, while
still protecting the interests of resident workers. Under the 1971 Immigration Act, a
work permit would be granted to a specific employer for a named person from outside
the EEA for a specific job. Work permits allowed skilled workers to apply for a work
permit as long as they held a valid job offer from an employer in the UK. Under
this system, employers had to advertise skilled occupations and carried out a labor
market test to hire migrants from non-EEA. Note that there were no limits on the
numbers allowed into the country. The position for a work permit required a National
2Tier 2 is divided into 4 subcategories: (i) Tier 2 (General), (ii) Tier 2 (Intra-company transfer),
(iii) Tier 2 (Minister of religion), (iv) Tier 2 (Sportsperson).
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Qualification Framework (NQF, hereafter) level 3 (equivalent to A-level) and above,
while for certain professions, the registration with the governing body of that profes-
sion was required. The duration of the work permit was dependent on the length of
time requested by the sponsoring company, and then work permit holders were able
to work in the UK without restrictions (Glennie, 2012). However, the Government’s
idea to link migration policies more explicitly to the UK’s skills needs to prompt it to
carry out a fundamental rethink of the rules around the selection of immigrants. In
2008, this idea led the UK to adopt a Points Based System for managing migration,
with Tier 2 as the main route for selecting skilled non-EEA nationals into the country
for work. The objective of the Labour government was to prioritize the selection of
the most highly skilled and best-paid migrants through the PBS. Instead, the New
coalition government came in power in 2010, based its immigration policies around
the reduction of the net immigration "from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of
thousands" (Conservative Party, 2010). On 23 November 2010, the Home Secretary
announced the Government’s criteria of applications for Tiers 2 program3. Statement
of changes HC 863 to the Immigration Rules was published by the Government on 16
March 2011 and applied on 6 April 20114. It is a substantial document that makes
various amendments, including changes to the Tier 2 (General) category. The major
reform introduced a permanent limit of 20,700 on the number of overseas applicants
who may be sponsored. It also revised some characteristics of the vacancies according
to minimum skill, appropriate salary rates, and English language thresholds. The new
system identified those migrants which the UK needs, ensuring they have the neces-
3The House of Commons ordered the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules and presented
the results on Parliament on 18 March 2010 under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. An
Explanatory Memorandum accompanied this document, and it included the changes of Tier 2 (Gen-
eral), following recommendations by the Migration Advisory Committee.
4A statement of practice characterizes the Immigration Rules according to the Immigration Act
1971. The Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules is incorporated into a consolidated version
of the Immigration Rules, found under the "Policy and Law".
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sary English-language ability and can support themselves when they first arrived. In
this way, the UK government gave more emphasis on the concepts of "skill needs"
and "skill shortages". The ’Shortage Occupation’ (SOL) is a list of job categories in
a shortage condition of natives filling their positions. It implies that the vacancies
in this list should fill with immigrants giving them priority in the VISA selection.
The system has quickly become a criteria-based system via minimum skill and pay
thresholds (MAC, 2015). Shortly after the May 2015 general election, the Govern-
ment announced a series of policy changes to the Tier 2 (General) migration route.
In particular, the Conservative party stressed on maintaining the cap at 20,700 to
grant visas to those who have the skills needed for the UK economy (Conservative
Party Manifesto, 2015).
For this reason, the Government asked the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)
to advise on further changes to restrict the numbers of Tier 2 migrants. The MAC
was asked to report on two issues: the possibility of increasing the minimum salary
levels for Tier 2 (General) and a more comprehensive review of the mechanism of Tier
2 visas. The review of Tier 2 included a revision of the Shortage Occupation List to
restrict Tier 2 (General) recruitment, and whether there should be a time limit on
how long occupations are on the SOL. While, on minimum salary thresholds, MAC
recommended that the Government should be cautious over raising the minimum
salary requirement. On 6 April 2017, significant changes to the UK Immigration Rules
for Tier 2 employer-sponsored migrants came into force. These changes have affected
all Tier 2 applications by increases in minimum salary thresholds and the introduction
of additional and increased charges. Other significant changes have come into force
since 2018. In particular, doctors and nurses were made exempt from the cap in June
2018, meaning there is no restriction on the number of doctors and nurses recruited
from overseas. Home Office, nevertheless, has presented this measure as temporary
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after the Tier 2 monthly limit had been exceeded for a record eight consecutive months
stretching back to December 2017. Besides, the Government has also asked the MAC
to review the Shortage Occupation List. The UK has implemented all changes to the
SOL recommended by the MAC from October 2019, alongside several other changes
to its points-based immigration system, including the amendment to the tier 2 salary
rates. The Tier 2 salary rates listed in Appendix J of the Immigration Rules and
amended through Immigration Rules change in March 2019. It reflects the latest
available occupational salary data for each occupation.
3.2.2 The Reform
Since 2011, the UK government has restricted the Tier 2 (General) visa, thus limiting
the access of immigrants outside the EEA (and Switzerland) interested in a job in the
UK. As mentioned above, the annual limit of 20,700 on the number of Certificates of
Sponsorship available for out of country immigrants in Tier 2 General. The limit size
has been established following advice from the Migration Advisory Committee and
divided into monthly allocations to prevent the limit from being exhausted early in
the year. The UK Border Agency (UKBA) is responsible for assessing applications
for restricted CoS.5. The system requires that migrants must be sponsored through a
Certificate of Sponsorship (CoS, hereafter) from a licensed sponsor. Then, immigrants
must be at least 16 years of age and advance English comprehension.6 The Home Of-
fice makes a monthly evaluation of the different requests for sponsorship. The criteria
5The UK Border Agency (UKBA) was the border control agency of the Government of the United
Kingdom and part of the Home Office that was superseded by UK Visas and Immigration in April
2013. On 26 March 2013, it was announced by Home Secretary Theresa May that the UK Border
Agency would have been abolished and its work returned to the Home Office.
6If the applicant is under 18 years, the applicant’s parents or the legal guardian must support
the application. Applicants that have been included as a Tier 4 (General) student as in the case of
doctorate extension scheme must provide written consent from the sponsoring Government, (Home
Office, 2019).
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to be selected are based on the priority given to specific job categories, particularly
tricky to be filled in the labor market. In particular, this mechanism provides priority
to the occupations belonging to the shortage occupation list (SOL) identified by the
Home Office. If the limit is under-subscribed in any particular month, the unused
surplus is rolled-over and added to the following month. While, if the limit is oversub-
scribed in a specific month, unsuccessful requests are not carried forward, although
those employers can submit requests again in the following month. Usually, the Home
Office rejects the requests in case the information cannot be verified or confirmed as
false or if there is a delay in completing the verification checks.7. Furthermore, the
limit excludes in-country applications for leave to remain, and any requests where
the job sponsored has a salary of £150,000 or above. Additional requirements were
included to ensure that applicants enter a graduate-level occupation, speak an inter-
mediate level of English, and meet specific salary and employment criteria. Tier 2
(General) holders can work in a particular sponsor in the job described in the COS
and can start their stay up to 14 days before the start date on the CoS. It is a tem-
porary permit that allows Tier 2 visa holders to stay for a maximum of 5 years and
14 days (UK Government, 2019).8. This system is designed to incorporate various
protections for resident workers by requiring the employer first to try to recruit from
within the resident workforce. Currently, Tier 2 (General) consists of the Shortage
Occupation List (SOL) route and the Resident Labor Market Test (RLMT) route.
Next sessions present the main changes in Tier 2 policy that are relevant for this
analysis.
7However, a certain degree of flexibility exists. Home Office could consider urgent requests in
exceptional circumstances. Or, if all requests scoring a particular number of points would cause a
monthly limit to be exceeded by 100 or less, the claims are granted and the excess deducted from
the following month.
8After six years, an applicant can apply to extend their Tier 2 (General) visa for up to another
five years. In fact, beyond the six years, Tier 2 visa holders will generally look at applying to settle
in the UK under "indefinite leave to remain".
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3.2.2.1 Tier 2 CAP
Since 2010, the policy objectives of the UK government aimed to reduce net migration
and to increase the selectivity of the migration system. The main reform of the Tier
2 system was to introduce a permanent limit to skilled migration from outside the
EEA. Thus, the Tier 2 (General) category became to be subject to a limit on numbers
of 20,700 in the year starting from 6 April 2011. Tier 2 cap operates by restricting
the number of CoS allocated to sponsoring employers looking to hire non-EU skilled
workers. CoS issued under the limit are called "restricted". The employers must
obtain the permissions for the restricted certificates by the Home Office through
a monthly allocation process.9. Restricted CoS is not necessary whether the gross
annual salary on the CoS is at least £159,600 or the job relates to an inward investment
project. The exclusion is also possible when the applicants is a Tier 4 visa switchers.
Since June 2018, the exclusion from the cap is valid also if the application is for a
doctor (SOC code 2211), and a nurse (SOC code 2231). The limit of 20,700 places
runs from 6 April one year to 5 April the following year. It is divided into 12 monthly
allocations to avoid it being exhausted in the early part of the year. Places are
allocated monthly according to the criteria set out in the Immigration Rules. The
Home Office designs the limit such that, if there is pressure on places, there is still
capacity for those whose skills are most in-demand.
Places are monthly allocated to avoid it being exhausted in the early part of the
year. The limit is designed so that, if there is pressure on places, there is still capacity
for those whose skills are most in-demand. Currently, the limit varies from around
2,200(April) to 1,000 per month. The monthly allocations of restricted certificates of
9Restricted CoS means that employers must obtain permission from the restricted certificates of
sponsorship team before they can issue restricted CoS by using the monthly allocation. Instead,
an unrestricted CoS is for individuals who are already working for the same sponsor and needed to
extend their stay or want to switch to the Tier 2 program.
158
sponsorship have changed over time, as reported in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Montly Allocation of CoS across the years
Application Period Monthly Allocation
2011 2012-2014 2015 2016-
6 March - 5 April 4,200 1,725 2550 2,200
6 April - 5 May 1,500 1,725 1,650 2,000
6 May - 5 June 1,500 1,725 1,650 2,000
6 June - 5 July 1,500 1,725 1,650 2,000
6 July - 5 August 1,500 1,725 1,650 2,000
6 August - 5 September 1,500 1,725 1,650 2,000
6 September - 5 October 1,500 1,725 1,650 1,500
6 October - 5 November 1,500 1,725 1,650 1,500
6 November - 5 December 1,500 1,725 1,650 1,500
6 December - 5 January 1,500 1,725 1,650 1,500
6 January - 5 February 1,500 1,725 1,650 1,500
6 February - 5 March 1,500 1,725 1,650 1,000
During the application process, the employers must confirm that: (i) the job is
skilled on NQF level required by the government, or it has a specific exception listed in
Appendix J of the Immigration Rules; or (ii) it is on the shortage occupation list; and
(iii) the applicant will be paid the relevant minimum salary. An employer wishing to
sponsor a non-EEA national under the Tier 2 route must ensure they have advertised
the role under the Sponsor Guidance before issuing a certificate of sponsorship. After
having advertised the vacancy, the employer must be unable to find a suitable resident
worker by a Resident Labour Market Test (RLMT, thereafter), which requires the
employer to show to UK Visas and Immigration that no resident worker is available
for the role they wish to fill with a Tier 2 visa worker. In this respect, an employer
must first advertise the job to enable settled workers (UK nationals, EEA nationals,
those with Indefinite Leave to Remain and permanent residency rights in the UK)
a chance to apply. In particular, employers are required to advertise the relevant
vacancy through "Find a Job", which is a Government-owned website, or in a private-
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sector job site for at least four weeks (UK Government, 2019).10. The employer must
usually assign applicants under the RLMT a Certificate of Sponsorship within six
months of the recruitment advertisement. Suppose that an employer has more than
one candidate with all the necessary skills and experience, e.g., a settled worker, and
a migrant. In this case, the Home Office requires that employers must offer the role
to the determined worker even if the migrant is more skilled or experienced11. For
the occupation considered in the Government’s Shortage Occupation List (SOL), an
employer does not need to conduct the RLMT, as explained in the next paragraph.
3.2.2.2 Shortage Occupation List (SOL)
The UK government has established a selection system where shortage occupations
receive priority over non-shortage jobs. The main aim is to encourage the skills sys-
tem and employers to give priority to the recruitment of resident workers to meet
skill needs. The Shortage Occupation List (SOL) indicates the skilled occupations
in a shortage as there are not enough settled workers to fill available jobs in partic-
ular sectors. The MAC is responsible for drawing up the SOL12. The MAC advises
Government on migration issues, in particular on skill shortages within occupations.
There are two shortage occupation lists: one for the whole of the UK (including Scot-
land) and an additional list of shortage occupations relating solely to Scotland. MAC
10More specifically, employers under RLMT route must ensure that: (i) the job advert has all the
mandatory requirements listed in the Home Office guidance; (ii) they are advertising the job using
the methods permitted in the Home Office guidance, one of which must be to use any website of the
government or a prominent or professional recruitment organization; and (iii) each advert appears
life for not less than 28 days. Where this advertising does not produce a suitable resident candidate
for the job, the employer can sponsor a migrant to fill the position (UK Government, 2019).
11The only exception could be if the job falls within one of the Ph.D. level standard occupation
classification SOC codes listed by the Home Office list.
12The Committee consists of a chair and five other independent economists who have been ap-
pointed by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA). To date, the MAC
is composed by: Professor Alan Manning (chairman), Madeleine Sumption, Dr. Jennifer C. Smith,
Professor Jackline Wahba, Paul Regan (ex-officio member, Home Office), Dr. Brian Bell, Professor
Jo Swaffield are currently the members of MAC.
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uses three criteria to decide which categories are in the SOL. It asks whether (i) the
job is skilled to the required level set by the Government, (ii) the job is in shortage,
and (iii) it is sensible to try to fill this shortage through migration. Tasks have to be
skilled to NQF 6 and above to be eligible for Tier 2 (General) included the SOL13. The
MAC uses a combination of quantitative indicators and qualitative evidence received
from stakeholders with a combination of national datasets in assessing whether there
is a shortage in some occupations but not in others. First of all, five skill indicators
are used, of which three top-down and two bottom-up. The former signs include (i)
median occupation pay, (ii) qualifications, and (iii) the classification provided by the
Office of National Statistics (ONS). The latter indicators are (iv) innate ability, and
(v) amount of on-the-job training required. Nationally, the datasets relevant for as-
sessing the SOL include: (i) the Labour Force Survey (LFS), (ii) the Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings, (iii) the ONS Vacancy Survey, (iv) the Job Centre Plus NOMIS
database, and (v) the National Employer Skills Surveys. The MAC also considers
nine indicators that look at wages, vacancies, and employment to identify shortages.
In particular, they consider: (i) rapidly rising earnings within a specific occupation or
high rates of return to qualifications in certain professions; (ii) vacancy level, rates,
durations and changes over time; and (iii) a variety of employment indicators (MAC,
2017)14.
The shortage indicators have been reviewed several times, most recently in 2017
and 2019. The update of SOL uses the 4-digit SOC codes hierarchy provided by the
13RQF6+ are "graduate-level" occupations, though also include higher-level vocational qualifica-
tions deemed equivalent to a degree. The Home Office lists the rules at RQF6+ in Appendix J of
the Immigration Rules.
14The employment indicators include: (i) the increasing levels of overtime or an increase in its
prevalence; (ii) the increased recruitment efforts; (iii) the reduced working standards; (iv) the altering
production methods to minimize the need for skills in short supply; (v) more contracting out of work
or outsourcing to other countries; (vi) the increased levels of training or training expenditure (MAC,
2017).
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ONS. For employers looking to sponsor skilled non-EEA workers, roles that feature
on the SOL benefit from several exemptions to the requirements valid for the other
occupations in Tier 2 (General). The advantages for employers to hire shortage
occupation workers include: (i) not having to conduct an RLMT; (ii) exemption
from the minimum income threshold for settlement; (iii) lower visa fees; (iv) priority
allocation in the event the cap limit is reached. In particular, if an employer wants to
employ a non-EEA Tier 2 worker in one of these shortage occupations, the role must
be for at least 30 hours per week and pay the appropriate minimum salary found in
the list. Some problems emerge on the methods of identifying the shortages. Even
semi-annual reports of the shortage lists might not be able to adequately capture and
respond to rapid changes in the labor market (Glennie, 2012).
3.2.2.3 Skills and Salary Thresholds
As the UK Government tightened the entry criteria, the system included greater se-
lectivity, including various measures to select the "brightest and the best," and those
are "economic desirable" (Home Office, 2011). For this reason, the minimum skill re-
quirement for Tier 2 occupations was raised to NQF level 6 (Degree level) and above
in 2012. The skill threshold of occupations under this category was previously set at
NQF level 4, graduate-level (Foundation degree), and above in 2011, and before that
NQF level 3 and above. The Government determines skill thresholds. However, the
MAC advises on which occupations and jobs that pass the threshold. Besides, the
English language requirement increases from basic user standards to an intermediate
level (B1 on the Council of Europe’s Common European Framework for Language
Learning). On the other hand, income criteria became central in the selection pro-
cess. All Tier 2 (General) migrants must be employed in a job with a minimum annual
salary fixed by the Home Office. This minimum annual salary has changed over time.
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When introduced in 2008, the minimum payment threshold is at £20,000. The MAC
recommended this figure, which was the 30th percentile of the pay distribution for
skilled workers to prevent undercutting (MAC, 2015; Metcalf, 2018). The threshold
was at £20,800 in 2015. The Government has asked to increase the minimum salary
threshold as the required skill level had become more stringent. In 2016 the MAC
recommended a new threshold of £30,000, which corresponded to the 25th percentile
of the pay distribution among individuals skilled to NQF6+15. More specifically, each
of the 4-digit SOL occupations skilled to NQF6+ has its minimum payment thresh-
old, which is normally the 25th percentile of the pay distribution of workers in the
given occupation. The pay thresholds in the health and education sectors are based
on national pay scales. When the occupation threshold exceeds the overall minimum
threshold (now £30,000), the occupation threshold prevails. Appropriate salary rates
are listed in Appendix J of the Immigration Rules. They are based on the salary for
full-time hours, and they have minimum salary requirements for both "new entrants,"
and "experienced" hires. A lower salary threshold will apply to "new entrants" on
initial application, and it is applied if one or more of the following conditions are
satisfied: (i) the applicant is exempt from the resident labor market test (RLMT) be-
cause they qualify under the post-study work provisions; (ii) the RLMT was met via
the provisions for "new graduate jobs or internships", or (iii) the applicant was under
26 on the date the application was made. The thresholds for new entrant employees
are set at the 10th percentile of the pay distribution for full-time employees in that
occupation. While, where a CoS is assigned, the salary shown on the CoS must be at
least the "experienced" rate of pay. The salary thresholds for experienced workers are
set at the 25th percentile for full-time employees in each occupation, mostly calcu-
15The increase in the threshold, from £20,800 to £30,000, was substantial, so the MAC recom-
mended phasing and some temporary exemptions (MAC, 2016). The Home Office accepted all these
recommendations.
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lated using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), a survey of employers
conducted by the Office for National Statistics. The number of hours considered to
be" full time" varies depending on the source used to determine the appropriate rate
for the specific occupation. The rates used to determine salary thresholds are usu-
ally based on a 39-hour working week for full-time roles as per the Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). However, where the source differs to ASHE, weekly
hours for salary threshold purposes are different16. Currently, the minimum salary for
the applicants under this category is normally £20,800 for new entrants or £30,000 for
experienced migrants. There are numerous exceptions including (i) new Entrants that
are subject to a salary threshold of £20.800 or the 10th percentile of the occupation
whichever is higher; (ii) the appropriate rate set for some public sector occupations,
including secondary school teachers in specific subjects, nurses, paramedics and med-
ical radiographers, are taken from national pay rates; (iii) pre-registration nurses and
midwives are paid on the NHS Agenda for Change Band 3 rates subject to certain
conditions. In addition, there are some occupations that have different appropriate
rates applied depending on certain characteristics.
3.2.3 The mechanism of Tier 2
This section briefly illustrates how the Tier 2 mechanism works. As part of the appli-
cation, the prospective employer-sponsor will need to request a CoS from the Home
Office. As mentioned before, the number of certificates that can be issued restrict
to 20,700 per year. Such amount is divided into different monthly CoS allocations,
16Where the source differs to ASHE, weekly hours for salary threshold purposes are considered as
follow: (i) 37.5 hour week where the source is the NHS Agenda for Change, or the Royal Institute
of British Architects; (ii) 37.5 hour week where the source is the National Grid submission to the
MAC; (iii) where the source is teachers national pay scale, the definition of full-time teachers is used
when determining those pay scales; (iv) in all other cases, a 40 hour week (MAC, 2015, 2019; Home
Office, 2018).
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which currently vary from around 2,200 to 1,000 per month to provide higher quotas
during the busier months of April through to September. An employer can only re-
cruit a non-EEA national. The conditions are the following: (i) a job cannot be filled
from the domestic UK market and has therefore passed the RLMT; (ii) a position is
exempt from the RLMT because a migrant worker is switching from Tier 4 student
visa, or the salary offered is £159,600 or above, or a job role is on the SOL. If the
post is not on the SOL list, then the employer must advertise the job domestically
and be able to show that no suitable settled UK worker could fill the position. For
the next six months, the employer can fill the post with someone from outside the
EEA. If the vacancy is unfilled after six months, the employer has to re-advertise in
the UK. Employers must request the COS by the 5th of each month. During each
month, a sponsor needs to confirm that: (i) the job is on the published Graduate
Occupations List of posts eligible for Tier 2; (ii) the occupation is on the SOL or (iii)
an RLMT has carried out, (iv) the job meets the minimum applicable salary require-
ments. If sponsors apply for more CoS than Home Office have available in any given
month, the "UK Visas and Immigration" is responsible for allocating CoS according
to a ranking system. In particular, if the number of applications granted is less than
the monthly allocation, the next monthly allocation is increased by the number of
restricted CoS remaining unallocated (Home Office, 2015). The assignment of the
Tier 2 (General) visa depends on a points system. There are points available for the
job, salary, English language ability, and the maintenance funds. When the number
of CoS requests exceeds monthly allocations, the points system is used to give pri-
ority to specific applications, notably: the roles officially recognized as being in the
SOL being awarded the most points, followed by some occupations at Ph.D. level
and finally points are awarded based on the applicant’s salary for those occupations
which meet the requirements of the RLMT. The application must score at least 70
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points. When eligible applications oversubscribe the monthly allocation of restricted
CoS, Home Office prioritizes application using the marks scored in the table below.
Home Office awards one point for each £1,000 of gross annual salary, up to a
maximum of £160,00017. If the wage does not meet the rate stated in the code
of practice, the Home Office assigns 0 points for an appropriate salary and refuses
the application, even if the applicant meets the other requirements. Concerning the
salary spectrum, points will be awarded for salary bands ranging from £20,800 to
£159,599,999 (Home Office, 2019). When the number of requests is much higher than
the monthly allocation of certificates, the Home Office will grant applications with the
most top salary and move down until they run out of licenses available. This means
that requests for occupations with a higher starting salary will stand a better chance
of being successful18. All applications for restricted CoS had to score a minimum of 21
points (minimum points required are varied over time) until December 2017. Then,
the minimum marks required increased to 55 with a minimum salary of £55,000. The
salary requirements dropped £50,000 in January and February 2018, and in March
2019, it rose £60,000 (Migration Observatory, 2018).
3.2.4 The impact of Brexit referendum on Tier 2 occupations
Although Brexit has still happened, some consequences of the Brexit referendum have
already had some important ramifications for migration to and from the UK. Since
December 2017, application for Certificate of Sponsorship for non-EU immigrants
has consistently been in excess of the monthly limit. For this reason, the Tier 2
cap has become one of the main political issues in the UK. As mentioned above,
certificates are allocated based on priority criteria determined by the UK Home Office.
17These rules are set in paragraphs 79 to 79C of Appendix A to the Immigration Rules
18In June 2015, an applicant needed to score 50 points to be successful, which means a non-PhD
occupation that is not on the Shortage Occupation List would need to have had a minimum salary
of £46,000.
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Table 3.2: Points allocated to CoS applications
Job and recruitment Points
Shortage occupation 320
PhD-level occupation code 175
Graduate recruitment via "milkround" or post-study work requirements 30
Job in one of the following public service occupations: 30
- Medical radiographers (2217)
- Secondary education teaching professionals (2314):
subject teachers in maths, physics, chemistry, computer
science and Mandarin only
- Paramedics (3213)
Others (RLMT) 20
Applicants whose occupations are considered to be in notable shortage are issued the
most points. Those who need PhDs to do their jobs also receive extra points, likely
to be enough to qualify in any given month. Remaining certificates are allocated
based on the proposed income of applicants coming to the UK. In this case, higher
demand throughout the fiscal year means that fewer visas are rolled over the following
month, and the number of CoS has declined. At this point, the cap has started to
prevent some non-EU skilled workers from taking positions in the UK. Since December
2017, the minimum number of points required for a Tier 2 Visa increased to 55
(until November 2017 was 21), which means that the minimum salary required for
most workers was £55,000. In January and February 2018, slightly lower demand
meant that this salary requirement dropped to £50,000, and in March 2018, it rose
to £60,000. Since the rest of the applications are prioritized on the basis of the
proposed salary, this meant that the effective salary required for most applicants has
increased from a minimum of £30,000 to an amount that fluctuated month-to-month,
to £60,000. Jobs on the SOL are not affected by higher salary requirements because
when the cap is binding, all applications are ranked using a points system, and the
number of points allocated for being on the SOL is so high that it automatically
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outstrips points earned by other applications for salary. This means that for that
positions that not belong to the SOL or are qualified Ph.D. level jobs, the effect of
the cap is that those with the lowest salaries will be rejected, pushing up the effective
minimum salary threshold. From an economic point of view, the use of salary when
the work-permit applications need to be capped is related to the productivity and skill
level of the worker, and ceteris paribus is, higher-paying, higher-productivity jobs are
expected to be more economically beneficial. However, the prioritization mechanism
means that the salary requirements that employers must meet to sponsor non-EU
workers are not known in advance. For this reason, an economic drawback of the cap
is unpredictable, causing economic costs (Migration Observatory, 2018).
3.2.5 Net migration in the UK
Immigration to the United Kingdom (UK) has risen significantly over the past 20
years19. The Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2019)20, estimates that net migration
was down in 2018 from a peak of 336,000 in the year ending June 2016. Fig.3.1
shows the total immigration trends of EU and non-EU immigrants to the UK. The
latest reports provided by the Office for National Statistics (2019) show that non-EU
immigration has followed a gradual increase over the past five years for both work
and study, and it is now the highest since 2004. Instead, migration from the EU
countries has firstly increased due to the EU enlargement from 2004 to 2017. Since
the Brexit vote, EU immigration has decreased, and the net migration has fallen to
a level recently reached only in 2009.
The decline in net migration between 2010 and 2012, from 256,000 to 177,000,
coincided with several restrictions in the migration policy measures designed to re-
19As mentioned in chapter III, there are different patterns for EU and non-EU migration.
20ONS provides quarterly reports on net migration in the UK, which is defined as the difference
between immigration and emigration of people moving for at least a year.
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Figure 3.1: Migration of different citizenship groupings
duce net migration for work, study, and family migration. The lowest estimation
of net migration during this period was 154,000 in the year ending September 2012
(Sumption and Vargas-Silva, 2019). From 2013 onwards, the levels started to in-
crease and reached a record of 336,000 in mid-2015 and again in the year ending June
2016, just before the EU referendum. Since June 2017, net migration recorded its
largest-ever single-year fall, although a statistical anomaly drove part of this decrease
in the measurement (Office for National Statistics, 2018). However, non-EU net mi-
gration has gradually increased since 2013, due to an increase in immigration, while
the emigration remained broadly stable for this group.
3.3 Literature Review
This chapter is mainly related to the branch of the economic literature that focuses
on the role, the effectiveness, and the "costs" of selective immigration policies. Pre-
vious studies have investigated the role of immigration policy on selection process of
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migrants and their socio-economic performance in the destination countries21. Po-
tential change in migration policy favoring high-skilled immigrants relative to less
educated ones is considered one of the most critical factors. Indeed it influences the
positive selection of immigrants, see (Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri,
2012). Belot and Hatton (2012) show that selective immigration policies operate as a
screening mechanism that imposes differential costs on potential immigrants by skill
and education. Bertoli and Rapoport (2015) predicts that the quality of migrants can
be positively associated when destination countries adopt sufficiently selective immi-
gration policies. However, unobservable characteristics may reduce migrants’ qual-
ity when migrants are positively self-selected (Bertoli, Dequiedt, and Zenou, 2016).
Rare studies look at the impact of selective-policies on skilled migration. According
to Docquier and Rapoport (2007), a selective process could help to mitigate some
demographic and economic trends, like skill shortages. Still, the effects of selec-
tive immigration may be limited within the European Union. Some studies showed
that the EU could benefit from a migration policy in line with economic needs (see
Constant and Zimmermann, 2005). However, Czaika and Parsons (2017) show that
points-based systems are much more effective in attracting and selecting high-skilled
migrants in comparison to demand-driven policies. Naturally, this should require a
job offer through a labor market test or working in a shortage listed occupation.
Ruhs and Anderson (2010) investigate whether the demand for migrants depends on
a wide range of government policies. They propose a conceptual framework to assess
whether migrants should be imported to fill labor shortages.
Nevertheless, there is little direct evidence about the relationship between labor
21The influence of immigration policies on selection on education has been analyzed both from a
theoretical (see Bertoli and Brücker, 2011; Brücker, Bertoli, Facchini, Mayda, and Peri, 2012; Bertoli
and Rapoport, 2015; Bianchi, 2013; Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2008) and from an empirical
perspective (see Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo, 2003; Aydemir, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012;
Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2008; Bertoli, Dequiedt, and Zenou, 2016)
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shortages and the inflow of high-skilled foreign workers in the economic literature.
Sparber et al. (2015) reports indirect evidence in trying to understand the conse-
quences of shortages implied by high H-1B demand in the US. Two recent working
papers by Raux (2018) and Signorelli (2019) show some evidence on labor shortages
and the need for high-skilled foreign workers at firm-level, respectively, for the US
and France. This chapter aims to fill this gap by investigating how tightness in a
selective policy affects the selectivity and the quality of immigrants and the effects on
real shortages in the labor market. The closest study is Mayda, Ortega, Peri, Shih,
and Sparber (2018), testing how the changes in H-1B policy affect the quantity and
the characteristics of H-1B workers22. Using a triple difference approach, the authors
find that the policy has caused a change in the composition of H-1B workers. There
was a high concentration among workers with middle-levels of skill associated with
a reduction in H-1B workers. Their results highlight how the binding H-1B cap has
reduced the number of workers most likely to be highly productive and innovative.
The second question addressed in this chapter is how immigration affects the la-
bor market in the destination country. This is a question that has been extensively
explored by the literature without reaching a definitive consensus. There is, in fact, a
vigorous debate among academics about the impact of immigration on wages, espe-
cially concerned the low-skilled migration in the United States (see Card, 1990; Borjas,
22The H-1B is a temporary work visa that allows high-skilled foreign-born individuals to work
in the United States. It is an "employer-driven" skilled system where the employers must sponsor
the application for the admission of foreign workers. Current policy restricts the number of new
H-1B visas at 65,000 per fiscal year, more an additional 20,000 visas available for masters or Ph.D.
recipients from US Universities. Because H-1B visas represent the main channel through which
high-skilled foreign workers enter the United States, it is perhaps the most controversial temporary
worker visa. Research on the economic impacts of the H-1B program has exploited the policy-driven
variation in the H-1B quota to understand better how inflows of highly-skilled foreign-born labor
affect American native-born workers and productivity. While some papers show adverse effects on
native-born workers in the US (see Lofstrom and Hayes, 2011; Doran, Gelber, and Isen, 2014), several
articles argue that H-1B workers improve innovation, productivity, and labor markets (see Kerr and
Lincoln, 2010; Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2015; Mayda, Ortega, Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2018).
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2015, 2017; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Peri and Yasenov, 2015, for a reassessment of
Card’s (1990) "Mariel boatlift" article). Some research finds that immigration flows
harm at least some workers, as economic theory predicts when immigration changes
the balance of skills in an economy (Staff, 2016). This wide range of findings de-
pends mainly on two factors. The first one concerns the definition of "skilled" and
"unskilled" workers (see Card, 1990; Borjas, 2015). The second factor involves the
presence of migrants in the labor market. In particular, the open question is whether
native-born workers depends on how migrants and natives workers are substitutes
(see Borjas, 1995; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012; Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2015). For these reasons, models on the impact
of immigration on the income distribution in the country of destination often pre-
dict ambiguous outcomes under different assumptions about (i) the socio-economic
characteristics of immigrants, (ii) the structure of the production system and (iii) the
public policies adopted in the field of immigration. Therefore, migration can have a
very little or zero effect on average wages among natives in the United States and
within the European Union (see Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Dustmann, Frattini, and
Preston, 2008; Card, 2009; Kerr and Kerr, 2011; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2011;
Peri, 2014) or it has at most modest adverse effects on employment and wages (see
Borjas, Freeman, Katz, DiNardo, and Abowd, 1997; Borjas, 1999, 2003; Aydemir and
Borjas, 2007; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2007). A study by Docquier, Ozden, and Peri
(2010) shows that immigration in Europe from 1990 to 2000 had a positive effect on
the average wage of native workers, while the extent of wage losses due to emigration
was close to or higher than the gains generated by immigration (Villani, Ferrara, and
Liotti, 2016). Edo and Rapoport (2019) study how the prevalence of minimum wage
affects the labor market impact of immigration in the US. They show that immigra-
tion has relatively small detrimental effects on the wages and employment outcomes
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of competing native workers.
Specifically, the studies on the impact of immigration on the labor market in the
UK have not found a significant effect on the wages of native-born workers (see Dust-
mann, Frattini, and Glitz, 2007; Ruhs and Vargas-Silva, 2019). By using variation in
immigration to different spatial areas as an instrument, Dustmann, Fabbri, and Pre-
ston (2005) show no evidence that immigration has overall effects on native wages at
the aggregate level. A similar conclusion is reached by (Dustmann and Preston, 2012)
that suggest an overall slightly positive effect on native wages, which, however, could
involve deviations of immigrant remuneration from contribution to production either
because of initial mismatch or immigrant downgrading. By expanding the multi-level
CES production function approach used by Card and Lemieux (2001); Manacorda,
Manning, and Wadsworth (2010) find that natives and immigrant workers are imper-
fect substitutes in the UK; namely, the wage differential is sensitive to the share of
immigrants in the working-age population. Wadsworth et al. (2017) show that the
areas of the UK with significant increases in EU immigration did not suffer higher
falls in the jobs and pay of UK-born workers and the big falls in wages after 2008 are
due to the global financial crisis and a weak economic recovery, not to immigration.
More recently, the Migration Advisory Committee (2018) shows that immigration has
little impact on average wages. Other studies have found a small negative effect on
average wages (see Nickell and Saleheen, 2015), while others found positive average
results for most workers (e.g. Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston, 2012).
This chapter expands the existing literature by examining whether the implemen-
tation of the Tier 2 policy had a strong impact on labor shortages for the demand
of foreign workers. It looks at the inflow of high-skill migrants due to an exogenous
shock by a policy rule and study whether exists a causal impact in the labor market
due to the presence of migrants primarily in some categories of workers. It is going
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to show the impact on wage differentials of natives working in the same categories.
3.4 Data
This section presents the data on which the analysis focuses. This analysis builds
on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly data released by the Office for National
Statistics (ONS) on the labor market in the UK. The section starts by presenting this
first administrative source of information on workers and labor markets. In particu-
lar, tier 2 occupations are taken into account by focusing mainly on shortage and no
shortage information. The second source concerns confidential data on the Certificate
of Sponsorship (CoS) collected through a Freedom of Information (FOI) Requests pro-
cess from the UK Home Office. These were monthly data, which we pool together in
a quarterly dataset from years 2009 to 2018 to identify the CoS demand at the profes-
sional level. In addition, a dataset on minimum salary thresholds at the occupational
level has been created by looking at the Codes of practice for Tier 2 Sponsors, which
sets out the skill level and appropriate salary rate for jobs. Eventually, this section
concludes on the description of the merging procedure delivering the final data used
in the analysis. The contribution of this analysis mostly relies on this merged dataset
that allows to exploit variations in high-skilled and especially in labor shortages at the
occupation level conditioned on information on CoS granted as well as on minimum
salary thresholds. By construction, this study takes occupation as unit of analysis,
where professions are identified by their Standard Occupation Classification (SOC)
provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). This classification is based on
the revision of SOC2010, while the first two years (2009-2010) look at the SOC2000.
The essential element in this classification is the concept of "job" which allows for a
rating into groups and sub-groups according to the ideas of "skill level" and "skill spe-
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cialization" 23. Specifically, it distinguishes between low-skilled, medium-low skilled,
medium-high skilled and high-skilled occupation, defined in terms of general nature
of the qualifications, training, skills, and experience associated with the competent
performance of work tasks. Table 3.3 lists the sub-major group of SOC2010.
Table 3.3: Sub major groups in SOC2010
Skill Level SOC 2010 Sub-Major groups
Level 4 11 Corporate managers and directors
21 Science, research, engineering and technological professionals
22 Health professionals
22 Teaching and educational professionals
24 Business, media and public professionals
Level 3 12 Other managers and proprietors
31 Science, engineering and technology associate professionals
32 Health and social care associate professionals
33 Protective service occupations
34 Culture, media and sports occupations
35 Business and public service associate professionals
51 Skilled agricultural and related trades
42 Skilled mental, electrical and electronic trades
53 Skilled construction and building trades
54 Textiles, printing and other skilled trades
Level 2 41 Administrative occupations
42 Secretarial and related occupations
61 Caring personal service occupation
62 Leisure, travel and related personal service occupations
71 Sales occupations
72 Customer service occupations
81 Process, plant and machine operatives
82 Transport and mobile machine drivers and operatives
Level 1 91 Elementary trades and related occupations
92 Elementary administration and service occupations
As in SOC2000, SOC2010 retains nine major groups and 25 sub-major groups,
but now it has 90 minor groups and 369 unit groups, while SOC2000 presented 81
small groups and 353 unit groups (Office for National Statistics, 2019). For a piece of
23Skill level is defined both in SOC2000 and in SOC2010 with respect to the duration of training
and/or work experience recognized in the field of employment concerned as is generally required in
order to perform the activities related to a job in a competent and efficient manner. While skill
specialization is defined as the field of knowledge necessary in the performance of the tasks associated
with an occupation (Office for National Statistics, 2019).
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detailed information on the structure and the definition of unit groups in SOC2010
and the main changes to SOC2000, see Appendix A.3.
3.4.1 Labour Force Survey (LFS)
This analysis relies on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly data over the
period from 2009 until 2018. The LFS is the most extensive household study in the
UK and provides a comprehensive source of data on workers and labor markets. The
LFS is intended to be representative of the whole population of the UK. The sample
design is about 60,000 households based on a quarterly survey, and it is conducted
by the ONS’ Social Survey Division. The population covered is all people resident
in private houses, all residents in National Health Service accommodation and young
people living away from the parental home in a student hall of residence or similar
institution during term time. Since 1992, the LFS has been a rotating quarterly
panel. Each sampled address is interviewed five consecutive times at three-monthly
intervals. However, the LFS was not primarily designed for the study of immigration.
The number of sampled immigrants reflects the proportion of immigrants in the total
population. The LFS allows a detailed disaggregation of employment patterns by
occupation and by industry, according to official classifications. In this analysis,
three different datasets have pooled together all quarters within each year: the first
dataset concerns the years from 2009 until 2013; the second dataset includes the
years from 2014 until 2018; the third dataset is the final one and consists of all
years (2009-2018). We first gather all LFS quarters together, and then, append
all years together. A consistent time series for some variables have been created
along with the variables "year" and "quarter" and the variable "soc_common," which
identify the four-digit SOC code used later for merging LFS with data on Certificate
of Sponsorship. The two different standard occupational classifications have required
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adjustments on laws based on an index for the conversion of a formerly used SOC2000
code to the corresponding SOC2010 one provided by the UK Visas and Immigration
(2015). The sample size resulted from the LFS quarterly datasets from 2009 to 2018
has initially been 3,912,853 observations. The percentage of working-age (sixteen to
sixty-four) among the native population between 2009 and 2013 represents the %92,
while the EU working-age population counts for 3% and non-EU communities are
the 5% of the total population. While, the native population counts 87% of the full
sample between 2014 and 2018, the EU represents 5% and non-EU is about 8%.
3.4.2 Dataset on Certificates of Sponsorship
The second dataset includes information on the Certificates of Sponsorship (CoS)
granted between years 2009 and 2018, obtained under the provisions of the Freedom of
Information (FOI) Act by the UK Home Office. The data consist in the occupational
breakdown by 4-digit SOC code of restricted CoS granted collected separately for
each month from January 2009 to December 2018, which then have been aggregated
on quarterly-basis. As for the LFS dataset, annual datasets have been created based
on the quarterly aggregation, which then has been aggregated into three different
datasets: 2009-2013; 2014- 2018, and the total dataset from 2009 until 2018. Similarly
to the LFS data, the two standard occupational classifications have required some
adjustment on the SOC codes. The variable "soc_common" and the variables for
year and quarter are included in the dataset. Another variable identifies the CoS
year, which considers the Home Office monthly allocation that runs from 6 April one
year to 5 March the following year. This dataset allows identifying visa demands at
the professional level. In particular, I have divided the Tier2 (general) occupation
into two different groups, by generating a dummy variable equal to one for those
occupations that are part of the Shortage Occupation List. Figure 3.2 represents the
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share of the CoS granted for shortage and no-shortage occupations by CoS year.
Figure 3.2: Share of CoS granted in Shortage and non-Shortage occupations by year
The graph shows the evolution of the demand for high-skilled jobs in the UK and
how it translates into a specific request for shortage and non-shortage foreign workers.
The figure shows that the share of CoS in Shortage occupations has increased over
the years. This is, therefore, consistent with the focus of the policy on Tier2, which is
based on a priority system determined to be in notable shortage. This is confirmed by
the t-test reported in the following Table 3.3, which confirms that the mean for SOL
occupation is increased after the policy change than that of non-SOL professions.
3.4.3 Dataset on Minimum Salary Thresholds
Since the remaining CoS are allocated based on the proposed income, this dataset
includes information on the minimum appropriate salary rates associated with each
178
Figure 3.3: Two-sample t test with equal variances
Tier 2 occupation. As mentioned in the Institutional Setting, minimum salaries for
each profession are based on the payroll for full-time hours, and they have minimum
salary requirements for both "new entrants" and "experienced" hires. The lower pay
threshold for new entrants workers is set at the 10th percentile of the pay distribution
full-time employees in that occupations. The pay threshold for experienced workers
is set at the 25th percentile of the full-time earning distribution measured using the
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). This dataset includes both new en-
trants and experienced salary thresholds for the years 2009-2018 based on appropriate
salary rates listed in Appendix J of the Immigration Rules. Until 2013, the Home
Office used the SOC 2000 classification and provided minimum salary on the basis of
hourly wages. To estimate yearly minimum wage, we have calculated hourly pay by
37,5 hours by 52 weeks 24. For the rest of the years, we have used the skill level and
appropriate salary rates as in the codes for practice provided by the Home Office. In
this dataset, the unit of analysis is represented by the 4-digit SOC occupations skilled
to NQF level 6 and professions listed in the Shortage Occupation List, namely only
the occupations that are in common before and after the Reform of 2011. Figure
24As stated in the Codes for practice for Tier 2 Sponsors until 2012, the salary rates were based
on a 37,5-hour working week, unless otherwise indicated.
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3.4 presents the yearly minimum wage differentials between shortage and no-shortage
categories.
Figure 3.4: Differences in Salary Threshold between SOL and no-SOL occupations
across years
Graph 3.4 highlights that the difference between the minimum salary thresholds
for "experienced" workers in shortage and no-shortage occupations are increasing
between the two categories. This latter observation supports the idea that the UK
government is looking for jobs that are considered in shortage but that are not top
skills in the foreign labor force. However, the empirical analysis later in the chapter
will give more detailed information about the effect of the policy change on wages
and on level of skills distribution.
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3.4.4 Merged Dataset and Variables
Finally, this section presents the final sample obtained from the merge of both LFS
data and data on the Certificate of Sponsorship. By focusing on the occupation
level, the four-category classification based on the SOC allows identifying the Tier2
occupations, which represents the final sample size in the dataset. In the following
analysis, we explore the determinants explaining the presence of shortage and non-
shortage jobs among the Tier2 occupations. This analysis examines the labor market
situation of UK-born and foreign-born people. The term "migrant" or "immigrant"
refers to the people who were born and have migrated to the UK, based on the
variable Country of birth. In particular, UK-natives and foreign-born population are
presented as a whole with a "foreign" dummy variable, or for the different country of
birth grouping. The country-categories are aggregated under the variable "group" as
follow:
• UK-born population (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the United
Kingdom not otherwise specified);
• European Union citizens (EU-14, EU-8, EU-2, EU others);
• EFTA citizens (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland);
• non-EU immigrants (Europe other, Americas and Caribbean, Africa, Middle
East, and Asia, Antarctica and Oceania, Other countries).
The analysis focuses on the working-age population, which includes all individuals
aged 16-64. Age is identified with the variables age (age of respondent) and AGES
(age bands), while the variable WorkingAge includes males 16-64 and females 16-59.
The employed population refers to all individuals who are employees, self-employed,
or under a government employment or training scheme, while full-time and part-time
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workers are both considered. The microdata also cover a wide range of individual
characteristics including variables on: gender (sex ); marital status (maritalstatust)
and sex and marital status (marsex ); nationality which is aggregated as in country
of birth; ethnicity, which include "white", "black - African and Caribbean, India-
nian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, "mixed-multiple ethnic groups and "other -
mixed". Geographical information is considered at the country-level within the UK
(England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland ) and at the regional level, where the
region is determined according to the usual residence. The LFS originally identifies
20 regions, while are aggregated into 17 regions to create territorially homogeneous
regions, by unifying Inner and Outer London into Greater London, and Strathclyde
and the Rest of Scotland into Scotland. Merging both data relies on the main di-
mensions of skills identifying an occupation. The analysis uses a four-category digit
classification of SOC, which is detailed reported in the Appendix, while employment
status is organized as in the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-
SEC) major group based on SOC, which identifies positions within labor markets
and production units in terms of their typical employment relations. The variable
economicactivity is used for consistency with current ONS practice as it gives the
International Labor Organization (ILO) standard definitions of employment, unem-
ployment, and economic activity and inactivity. This analysis uses two variables of
education to better describe the immigrants’ qualification. The first one is based
on the highest qualification (specific grouping), which is aggregated under four lev-
els, such as: "No qualification", "Low", "Medium", and "High". While, the second
variable is education and is based on years of education and, specifically, includes
three levels, namely: "low education", "intermediate education", and "high educa-
tion". Consistent with the literature, the variable experience is created by considering
years of potential experience in the workforce. Salary information in the LFS is the
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self-reported gross weekly pay for the "reference week" that interviews are asked in-
formation about. From 1997 onwards, questions on both gross weekly wages and
hours worked were asked during the first and the fifth interview in order to reduce
the sampling errors. The LFS includes a variable for gross weekly pay in the main
job (grosswpay), a variable for average gross hourly pay (hourpay), and a variable
for net weekly pay in main job (netpay). Furthermore, a variable hourlywage is
calculated based on gross hourly pay by usual total hours worked in main job and
usual hours of paid overtime. Moreover, we compute the real wage based on hourly
wages in 2015 prices as used by the OECD in two different ways. The first one is:
realpay = hourpay ∗ (CPI2015/CPIyear). The second one is based on Dustmann,
Glitz, and Frattini (2008) and is: realwage = hourpay/(CPI2015/100). The 2009-
2018 dataset also includes a "recent immigrant" dummy for immigrants who arrived
in the last two years and a categorical variable to identify natives and earlier and re-
cent immigrants. Moreover, matching both sources of data need to take into account
the specific characteristics of the tier 2 policy. A specific dummy variable, in fact,
identifies the occupations that are included in the Shortage Occupation List, which
is equal to one if the specific occupations are considered in Shortage, while it equals
zero otherwise. To strengthen the analysis, a variable named Tier2_bis identifies the
same occupations in tier 2 from 2009 to 2018, such as only the occupations based on
skill restrictions resulted from the policy change. In the final dataset, I drop some
variables and observations I do not need for the analysis, and I filter on hourpay > 0.
3.5 Descriptive Statistics
The 2009-2018 final estimation sample includes 173,740 observations, with a sample
size of 103,982 observations for the period 2009-2013 and of 69,758 observations for
the period 2014-2018. This analysis is focused on immigrants to the UK and compares
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them to natives, where among the foreign-born, this analysis distinguishes between
EU citizens (or eventually EEA citizens) and non-EU immigrants. The sample of
individuals between 2009 and 2018 is mostly composed of UK-born workers (86.8%).
The foreign-born population represents 13.21% of the total working-age population
working age (eighteen to sixty-four). Figure 3.5 shows working-age natives and im-
migrants across years, where immigrants count for 4,41 % from EEA countries and
for about 9% from non-EEA countries.
Figure 3.5: Working age natives and immigrants, 2009-2018
Table 3.4 shows the summary characteristics for the variables that are relevant for
the empirical analysis. In particular, the outcome of interest is the real wage. The
variable that will represent the treatment in the following report is Shortage, which
is a dummy variable, as explained above.
Immigrants are younger than natives: EEA is especially likely to be young com-
pared to the average wage of non-EU immigrants and natives. The gender com-
position of the working-age population is quite balanced, with 52.3% of males and
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
ln_wage 2.766 0.575 173740
Shortage 0.321 0.467 173740
group 0.221 0.591 173716
age 42.6 11.32 173740
sex 1.479 0.5 173740
maritalstatus 1.954 0.877 173740
education 2.205 0.814 172106
experience 23.152 12.201 172106
employmentstatus 2.019 1.409 173740
region 10.43 4.634 173740
47.7 % of females. However, among EU citizens, the percentage of females (51%) is
slightly higher than that of the males (48.9%). The non-EEA immigrants have a more
differentiate ethnic origin from EU citizens and UK natives. Both natives and immi-
grants are mostly used to live in England (about the 85% of the total sample), which
about 12% live in the region of Greater London and approximately 22% in the South
East. UK natives, as well as immigrants both from the EU and from non-EU coun-
tries, are more concentrated in higher managerial and professional occupations and
in lower managerial and professional occupations based on the NS-SEC classification,
as shown in table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Occupational distribution of immigrants and natives
NS-SEC natives EU citizens non-EU imm Total
Higher managerial and professional 57,854 3,266 6,605 67,725
Lower managerial and professional 72,663 3,000 6,530 82,193
Intermediate occupations 6,743 269 476 7,488
Small employers 10 0 0 10
Lower supervisory and technical 6,777 501 920 8,198
Semi-routine occupations 3,077 170 369 3,616
Routine occupations 1,533 189 101 1,823
n.e.c. 2,022 187 358 2,567
Total 150,679 7,582 15,359 173,620
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The next figure (3.6) shows the level of education among groups in Tier 2 occu-
pations. As mentioned above, the variable education, in this case, defines individuals
when left full-time education. Although this variable could be imperfect in measuring
knowledge (for instance, do not allow for country differences in school starting age
or in the number of years of high school), it is considered the best available measure
of immigrants’ education in the UK LFS. The other variable, school, confirms the
picture below, but it also includes the no-answers and "other" qualifications, which
makes it more problematic to compare immigrants’ and natives’ educational levels.
Figure 3.6: Education level among groups in Tier 2 occupations
The level of educated individuals for both EEA and non-EEA immigrants is higher
than for the UK natives. The educational advantage of immigrants is probably due
to the occupations included in the sample and to the different age composition of
the native and immigrant populations as well. However, this picture confirms the
high-selectivity of the UK policy in selecting immigrants on the basis of skills and
shortages. By looking at the level of education in both shortage and no shortage
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occupations, it has been possible to observe an increase in the level of knowledge
in both categories since 2012 (see fig. 3.7). This confirms the increase in the skills
threshold for Tier 2 at NQF level 6. As mentioned in the Institutional Setting, the
lists of occupations skilled to NQF level 4 and NQF level 3 apply to skilled workers
who entered Tier 2 before the threshold was raised to NQF level 6 in June 2012.
Figure 3.7: Education Differential between Shortage and non-Shortage Occupation
by year
Since the beginning of the policy change in 2011, the average wage for both oc-
cupations in shortage and no shortage has increased due probably to the more re-
strictive criteria both in skill levels and in the minimum salary thresholds. How-
ever, the average wage for occupations in non-shortage occupations is increasing
more than the average salary in shortage occupations, as shown in Fig. 3.7. In
this case, the average wage refers to the logarithm of the real wage computed as
realwage = hourpay/(CPI2015/100)25.
25This analysis has included the same exercise by taking into account the other "wage" variables
to confirm the results of these pictures.
187
Figure 3.8: Wage Differentials between Shortage and non-Shortage Occupations by
year
The educational level showed in figure 3.6, as well as the wage pictures can explain
the wage differentials among groups measured both in shortage and in non-shortage
occupations. Again, the jump in the average wages before the policy is defined by
the reduction of the occupation categories due to restriction of skills threshold to
NQF level 6. The same exercise has been carried out by using the same occupational
groups, also in the years before the Reform. In this case, the jump is decreased, but
the result is the same, namely after the policy change in 2011, the average wage both
for shortage and no shortage occupations has increased. However, the average wage
differentials are higher in non-shortage professions than in shortage ones. For this
reason, the next session highlights two possible hypotheses relevant for testing the
empirical analysis.
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Figure 3.9: Average real wage in SOL and no-SOL by groups
3.6 Hypothesis and Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework in this chapter starts from the simple theoretical models
elaborated by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010)26
to allow for the impact of a selective-immigration policy on selection in the United
Kingdom, and how a change in selection caused by a tightness in the policy affects
the selectivity and the quality of the immigrants. In this model, two origin countries
26Both these theoretical models are based on the study of migration from Mexico to the US.
Consistent literature has produced conflicting results as to whether Mexican migrants are positively
or negatively selected in terms of educational skills. By developing a simple model of selection,
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) claim that migrant selection in a country such as Mexico may be
negative, intermediate, or positive, depending on the size of migration costs and how they vary
with skill. McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) examine the role of migration networks in determining
self-selection patterns of Mexico-U.S. migration. They present a theoretical framework that includes
the impact of networks on migration incentives at different education levels and how this affects the
composition of migrant skills.
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are considered. In particular, residents of the non-EU source countries (subscript 0)
and residents of the EU-countries (subscript 1) can choose to migrate to a destina-
tion country (subscript 2), such as the United Kingdom. The migration decision is
assumed to be irreversible. Using the notation of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) the wage equation for immigrants that come from
non-EU countries (0) and EU (1) countries may be written as:
lnw0 = µ0 + δ0s (3.1)
lnw1 = µ1 + δ1s (3.2)
where w is the wage, µ is the base wage, δ is the return to skills, and s is the level
of skills in countries of origin. In this case, the focus is on observable characteristics.
Similarly, the wage equation in the destination (subscript 2) may be written as follows:
lnw2 = µ2 + δ2s (3.3)
Suppose that the wages are higher in the destination country than in the origin
countries. It is possible to assume that µ2 > µ1 > µ0, as showed in Fig.3.10. Fur-
thermore, since the relative returns to observable skills are higher in origin countries
than in the UK, it is possible to assume that δ0 > δ1 > δ2
Thus, assuming that the migration decision is determined by a comparison of
wages across countries net of migration costs C, the decision to migrate is given by:
Ii = ln(w2|w0 + C) ≈ (µ2 − µ0 − π) > 0 (3.4)
Ii = ln(w2|w1 + C) ≈ (µ2 − µ1 − π) > 0 (3.5)
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Figure 3.10: Destination and origin wages by-skill level
where π is a time-equivalent migration costs and it is given by the ratio between
migration costs (C) and the individual-specific wage at origin, (π = C/wi0; π =
C/wi1). Following Bertoli, Dequiedt, and Zenou (2016), the time-equivalent migration
cost is assuming do not vary across individuals with the same level of education27.
This analysis exploits an exogenous reform which impacts on selectivity and wages
at the destination. Migration policy in the UK is based on priority criteria that
address the "skill needs". As mentioned in the institutional setting, in fact, the
UK has developed a system of immigration control that reacts to the demands of the
national needs. This system is designed to incorporate various protections for resident
workers, which have a priority in the labor market. For this reason, the UK has
developed an educational selectivity system, which looks at the labor-market quality
of immigrants. In this respect, the government uses immigration as a tool to address
“labor shortages”, through the shortage occupation list, which identifies occupations
27In his previous paper (1987), Borjas considered π as constant, so that C was directly proportional
to wi0. Then, according to his framework, migration costs vary among individuals, but the sign of
the correlation between costs and skills is ambiguous (Poutvaara, Borjas, and Kauppinen, 2015).
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where there is an understanding both that a shortage exists and that this shortage
should be addressed through labor immigration. As shown in the previous section,
the data seems to confirm this priority restriction, because the visa for shortage
occupations has increased over time compared to non-shortage professions, as well
as the differences between minimum salary thresholds between the two categories
has raised. According to the literature, more quality-selective immigration policy
is expected to lower the number of immigrants and, at the same time, increase the
average quality of immigrants. However, observing the data, this prediction can imply
two different hypotheses:
H0: Within high-skilled occupations, UK-born workers do not react to labor mar-
ket needs, and consequently, the policy is "forced" to recruit immigrants willing to
work in those occupations from abroad. In this case, it is expected to find lower wages
and less quality of immigrants.
Figure 3.11: Predictions on wages based on skill level and low-quality of immigrants
where s* refers to the level of skills that are assumed to be perfectly transferable
192
across countries. In this case, a decrease in the average wage in the destination causes
the dashed skill-wage line to shift down. The skill threshold s* decreases, and the
quality is going down in s’*.
The alternative hypothesis states as follow:
H1: Within high-skilled occupations, the quality of the UK-natives in those oc-
cupations is too low and hence the policy acts to recruit more skilled workers from
abroad. In this case, it is expected to find higher wages and more quality of immi-
grants.
Figure 3.12: Predictions on wages based on high-skilled level and high-quality of
immigrants
Therefore, an increase in the average wage in the destination country lead the
dashed skill-wage line to shift up. The skill threshold increases from s* to s’*, and
the quality of immigrants is going up.
The following empirical analysis aims to test these hypotheses on average wages
between a treatment group and a control group. Specifically, in the presence of an
exogenous shock, this research design intends to estimate a causal effect, such as
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the effects of a policy change that do not affect everybody at the same time and in
the same way. In addition, the impact of this policy change will be further tested
considering a comparison between natives with EU citizens and non-EU immigrants.
3.7 Identification Strategy
This section is devoted to different empirical investigations. The primary objective is
to comprehend the impact of an institutional change in policy at a national level. In
our setting, this implies to quantify how a policy change in the VISA selection affects
the group of shortage occupations compared with the differences in the other Tier 2
occupations before and after the 2011 Reform.
This empirical investigation is possible under a difference-in-difference (DID) anal-
ysis. It estimates the impact of a policy interpreted as an exogenous shock made by
the Government in the selection of people in the labor market. Such institutional
changes have influenced access to some categories of works (treated) and not oth-
ers (control) by observing both groups before and after the event of interest. This
methodology is used in the setting of a natural experiment or a quasi-experiment in
which a treatment variable undergoes a change that can be viewed as an exogenous
variation in a treatment variable, (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).28. The in-
tuition behind the DID is to measure the effect of the policy on the outcome in the
treated group relative to changes in the outcome in the control group. A natural
experiment always, in fact, includes a control group, which is not affected by the
policy change, and a treatment group, which is thought to be affected by the policy
change29. DID requires data measured from a treatment group and a control group at
28One of the first contributions to the DID strategy is made by Card and Krueger (1993) paper on
minimum wages. In migration studies, the seminal paper using this approach is Card (1990) study
on Mariel Boatlift to Miami.
29The control and treatment groups in natural experiments arise from the particular policy change
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two or more different time periods, specifically at least one time period before "treat-
ment" and at least one time period after "treatment." For the ith treated group, the
change in the outcome is measured by [yi0 − yi1|Di0 = 1] and that for the control
group is measured by [yi0 − yi1|Di0 = 0]. Then, the differences-in-differences mea-
sures [yi0− yi1|Di0 = 1]− [yi0− yi1|Di0 = 0], where 0 and 1 denote respectively “after”
and “before” the experiment occurs. The idea is to difference out the confounding
time trends: [y0i0 − y0i1|Di1 = 1]− [y0i0 − y0i1|Di0 = 0]. This is called the parallel trend
assumption; namely, it is assumed that in the absence of treatment, the difference
between the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group is constant over time. This means that
the group of occupations concerned by the policy change would have evolved with the
same trend as the group used as control if the policy change would not have happened,
therefore ensuring that the evolution observed in controls is a valid counterfactual.
This rules out: (i) group-specific time trends, such as: E[mt|di1 = 1] 6= E[mt|i1 = 0],
and (ii) composition effects if the treatment under consideration affects the compo-
sition of treatment and control groups30. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimators
provide unbiased treatment effect estimates when, in the absence of treatment, the
average outcomes for the treated and control groups would have followed parallel
trends over time. For this reason, the validity of DID estimator (and the distinction
with Fixed Effects (FE) estimator) lies in the choice of the appropriate comparison
group where the common trend assumption above holds. This approach aims to avoid
endogeneity by exploiting exogenous sources of variation, but finding a true natural
experiment is quite difficult (Bansak, Simpson, and Zavodny, 2015).
unlike a true experiment, in which treatment and control groups are randomly and explicitly chosen
(Wooldridge, 2016).
30Potential solutions for composition effects, in fact, include (i) re-define the control group or (ii)
estimate the intention to treat.
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3.7.1 Estimating the Effect of Tier 2 Policy on Wages
The empirical strategy in this analysis takes advantage of the variation in the Tier 2
policy during April 2011. The estimation sample consists of all occupations within
each establishment, which are assigned to the treatment group if they appear in
the Shortage Occupation List. The outcome of interest is the average salary within
occupations. The first sample includes periods from January 2009 until December
2013. The reform coincides with the second quarter of the year 2011. Moreover,
the second part of the analysis presents a preliminary study on the effect of Brexit
referendum on the same categories by exploiting variations at extensive margins. In
this case, the sample includes periods from January 2014 to December 2018. Formally:
yiot = α + β1To + β2postt + β3To ∗ postt + εit31 (3.6)
In this setting, eq. (3.6) can be rewritten as follows:
lnwageiot = α + β1Shortageo + β2postt + β3Shortageo ∗ postt + β4Xiot + εit (3.7)
The dependent variable lnwageiot represents the natural log of real wage within
occupation o, individual i at time t. The variable Shortageo represents the treatment
To in equation (1) and it is a dummy varying at occupational level. In particular,
Shortageo identifies those occupations that are in the Shortage Occupation List and
it is equal to one for observations in the treatment, while it equals zero for those
in the control group. The variable post is a time period dummy for the second time
period. The treatment started in 2011, second quarter. In this case, years before 2011
have a value of 0 and 2011+ have a value of 1. The coefficient (β3) directly measures
31This model is called "log-level model" and impies the log(y) as the dependent variable and x as
the independent variable (Wooldridge, 6E).
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the impact of the policy change by estimating the differential trend observed in the
treatment group after the policy change, i.e., Shortageo ∗ postt. The remaining term
(εit) is at the individual level (i) and the time period (t). The analysis controls, then,
for these variations through a matrix of controls (Xoit), which includes measures of
individual and demographic characteristics, schooling, employment, and ability that
allows for correcting for any pre-trend differences.
In particular, controls include different aspects of the individual or market behav-
iors: (i) some variables for individual covariates, namely age, sex and marital status;
(ii) a variable for education based on age at which left full time education; (iii) a
variable of potential experience in workforce; (iv) a variable for employment status;
and (v) a variable for region of usual residence. Because the variable post captures
the aggregate factors that would cause changes in the dependent variable even in the
absence of a policy change, the second step aims to test the parallel trend assump-
tion. As explained above, in this case we can observe whether the difference between
shortage and no shortage groups (our treated and control references)the ‘treatment’
and ‘control’ group is constant before the reform. For this reason, equations 3.8 test
the effect through the interaction between Shortage for different years, as formally
specified in the following equation:
lnwageiot = α + β1Shortageo +
T∑
j=t+1
β2It + β3Xiot + εit (3.8)
where j denote the years of analysis and It is the interaction between treated and
years after the policy change and is now an indicator for whether the treatment is
switched on a certain period.
Equation 3.9 is more detailed and looks at the effects in the outcome by the
interaction between treated and quarters. The treatment starts, in fact, in 2011, the
second quarter. For this reason, I have created the variable period, which indicates a
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detailed time period.
lnwageiot = α + β1Shortageo +
T∑
j=q+1
β2It + β3Xiot + εit (3.9)
where q denotes all quarters, which are indicated as periods from 1 (quarter 1,
2009) to 20 (quarter 4, 2013) or in the second case from 1 (quarter 1, 2014) to 20
(quarter 4, 2018). Thus, j=q+,..., Q. The variable I, in this case, refers to the effect of
the interaction between treated and quarters. The policy change in both cases occurs
at period 10th.
3.7.2 The Effect of Tier 2 Policy in Shortages and Groups
A triple-difference (DDD) estimation strategy is implemented by adding an addi-
tional comparison group. The idea is to explore not only the differences in wages
across shortage and non-shortage occupations, but across the three groups of work-
ers: natives, EU citizens, and non-EU immigrants. In fact, the shock could affect the
wages of these three groups within both shortages and no shortage occupations in
different ways. Triple differences estimator is an extension to the basic DID analysis
and covered above to multiple groups and for multiple time periods. DDD follows
the logic of difference-in-differences and presents the same assumption as the first
estimator. However, the DDD estimation model allows exploiting differentials that a
standard DD cannot. In this respect, it allows estimating the diff-in-diff model for
two groups: one which is affected by the reform and one which is not. If the group
which is not affected by the reform has any change over time, this is then subtracted
from the main diff-in-diff estimate to give a triple difference estimate. In this way,
when the outcome variable is determined by policy, time, place, or another variable,
a triple difference strategy may remove the bias from the confounder and isolate the
treatment effect (Wing, Simon, and Bello-Gomez, 2018). The identifying assumption
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of this DDD estimator is that there be no contemporaneous shock that affects the
relative outcomes of the treatment group in the same groups or years as the reform
(Gruber, 1994). In a DDD analysis, a full set of dummies is included for each of the
two kinds of groups and all time periods, as well as all pairwise interactions. Then, a
policy dummy (or sometimes a continuous policy variable) measures the effect of the
policy. Besides, this method can potentially account for unobserved trends.
Triple differences as identification strategy exploits variation across occupations
and different groups of workers, as formally follows:
lnwageiot = α + β1Shortageo + β2postt + β3Shortageo ∗ postt + β4group
+β5group ∗ post+ β6group ∗ Shortageo + β7group ∗ Shortageo ∗ post+ β8Xiot + εit
(3.10)
where i indexes individuals, o refers to the occupation and t at years equal to
1 if it is after the policy change, while it equals 0 if before. The outcome is the
log real hourly wage, X is a vector of observable characteristics as explained above,
and Shortage is a dummy for treatment group (1 if treatment, 0 if control), while
group refers to the EU and non-EU immigrants relative to the UK-born workers. In
this model, the effect of the policy is captured by β3, such as the triple-difference
estimator. The coefficient of interest is now β7, such as the coefficient on the triple
interaction term, namely Shortage * group * post. Therefore, the treatment effect
will measure the effect of the policy change on the average real wages of Shortage
and no shortage occupations of UK native-workers relative to the EU and non-EU
immigrants. This exercise would test the parallel trends between groups in order to
exclude the possibility that wages are subject to systematically different changes that
have nothing to do with the policy.
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3.8 Empirical Results
This section presents estimations for the equations described in the empirical strat-
egy. The causal identification regards the effect of a policy change on the average
wages for the period between 2009 and 2013. By using a difference-in-differences
method, the treatment effect tests whether the policy implemented in 2011 can affect
the wage outcome of shortage occupations compared with individuals in non-shortage
occupations, as shown in table 3.6. Moreover, table 3.7 shows this effect by exploit-
ing a triple-difference estimation, which allows differentiating by groups, namely EU
citizens and non-EU immigrants, for UK-born workers. Results are consistent across
all specifications and show, on average, a negative impact of the reform to the wage
of shortage occupations compared to the control occupations. This effect is more neg-
ative for immigrants compared to the UK-natives. The second part of the analysis
shows the results for the period between 2014 and 2018. In this case, an "identify-
ing" effect involves an extensive margins view by exploiting a policy announcement,
namely the Brexit referendum, on the same treatment and control groups. Table 3.8
shows the DID estimation highlighting a positive effect on the shortage occupation
after the treatment, while table 3.9 finds a slightly positive effect on the treatment
on immigrants compared to the natives.
3.8.1 Institutional Changes in the period 2009-2013
To investigate the causal role of the policy change implemented in the UK in 2011,
the first estimation (equations (1)-(4) in the previous section) considers the effects
of the policy on wages of shortage occupations relative to the ones of non-shortage
occupations. The first estimations are based on data for the years between 2009
and 2013. Specifically, table 3.6 explores the effects at intensive margins, such as
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the effects of a change in a policy on labor market within occupational and salary
categories. Therefore, estimations rely on variations across occupations competing
within the same labor market. Columns (1) and (2) look at the effects of the treat-
ment (β1) and time (β2) and at the interaction between treatment and the time (β3)
after the policy change. This is a log-level model, where the log(y) is the dependent
variable, and x identifies the regressors. In this case the coefficient (β1) is interpreted
as %∆y = (100β1)∆x (Wooldridge, 2016)32. Specifically, the treatment (β1) shows a
positive and statistically significant sign, which means that the individuals in short-
age occupations present average wages higher than that of individuals in non-shortage
occupations. Variable post confirms that average wages are higher in the year when
the policy change happened in 2011. Looking at the estimate of the interaction vari-
able (β3) suggests that 25,5 % units reduce the average wages in treated occupations
because of the policy change that happened. When the controls are added, these
results can be interpreted as a reduction of 9,4% units in the average wages of the
shortage occupation after the reform. A test for the validity of the “parallel trends”
assumption has been conducted to exclude changes in outcomes for the treatment
and control groups before the program was implemented33. By using the interaction
between the treatment and the variable year, the evaluation takes into consideration
two pre-intervention observations to assess the pre-policy and the post-intervention
trends. Columns 3 and 4 show the equality of pre-intervention trends with coefficients
that are not statistically significant before the policy change. The interaction between
32In the log-level model, 100β1 is sometimes called the semi-elasticity of y with respect to x
(Wooldridge, 2016)
33As said, the difference-in-differences strategy allows testing the effects between a treatment
and a comparison group that are constant over time. Therefore providing a valid estimate of the
counterfactual, the assumption that no such time-varying differences exist between the treatment
and control group should be confirmed. If the outcome trends are different for the treatment and
comparison groups, then the estimated treatment effect obtained by the DID method would be
biased.
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Shortage and year indicates that policy restrictions introduced in 2011 reduced the
average wages of shortage occupations by 7,6% in 2011, by 11,6% in 2012 and by
11,3% in 2013. To further confirm that there are no differences between the treat-
ment and comparison groups that change over time, this analysis has been conducted
at a quarterly level. In this case, the interaction between treatment and periods
further confirms that no time-varying differences exist between the treatment and
control group, which present no statistically significant coefficients before the policy
change. Since period 9, and more specifically since period 10 (2011, second quarter),
the interaction coefficients show a decrease in the average wages for individuals in
shortage occupations. These empirical results support hereby the causal effect of the
policy change on the treatment. In addition, this confirms what discussed in the
descriptives. As restrictions in the policy were implemented since 2011, the average
wage for both occupations in shortage and no shortage occupations has increased due
probably to more restrictive criteria both in skill levels and in the minimum salary
thresholds required to enter the country. However, the average wage in shortage oc-
cupations has decreased compared to non-shortage professions, as shown in Fig. 3.8.
By using a priority system based on a "skill need" approach, the reform may thus
have contributed to lower the wages required to fill these positions. In this case, the
presence of such an essential difference in the effect on salaries between shortage and
shortage occupations could confirm the first hypothesis. The lower level of wages in
shortage occupations could confirm that immigrants selected based on skill priority
on Shortage are not the top-level of skill distributions. This finding is also consistent
with the picture of the minimum salary threshold, as shown in Figure 3.5. It shows
that the difference between minimum salary thresholds for "experienced" workers in
shortage and no-shortage occupations are increasing.
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Table 3.6: Results from Diff-in-Diff 2009-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln_wage ln_wage ln_wage ln_wage
1.Shortage 0.153*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.058***



















































Constant 2.558*** 2.203*** 2.189*** 2.184***
(0.003) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Individual controls NO YES YES YES
Skill controls NO YES YES YES
Occupation control NO YES YES YES
Demographic control NO YES YES YES
Observations 102,777 102,777 102,777 102,777
R-squared 0.046 0.278 0.279 0.279
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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These findings are also consistent with the literature on the impact of skill-selective
immigration policies on immigrants’ and natives’ outcomes. In particular, it is com-
patible with the analysis carried out by Czaika and Parsons (2017), which uses a
micro-founded gravity model find that demand-driven systems, which are usually
based on the principle of job contingency and which are often supplemented by labor
markets test or shortage list assessments of labor market needs, have little, and po-
tentially even a negative, effect. These findings are also consistent with the literature
on the quality of immigrants based on observable characteristics (see McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2010; Bertoli and Rapoport, 2015).
3.8.2 Wages and inequality of immigrants and natives
The results in Table 3.6 highlights a causal effect where a restriction in the policy
has caused a reduction in the average wages of the treated group after the change
in respect to the control group. Second, they show that no differences in trends
are observed between the comparison and treatment groups before the policy change
began. Triple-difference estimation would exploit variation across occupations and
different groups of workers, and it is a robust way to test the assumption of parallel
trends since it uses different comparison groups. The main issue of interest estimated
in equations 3.10 is whether the effects on the average wages caused by a restriction
in the policy on shortage and no shortage occupations are passed over to immigrants
with respect to the UK natives. The results are shown in table 3.7. In this respect,
the interaction between treatment and time provided the double difference, while
further interaction between the groups is the triple difference. The results confirm
that individuals in shortage occupations present average wages higher than that of
individuals in non-shortage professions. In fact, the treatment (β1) shows a positive
and statistically significant sign. Variable post confirms that average wages are higher
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in the year when the policy change happened in 2011. And the interaction between
treatment and time suggests that the average salaries in treated occupations are
reduced by 8,6 % units because of the policy change that happened. Looking at
the estimate of the interaction variable (β6) suggests that EU immigrants (1.group)
present lower average wages in shortage occupations with respect to the UK-born
workers of 1,9%, while the average salary for non-EU immigrants (2.group) increases
by 0,3 in a shortage occupation. The interaction between group and time shows an
increase in the average wage both for EU citizens (by6, 4%) and non-immigrants by
5,1%. However, the triple-difference coefficient (β7) highlights the negative effect of
the policy on shortage occupations for EU immigrants by 7,6%. This effect is even
more negative for non-EU immigrants in shortage occupations with respect to the
UK-born workers. The impact on wages between EU and non-EU immigrants is
negative, but it is not so different between these two groups. This latter observation
supports the idea of the UK government’s demand for high-skilled foreign workers,
but that are not top-skills in the foreign labor force. This is consistent with the
results finding by Mayda, Ortega, Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2018) on the effect of the
binding H-1B cap in the US. They find that the policy has reduced the number of
workers who were likely to have been among the most talented and productive foreign
individuals seeking US employment and has caused the composition of H-1B workers
to become more concentrated among workers with middle-levels of skill or ability.
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Individual controls NO YES
Skill controls NO YES
Occupation control NO YES
Demographic control NO YES
Observations 102,718 102,718
R-squared 0.047 0.279
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.8.3 The impact of Brexit Referendum
This section would explore the effects of policy intervention at the extensive margin by
exploiting variations in the labor market by taking into account the effect between the
same occupational and salary categories. Although Brexit has not still happened, the
referendum can be already considered as a natural experiment. However, this analysis
would find an "identifying" effect to test if the result of the referendum has already
had an impact on the UK labor market. Although the Brexit poll directly changes
the labor market by affecting individuals, this analysis would test the "indirect" effect
caused by an announcement on average wages in shortage and non-shortage occupa-
tions. The results are shown in table 3.8. Columns (1) to (2), which look at the effects
of the treatment (β1) and time (β2), show that the policy intervention has a negative
but statistically significant effect on the treatment (β1), which means that the indi-
viduals in shortage occupations present average wages lower than that of individuals
in non-shortage occupations. However, average wages become higher in the year when
the referendum happened in 2016. Looking at the estimate of the DID interaction
variable (β3) suggests that the average wages in treated occupations are increased by
3,7 % units because of the referendum. When the controls are added, these results
can be interpreted as an increase of 1,7% units in the average wages of the shortage
occupation after the referendum. Also, in this case, it is possible to assume that no
time-varying differences exist between the treatment and control groups before the
policy intervention. Because coefficients are negative or not statistically significant
before the referendum, it is possible to assume that the change in the average wages
of individuals in non-shortage occupations reflects what would have happened to the
average wages of individuals in shortage occupations in the absence of the treatment.
Columns (3) and (4) can confirm the parallel trend assumption. Specifically, the
interaction between Shortage and year results to be statistically significant and indi-
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cates that policy intervention in 2016 slightly increases the average wages of shortage
occupations. This is also confirmed by the interaction between treatment and peri-
ods, which present no statistically significant coefficients before the announcement,
while an increase in the average wages for shortage occupations since period 9. In
this case, the effect is less pronounced than in the first specification, probably due
to the "announcement" effect. However, the results show that the Brexit referendum
has already had an impact on the high-skilled labor market. These findings are con-
sistent with the figures on wages shown in the Descriptive Statistics, which show an
increase in the average salary of shortage occupations over time. These results are
also consistent with the literature on the effects of immigration on native wages that
exploits a natural experiment (see for instance, Card, 1990; Friedberg, 2001; Angrist
and Krueger, 1991), which find limited evidence on an adverse effect of immigration
on natives’ labor market outcomes.
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Table 3.8: Results from Diff-in-Diff 2014-2018
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln_wage ln_wage ln_wage ln_wage ln_wage ln_wage
1.Shortage -0.164*** -0.076*** -0.170*** -0.078*** -0.181*** -0.086***



















































Constant 2.938*** 2.467*** 2.931*** 2.460*** 2.930*** 2.457***
(0.004) (0.020) (0.006) (0.020) (0.012) (0.022)
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Skill controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Occupation control NO YES NO YES NO YES
Demographic control NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 69,329 69,329 69,329 69,329 69,329 69,329
R-squared 0.018 0.169 0.018 0.170 0.019 0.170
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.8.4 Effect of Brexit vote on wages and worker quality
The years between 2014 and 2018 are particularly relevant to the study of the labor
market in the UK. Since the Brexit referendum in 2016, the priority system in the
UK labor market is changing, especially with respect to labor migration. Since the
immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote hit the EU immigrants, one could expect
a more evident effect on the labor market outcomes of this group. However, the
Brexit referendum has caused an "indirect" impact on non-EU labor immigration,
which is substantially increased since 2016. In fact, as explained in the Institutional
Setting, the Tier 2 Visa restricted COS monthly allocation limit was reached for a
record of different consecutive months in a row. As a result, prioritized applications
such as those on the shortage occupation list have been granted ahead of many other
applicants. At the same time, significant restriction to the UK Immigration Rules
for Tier 2 employer-sponsored migrants has come into force since 6 April 2017 by
the increase in minimum salary thresholds and the introduction of additional and
increased charges. This analysis would offer an understanding that could explain how
the Brexit vote has had an effect, either positive or negative, on the wage outcome of
EU and non-EU immigrants in respect of the UK-born residents. Equations 7 and 8
would test whether the effects on the average wages caused by this announcement on
shortage and no shortage occupations between these three different groups. Results
in table 3.9 confirm that the referendum has a negative effect more on average wages
of the EU citizens that of the non-EU immigrants with respect to the UK natives.
The triple-difference coefficient (β7), in fact, highlights an adverse effect of the policy
intervention on shortage occupations for EU immigrants by 2,2% with respect to na-
tives. This effect is also harmful to non-EU immigrants in shortage occupations with
respect to the UK-born workers but is lower than for EU immigrants. By decom-
posing this effect, the treatment (β1) shows a negative and statistically significant
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sign, which means that the impact on the policy intervention on average wages of
the individuals in shortage occupations is decreasing by 1,58% units in respect to
the control group. Variable post confirms that average salaries are higher in the year
when the referendum happened in 2016. And the interaction between treatment and
time suggests that the average wages in treated occupations have increased by 4,7
% units because of the policy intervention that happened. The interaction between
group and time shows a slight increase in the average wage both for EU citizens by
(2, 1%) and non-EU immigrants by 0,9%. However, the average salary of the EU
individuals in shortage occupations has decreased after 2016 with respect to both
natives and non-EU immigrants, as in Fig. 3.9. This estimation result again is in line
with the UK government policy currently based around the notion that bringing in
migrants alleviates skill shortages. However, the wage gap effect between groups is
decreasing with respect to the previous analysis conducted for 2009-2013. In this case,
the impact of tightness in the policy on the quality of immigrants is more ambiguous.
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Individual controls NO YES
Skill controls NO YES
Occupation control NO YES
Demographic control NO YES
Observations 69,270 69,270
R-squared 0.019 0.170
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.9 Discussion and Conclusion
In recent years skill-selective immigration policies have been implemented in several
developed countries. Despite their growing popularity, little evidence exists to date
documenting their impact on the local labor markets. This chapter aimed to address
this gap first by focusing on a reform that was introduced in the UK in 2011 to re-
orient economic migration towards skills that are the most in need of the economy.
Tier 2 system has been implemented for selecting economically desirable immigrants
depending on a job offer and skills shortages. This admission system also provides
more flexibility in identifying appropriate candidates, who can be highly skilled. In
this case, self-selection should work to attract the ablest and motivated workers be-
cause the distribution of income between countries remains unequal over time (see
Borjas, Kauppinen, and Poutvaara, 2018). When the pool of high-skilled individuals
in the country is insufficient, the ability to attract high-skilled immigrants is crucial
for improving the quality of a country’s workforce and its innovative capacity (Parey,
Ruhose, Waldinger, and Netz, 2017). The UK has developed a system of immigration
control that reacts to the demands of the national need through priority criteria. For
this reason, the UK has developed an educational selectivity system, which looks at
the labor-market quality of immigrants. In this respect, the Government uses immi-
gration as a tool to address labor shortages. The shortage occupation list identifies
all occupations in a shortage within the UK market, and that can be of interest in
labor immigration. This analysis investigates whether the policy was successful in
selecting individuals for the priority list. The data have confirmed this priority re-
striction. Indeed the visa for shortage occupations has increased over time compared
to non-shortage professions. Further, the differences between the minimum salary
thresholds between the two categories have raised. According to the literature, more
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quality-selective immigration policy is expected to lower the number of immigrants
and, at the same time, increase the average quality of immigrants. However, ob-
serving the data, this analysis has tested two different hypotheses on the variety of
immigrants. The first hypothesis would test whether a lower quality of immigrants
corresponds on average to lower wages. The idea is that native workers do not re-
act to the requests of the internal market. In turn, the Government is forced to
recruit immigrants from abroad. The second hypothesis would take into account the
possibility that the natives’ quality is relatively low for the market needs. In this
alternative case, the Government should select more qualified people from abroad.
I test these hypotheses for two different periods. This challenge is possible under a
difference-in-difference (DID) analysis, which in this case estimates the impact of a
policy interpreted as an exogenous shock made by the Government in the selection of
people in the labor market. Such institutional changes have influenced access to some
categories of works (treated) and not others (control) by observing both groups before
and after the event of interest. The first causal identification regards the effect of a
policy change on the average wages for the period between 2009 and 2013. By using a
difference-in-differences method, the treatment effect tests whether the policy imple-
mented in 2011 can affect the wage outcome of shortage occupations compared with
individuals in non-shortage professions. Moreover, we test this effect by exploiting a
triple-difference estimation, which allows differentiating by groups, namely EU citi-
zens and non-EU immigrants, for UK-born workers. A first descriptive examination
of the CoS and salary thresholds shows that the visas issued for shortage occupations
have increased over time. The result is confirmed by looking at the differences in the
minimum salary thresholds among groups. Results from estimation show, on aver-
age, a negative impact of the reform to the wage of shortage occupations compared
to the control group. This effect is more harmful to immigrants compared to the UK-
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natives. Thus these results from our empirical analysis confirm that hiring workers in
shortage occupation has increased, but this has not caused adverse effects on native
wages. The reform was thus able to increase the migration levels in target occupa-
tions, revealing that this policy may be effective in addressing skill needs in the short
run. However, the lower level of wages in shortage occupations seems to confirm that
the selection of immigrants based on shortage is not the top-level of skill distribu-
tions. The second part of the analysis shows the results for the period between 2014
and 2018. In this case, an" identifying" effect involves an extensive margins view by
exploiting a policy announcement, namely the Brexit referendum, on the same treat-
ment and control groups. In this case, the DID estimation highlights a positive effect
on the shortage of occupation after the treatment, while a slightly positive impact on
the treatment of immigrants compared to the natives. The analysis shows a slight
increase in the average wage both for EU citizens (by 2,1%) and non-EU immigrants
by 0,9%. However, the average salary of the EU individuals in shortage occupations
has decreased after 2016. This is true even in relative terms in comparison with the
salaries of both natives and non-EU immigrants. This estimation result again is in
line with the UK government policy currently based around the notion that bringing
in migrants alleviates skill shortages. However, the wage gap effect between groups is
decreasing compared to the previous analysis conducted for 2009-2013. In this case,
the impact of tightness in the policy on the quality of immigrants is more ambiguous.
These results reveal that natives are, in part, affected by immigration in shortage
categories. However, these small adverse effects on wages explain the reduction of the
occupational groups in the Labor Force Survey for the period between 2014 and 2018.
These results are consistent with the literature on the effects of immigration on na-
tive wages that exploits a natural experiment (see for instance, Card, 1990; Friedberg,
2001; Angrist and Krueger, 1991), which find limited evidence on an adverse effect of
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immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes. Some criticisms of this policy reside
in the definition of skill shortages. While the reform has been effective in reaching its
goals in the first period, the effect on the second period is more ambiguous. For this
reason, this analysis raises some further research questions on the effectiveness of a
selection policy based on skill-needs.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
Although countries focus on selective migration, a further reduction of family mi-
gration and an ever more systematic re-addressing of asylum flow, the economic im-
portance of migration continues to grow for both sending and receiving countries.
Many states in Europe and North America have experienced rapid increases in la-
bor immigration over the past 20 years. In 2017 the number of immigrants in the
European Union (EU) was 53.1 million, roughly 10% of the total population. Most
of them (48.2 million) live in an EU15 country. More than half of the immigrants
in EU countries are European (38% of the foreign-born population in the EU). An
additional 16% was born in a European country outside of the EU. Africa and the
Middle East account for 19 % of all immigrants, with around 16 % coming from Asia
and 11% from the Americas or Oceania (EU LFS, 2019). Labor migration in the
EU has changed in recent years, in particular, as far as the time length that labor
migrants spend abroad. In addition, the nature, scale, and direction of the migration
flows have also changed dramatically. The EU successive enlargements towards the
former Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007 were influential in this respect.
Another important element we need to consider is related to some EU demographic
trends: populations aging and declining birth rates both imply shrinking labor force.
Moreover, the presumably most important reason concerns the changes in employ-
ment relations with the transition to flexible employment practices which is causing a
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worldwide redistribution of labor. Several other elements add up. In fact, European
migration patterns have heavily influenced by the transitional measures that have
been applied, their duration, and by the economic crisis. In addition, technological
innovation and global competitiveness are addressing many of the labor market trends.
In combination with increasing demand for skilled workers due to demographic chal-
lenges and growing innovation pressures, key sectors of the EU’s economy suffer from
specific labor and skill shortages (European Commission, 2019). Across the EU, the
top five skill shortage occupations are: (1) ICT professionals; (2) medical doctors; (3)
science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) professionals; (4) nurses
and midwives; and (5) teachers. However, the specific occupations experiencing short-
ages differ among member states (CEDEFOP, 2016). In countries facing pronounced
demand for skilled workers, labor migration can help to mitigate skill shortages in the
domestic workforce. For this reason, attracting highly qualified labor has become a
priority of many member states. Both supra-national and national policies are being
introduced and implemented to increase the attractiveness of the EU countries as a
migration destination (Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert, 2011; Chaloff and Lemaitre,
2009). The European Commission (EC) has tried to harmonize the selection poli-
cies for purposes of labor, research and study. The underlying idea is to enable the
EU to respond quickly and efficiently to labor market requirements at the national,
regional, and local level in the face of a growing global competition. As part of the
EU strategy to respond to fluctuating demand for high-qualified workers, the “EU
Blue Card” was introduced in 2009, with the aim to to offset skill shortages and to
address the problem of demographic aging. The EU Blue Card is an EU-wide work
permit for highly qualified employment, aimed at making EU a desirable destination
for skilled workers from third countries. The EU Blue Card was implemented by
25 EU member states, apart from Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. It
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is designed to be demand-oriented, such that immigration follows the needs of the
labor market. Restrictive admission conditions and the existence of parallel rules,
conditions and procedures at national level have limited the use of the EU Blue Card
scheme. In 2017, Germany issued almost 21.000 Blue Cards (85% of the EU total),
followed by France (4.3 %), Luxembourg (2.8 %) and Poland (1.9 %) (see Hatton,
2008; OECD, 2008; Speciale, 2010; Commission, 2016; Eurostat, 2019a,b, for analyses
of the impact of the EU Blue Card). Mobility within the EU can in principle help
to fill labor market shortages, but the cost of moving for individuals is increased by
policy-induced barriers to mobility such as the loss of pension entitlements, lack of
recognition of qualifications, inaccessibility of some public sector jobs and housing
market frictions (OECD, 2012).
Since assessing the overall net gains or losses to the economy from immigration is
one of the most debated issue, the first chapter of the Thesis has provided an overview
of the main theoretical and empirical contributions for explaining the socio-economic
impact of immigration from the receiving country perspective. Starting from the ba-
sic model of immigration, Chapter 1 has provided a survey of the economic literature
on the characteristics and socio-economic impact of migration. The first part has
analyzed why people become immigrants and whether immigrants are positively or
negatively selected relative to the receiving country population. In particular, it has
focused on the literature that has tried to answer to “why people migrate” and “who
immigrates”. It takes into consideration the theoretical literature on the economic
determinants of international migration which stemmed from the much older theory
of internal migration. The standard models imply that immigration rate depends on
the international differences in the returns to factor supply, net of migration costs,
skill levels, income inequality, and immigration policies. In particular, considering
the cross-country differences in economic conditions, utility-or- income maximization
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model at micro level and the gravity model at macro level predict that changes in
relative economic conditions lead to changes in migration flows determining whether
people move. While the economic models of migration decision look at the cross-
country differences in the economic conditions to determine the migration flows, the
“Selection Models” focus on the immigrants’ skill levels and returns to skill in order
to look at the immigrants’ characteristics. The most influential model on skill se-
lection in immigration was elaborated by Borjas (1987) based on a canonical model
by Andrew Roy (1951). His application (Borjas, 1987, 1991), shows that interna-
tional migration is not only influenced by net earnings differences between countries,
but also by factors such as international differences in income inequality and the
degree of skills transferability. The second part of the chapter has focused on the
literature on labor market effects of immigration. By exploring the basic neoclassi-
cal model of immigration, the chapter has explored the main theoretical predictions
concerning the labor market impact of immigration on demand and supply of labor
taking into account the difference between substitutability and complementarity in
the production process, as well as between skilled and unskilled labor. Although basic
economic theory suggests that immigration increases the labor supply, leading to an
adjustment of employment and wages, the empirical literature shows more complex
evidences. The last part of the chapter focuses on the empirical strategies and the
main findings on the labor market impact of immigration in the destination coun-
tries. The main conclusion of this stream of literature tend to find small effects of
immigration on wages in destination countries. Although many studies find that im-
migration does not appear to have had negative labor market effects on natives the
destination, some studies do find evidence that certain groups have seen their wages
fall because of immigration. In particular, studies that use the spatial correlation and
natural experiments approaches tend to find smaller, if any, negative effects on wages
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and employment of native-born workers. Studies that use the skill cells approach or
factor proportions models tend to find more evidence of detrimental effects, although
there are exceptions. The labor market effects of immigration thus remain open to
debate.
In recent years skill-selective immigration policies have been implemented in sev-
eral developed countries. In particular, a growing number of OECD countries are
likely to adopt more restrictive and increasingly quality-selective immigration policies,
with the aim to confer better chances of admission at destination to those applicants
with a higher level of education. This policy become to be clear from the gradual
introduction of points-based immigration systems, first in Canada in 1967, recently
in the UK in 2008. Elsewhere, immigration policies have also evolved towards be-
coming more restrictive quantitatively and more selective qualitatively, through the
introduction of specific visa categories for highly skilled professionals (e.g., the H1-B
visa category in the US, or the European “Blue Card”) or through the introduction
of biased selection criteria, making low-skill immigration more difficult while at the
same time encouraging permanent high-skill immigration. Labor markets across the
European Union are characterized by varied regulatory frameworks, but each Mem-
ber State faces the challenges of shortages of workers with relevant qualifications or
interested to take up certain occupations. Chapter 2 has focused on the review of the
admission policies within the European Union (EU) that affect the size and the char-
acteristics of the highly skilled immigrant inflows. Within EU, countries currently
allow citizens of other EU countries to enter freely to work. Although the mobility of
EU-born workers within the EU is free and not skill-selective, an endorsement for a
high skill mobility within the common market has been provided under several reg-
ulations. Generally, the rules about the selection admission policies in EU are based
on Treaty provisions interpreted by Court decisions. Concerning the movement of the
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third countries nationals, European Commission has dealt with several proposals for
directives on labor migration, although the Member States have relatively strict poli-
cies for immigrants from non-EU countries. The attempts by European Commission
(EC) to harmonize the selection policies for purposes of labor, research and study
has been analyzed. The EC, in fact, has been promoting the immigration of highly
skilled people in order to compensate the labor shortages in the face of a growing
global competition. The last part has aimed to discuss the different approaches to
selecting and admitting highly-skilled immigrants in UK and Germany.
The immigration system of the United Kingdom does not include the EU Blue
Card as in the main EU countries. Instead, the UK manages its migration flows
through a national immigration law. Since 2008, UK governments have published the
immigration policy framework that marked a shift in the priorities on immigration
policy through the adoption of a points-based system. This new system is specifi-
cally designed to select individuals with skills regarded as beneficial to the national
economy. However, since 2011, the UK policy has aimed to reduce net-migration by
restricting inflows of non-European Area (EEA) net migration and encouraging the
outflows of non-EEA nationals to affecting the size and the composition of UK mi-
grant workforce. An annual cap of 20,700 was introduced to the number of non-EEA
nationals who apply under Tier 2 visa. The cap created an upper limit on the number
of workers that employers could sponsor to come from overseas. It also revised some
characteristics of the vacancies according to minimum skill, appropriate salary rates,
and English language thresholds. In this way, the UK government gave more empha-
sis on the concepts of "skill needs" and "skill shortages." The ’Shortage Occupation’
(SOL) in this respect was introduced to list job categories in a shortage condition
of natives filling their positions. It implies that the vacancies in this list should fill
with immigrants giving them priority in the VISA selection. The system has quickly
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become a criteria-based system via minimum skill and pay thresholds, which reacts to
the demands of the national need through a priority criteria that incorporate various
protections for resident workers, which have a priority in the labor market. This anal-
ysis has exploited an exogenous reform in 2011 intending to understand the impact
of an institutional change in policy at a national level. In this setting, this implies
to quantify how a policy change in the VISA selection affects the group of shortage
occupations compared with the differences in the other Tier 2 occupations before and
after the 2011 Reform. Moreover, this analysis has exploited the Brexit referendum
to observe if it has caused an impact and to which extent, on the same professional
categories. The main dataset used is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly data
released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), which it is the official source of
information on labor market outcomes in the UK. By paying attention to tier 2, the
focus has been on shortage and no shortage occupations. The second source concerns
confidential data on the Certificate of Sponsorship (CoS) collected through a Freedom
of Information (FOI) Requests process from the UK Home Office. These specifically
concerns the occupation breakdown of restricted CoS granted from years from 2009
to 2018 to identify the CoS demand at the professional level. The third source is
a dataset on minimum salary thresholds at the professional level by looking at the
Codes of practice for Tier 2 Sponsors. It sets out the skill level and the appropri-
ate salary rate for jobs. The contribution of this analysis mostly relies on a merged
dataset that exploits variations in high-skilled and especially in labor shortages at the
occupation level conditioned on information on CoS granted as well as on minimum
salary thresholds. The third chapter has taken advantage of a ’natural’ experiment in
the UK by investigating how tightness in a selective policy affects the selectivity and
the quality of immigrants and the effects on real shortages in the labor market. To the
best of my knowledge, this analysis represents the first exercise in this respect. This
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challenge has been possible under a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis, which in
this case estimates the impact of a policy interpreted as an exogenous shock made
by the Government in the selection of people in the labor market. Such institutional
changes have influenced access to some categories of works (treated) and not others
(control) by observing both groups before and after the event of interest. The first
causal identification regards the effect of a policy change on the average wages for
the period between 2009 and 2013. By using a difference-in-differences method, the
treatment effect tests whether the policy implemented in 2011 can affect the wage
outcome of shortage occupations compared with individuals in non-shortage profes-
sions. Moreover, we test this effect by exploiting a triple-difference estimation, which
allows differentiating by groups, namely EU citizens and non-EU immigrants, and
UK-born workers. A first descriptive examination of the CoS and salary thresholds
shows that the visas issued for shortage occupations have increased over time. The
result is confirmed by looking at the differences in the minimum salary thresholds
among groups. Results from estimation show, on average, a negative impact of the
reform to the wage of shortage occupations compared to the control group. This
effect is more harmful to immigrants compared to the UK-natives. Thus, these re-
sults from the empirical analysis confirm that hiring workers in shortage occupation
has increased, but this has not caused adverse effects on native wages. The reform
was thus able to increase the migration levels in target occupations, revealing that
this policy may be effective in addressing skill needs in the short run. However, the
lower level of wages in shortage occupations seems to confirm that the selection of
immigrants based on shortage is not the top-level of skill distributions. The second
part of the analysis shows the results for the period between 2014 and 2018. In this
case, an" identifying" effect involves an extensive margins view by exploiting a policy
announcement, namely the Brexit referendum, on the same treatment and control
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groups. In this case, the DID estimation highlights a positive effect on the shortage
of occupation after the treatment, while a slightly positive impact on the treatment
of immigrants compared to the natives. The analysis shows a slight increase in the
average wage both for EU citizens (by 2,1%) and non-EU immigrants by 0,9%. How-
ever, the average salary of the EU individuals in shortage occupations has decreased
after 2016. This is true even in relative terms in comparison with the salaries of both
natives and non-EU immigrants. This estimation result is in line with the UK gov-
ernment policy currently based around the notion that bringing in migrants alleviates
skill shortages. However, the wage gap effect between groups is decreasing compared
to the previous analysis conducted for 2009-2013. In this case, the impact of tightness
in the policy on the quality of immigrants is more ambiguous. These results reveal
that natives are, in part, affected by immigration in shortage categories. However,
these small adverse effects on wages explain the reduction of the occupational groups
in the Labor Force Survey for the period between 2014 and 2018. These results are
consistent with the literature on the effects of immigration on native wages that ex-
ploits a natural experiment (see, for instance, Card, 1990; Friedberg, 2001), which
find limited evidence on an adverse effect of immigration on natives’ labor market
outcomes. Some criticisms of this policy reside in the definition of skill shortages.
While the reform has been effective in reaching its goals in the first period, the effect
on the second period is more ambiguous. For this reason, this analysis represents a
preliminary study and raises some further research questions on the effectiveness of
a selection policy based on skill-needs.
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A.1 Basic Model of Immigration
Before Immigration:
• Under the pre-immigration labour market equilibrium, LD workers are employed
at WD in the destination that represents the country with the higher wages.
• On the contrary, in the origin, such as the country with lower wages, Lo workers
are employed at wage Wo.
After immigration:
• LD +M workers result to be employed at wage WD+M in the destination
• LO −M workers are employed at wage WO-M in the origin, generating a new
equilibrium
Figure A.1: Basic Model of Immigration
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Basic Model of Immigration with Costs
Figure A.2: Basic Model of Immigration with costs
• Each immigrant incurs a fixed cost equal to C.
• In equilibrium, workers migrate until WD ∗ ∗ − C = WO ∗ ∗, which occurs at
L ∗ ∗.
• The shaded area is the loss in social welfare due to migration costs compared
with costless migration.
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Effects of immigration in the destination with upward-sloping labor
supply
Figure A.3: Basic model with upward-sloping labor supply
• Immigration causes the supply of labour to shift to the right.
• The wage falls from WD to W ′D.
• The number of natives employed falls from LD to LN .
• The number of immigrants employed is L′D − LN
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The effects of Immigration on Labor Demand
Figure A.4: Labor Demand
• Immigration increases both labor supply and labor demand.
• However, the increase of labor demand is assumed to be smaller than the in-
crease in labor supply
• The wage falls from WD to W ′D.
• The number of employed natives falls from LD to LN
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Effects of immigration when immigrants and natives are complements
Figure A.5: Basic model when immigrants and natives are complements
• Immigration increases demand for workers who are complements to immigrants
in production.
• The increase in labor demand causes the wage to rise from WD toW ′D and the
number of employed natives to rise from LD toL′D
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Effects of immigration with skilled and unskilled workers
Figure A.6: Effects of immigration with skilled and unskilled workers
• In (a), an increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers due to skilled
immigration reduces the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers.
• In (b), a decrease in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers due to unskilled
immigration raises the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers.
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The role of Physical Capital
Figure A.7: Basic Model with Physical Capital
In the short run, physical capital is fixed.
• Over time, physical capital adjusts.
• This causes labor demand to become more elastic and the labour demand curve
to become flatter.
• The decrease in wages as a result of immigration is therefore smaller in the long
run (WLR > WSR)
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A.3 Appendix Chapter 3
A.3.1 Standard Occupation Classification
The basic element in SOC2000 and SOC2010 classification is the concept of “job”
which allows a classification into groups and sub-groups according to the concepts
of “skill level” and “skill specialization”. Skill level is defined with respect to the
duration of training and/or work experience recognized in the field of employment
concerned as being normally required in order to perform the activities related to a
job in a competent and efficient manner. Furthermore, skill levels are approximated
by the length of time deemed necessary for a person to become fully competent in the
performance of the tasks associated with a job. In this respect, the broad structure of
the classification is composed by four skill levels: the first skill level is related to the
competence associated with a general education; the second skill level covers all of
which require the knowledge provided by a good general education but which typically
have a longer period of work-related training or work experience; the third skill level
applies to occupations that normally require a body of knowledge associated with a
period of post-compulsory education but not normally to degree level; the fourth skill
level relates to what are termed “professional” occupation and high level managerial
positions in corporate enterprises or national/local government.
Skill specialization is defined as the field of knowledge required for competent,
through and efficient conduct of the tasks. This last criterion has been used to
distinguish groups of occupations within each skill level. Furthermore, the revised
structure identifies a number of supervisory occupations as unit groups within Inter-
national Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO08). ISCO-08 is a four-level
hierarchically structured classification that aggregates all jobs into 130 minor groups,
43 sub-major groups and 10 major groups, based on their similarity in terms of the
skill level and skill specialization. In this respect, SOC2010 consists in nine major
groups, 25 sub-major groups, 90 minor groups and 369 unit groups, defined in terms
of general nature of the qualifications, training and experience associated with compe-
tent performance of tasks in the occupation classified within each major group Under
Tier 2 Visa, the data required the analysis of the major groups 1, 2, 3 and 5 and the
sub-major groups and the minor groups. They are reported in the following tables.
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Table A.1: Sub major groups in SOC2010
Skill Level SOC 2010 Sub-Major groups
Level 4 11 Corporate managers and directors
21 Science, research, engineering and technological professionals
22 Health professionals
22 Teaching and educational professionals
24 Business, media and public professionals
Level 3 12 Other managers and proprietors
31 Science, engineering and technology associate professionals
32 Health and social care associate professionals
33 Protective service occupations
34 Culture, media and sports occupations
35 Business and public service associate professionals
51 Skilled agricultural and related trades
42 Skilled mental, electrical and electronic trades
53 Skilled construction and building trades
54 Textiles, printing and other skilled trades
Level 2 41 Administrative occupations
42 Secretarial and related occupations
61 Caring personal service occupation
62 Leisure, travel and related personal service occupations
71 Sales occupations
72 Customer service occupations
81 Process, plant and machine operatives
82 Transport and mobile machine drivers and operatives
Level 1 91 Elementary trades and related occupations
92 Elementary administration and service occupations
Table A.2: Major Group 1: Managers, Directors and Senior Officials
Major Group 1 11 Corporate managers and directors
Minor Group 111 Chief Executives and Senior Officials
Minor Group 122 Production Managers and Directors
Minor Group 123 Functional Managers and Directors
Minor Group 125 Financial Institution Managers and Directors
Minor Group 116 Managers and Directors in Transport and Logistics
Minor Group 118 Health and Social Services Managers and Directors
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Table A.3: Major Group 2: Professional Occupations
Sub-Major Group 21 SCIENCE, RESEARCH, ENGIN. & TECHNOLOGY PROFESSIONALS
Minor Group 221 Natural and Social Science Professionals
Minor Group 222 Engineering Professionals
Minor Group 223 Conservation and Environment Professionals
Sub-Major Group 22 HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
Minor Group 211 Health Professionals
Minor Group 222 Therapy Professionals
Minor Group 223 Teaching and Educational Professionals
Minor Group 224 Research and Development Managers
Minor Group 225 Teaching and Educational Professionals
Sub-Major Group 24 BUSINESS, MEDIA AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROFESSIONALS
Minor Group 241 Legal Professionals
Minor Group 242 Business, Research and Administrative Professionals
Minor Group 243 Architects, Town Planners and Surveyors
Minor Group 244 Welfare Professionals
Minor Group 245 Librarians and Related Professionals
Minor Group 246 Quality and Regulatory Professionals
Minor Group 247 Media Professionals
Table A.4: Major Group 3: Associate Professional and Technical Occupations
Sub-Major Group 31 SCIENCE, ENGIN. AND TECH. ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
Minor Group 311 Science, Engineering and Production Technicians
Sub-Major Group 32 HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE ASSOCIATE PROFESSIONALS
Minor Group 321 Health Associate Professionals
Sub-Major Group 34 CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORTS OCCUPATIONS
Minor Group 341 Artistic, Literary and Media Occupations
Minor Group 342 Design Occupations
Minor Group 243 Architects, Town Planners and Surveyors
Sub-Major Group 35 BUSINESS AND PUBLIC SERVICE ASS. PROFESSIONALS
Minor Group 323 Business, Finance and Related Associate Professionals
Minor Group 324 Sales, Marketing and Related Associate Professionals
Table A.5: Major Group 5: Skilled Trades Occupations
Sub-Major Group 52 Metal Forming, Welding and Related Trades
Minor Group 521 Science, Engineering and Production Technicians
Minor Group 523 Vehicle Trades
Sub-Major Group 54 TEXTILES, PRINTING AND OTHER SKILLED TRADES
Minor Group 343 Food Preparation and Hospitality Trades
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Table A.6: Tier 2 Occupation SOC2010
SOC Code Job Title
1115 Chief executives & senior officials 2312 Further education teaching professionals
1121 Production managers & directors in manufacturing 2314 Secondary education teaching professionals
2315 Primary & nursery education teaching professionals
1122 Production managers & directors in construction 2316 Special needs education teaching professionals
1123 Production managers& directors in mining and energy 2317 Senior professionals of educational establishments
1131 Financial managers and directors 2319 Teaching and other educational professionals n.e.c.
1132 Marketing and sales directors 2412 Barristers and judges
1133 Purchasing managers and directors 2413 Solicitors
1134 Advertising and public relations directors 2419 Legal professionals n.e.c.
1135 Human resource managers & directors 2421 Chartered & certified accountants
1136 Information tech. &telecommunications directors 2423 Management consultants and business analysts
1139 Functional managers &directors n.e.c. 2424 Business and financial project management professionals
1150 Financial institution managers & directors 2425 Actuaries, economists& statisticians
1161 Managers & directors in transport and distribution 2426 Business &related research professionals
1181 Health services and public health managers and directors 2429 Business, research and administrative professionals n.e.c.
2111 Chemical scientists 2431 Architects
2112 Biological scientists and biochemists 2432 Town planning officers
2113 Physical scientists 2433 Quantity surveyors
2114 Social & humanities scientists
2119 Natural & social science professionals n.e.c. 2434 Chartered surveyors
2121 Civil engineers 2436 Construction project managers and related professionals
2122 Mechanical engineers 2442 Social workers
2123 Electrical engineers 2443 Probation officers
2124 Electronics engineers 2449 Welfare professionals n.e.c.
2451 Librarians
2126 Design & development engineers 2452 Archivists& curators
2127 Production &process engineers 2461 Quality control & planning engineers
2129 Engineering professionals n.e.c. 2462 Quality assurance & regulatory professionals
2133 IT specialist managers 2463 Environmental health professionals
2134 IT project & programme managers 2471 Journalists, newspaper &periodical editors
2135 IT business analysts, architects and systems designers 2472 Public relations professionals
2136 Program & software development professionals 2473 Advertising accounts managers& creative directors
2137 Web design &development professionals 3113 Engineering technicians
2139 Information tech &a telecommunications professionals n.e.c.
3213 Paramedics
2141 Conservation professionals 3411 Artists
2142 Environment professionals 3412 Authors, writers & translators
2150 Research and development managers 3413 Actors, entertainers and presenters
2211 Medical practitioners 3414 Dancers and choreographers
2212 Psychologists 3415 Musicians
2213 Pharmacists 3416 Arts officers, producers and directors
2214 Ophthalmic opticians 3421 Graphic designers
2215 Dental practitioners 3422 Product, clothing and related designers
2216 Veterinarians 3532 Brokers
2217 Medical radiographers 3534 Finance and investment analysts and advisers
2218 Podiatrists 3535 Taxation experts
2219 Health professionals 3538 Financial accounts managers
2221 Physiotherapists 3541 Buyers and procurement officers
2222 Occupational therapists 3545 Sales accounts & business development managers
2223 Speech & language therapists 5215 Welding trades
2229 Therapy professionals 5235 Aircraft maintenance and related trades
2231 Nurses 5249 Electrical and electronic trades n.e.c.
2311 Higher education teaching professionals 5434 Chefs
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Table A.7: Shortage Occupation List SOC2010
1123 Production managers& directors in mining and energy
2112 Biological scientists and biochemists
2113 Physical scientists




2126 Design & development engineers
2127 Production &process engineers
2129 Engineering professionals n.e.c
2133 IT specialist managers
2135 IT business analysts, architects and systems designers
2136 Program & software development professionals







2425 Actuaries, economists& statisticians
2442 Social workers




3414 Dancers and choreographers
3415 Musicians
3416 Arts officers, producers and directors
3421 Graphic designers
3541 Buyers and procurement officers
5215 Welding trades
5235 Aircraft maintenance and related trades
5249 Electrical and electronic trades n.e.c.
5434 Chefs
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